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INTRODUCTION 
This u s e r ' s  manual was prepared as p a r t  o f  a  study performed a t  B a t t e l l e  
Northwest Laboratory f o r  t h e  U.S. Bureau o f  Mines under c o n t r a c t  No. 30225005. 
The o v e r a l l  o b j e c t i v e  o f  t h i s  study was t o  eva luate  formal  s a f e t y  assesssment 
methods u t i l i z e d  i n  t h e  nuc lear  and aerospace i n d u s t r i e s  t o  determine t h e  most 
useful  and e f f e c t i v e  methods f o r  technology t r a n s f e r  t o  t h e  m in ing  indus t ry .  
Each method was evaluated r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  s a f e t y  i n t e r e s t s ,  needs, and 
requirements of mine s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s .  Th is  i n f o r m a t i o n  was obtained through 
te lephone and personal i n te rv iews  w i t h  mine s a f e t y  personnel and a  t o u r  of an 
o p e r a t i n g  underground m i  nee Resu l ts  o f  t h e  i n t e r v i e w s  were u t i l i z e d  t o  develop 
eva lua t ion  c r i t e r i a  i n  areas i n c l u d i n g  t h e  complexi ty o f  t h e  methods, data and 
resources ava i  l a b l e  a t  mines t o  perform t h e  analyses, t r a i n i n g  and educat ional  
requ i  rements f o r  per forming t h e  analyses, responsi veness t o  mine operator  
sa fe ty  needs, and cost-ef fect iveness.  The eva lua t ion  c r i t e r i a  were used t o  
examine and s e l e c t  formal system s a f e t y  assessment methods t h a t  a re  most 
s u i t a b l e  f o r  t r a n s f e r  t o  t h e  m in ing  i n d u s t r y  a t  t h i s  t ime. 
The o b j e c t i v e  o f  t h i s  u s e r ' s  manual i s  t o  present t h e  sa fe ty  techniques 
se lec ted  f o r  d i r e c t  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  t h e  m in ing  i n d u s t r y  i n  a  s e l f - t e a c h i n g  
workbook format f o r  use by mine s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s .  The r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  
i n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  mine s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s  and t h e  eva lua t ion  o f  t h e  var ious methods 
considered a re  contained i n  a  separate r e p o r t  prepared f o r  t h i s  p r o j e c t .  This 
u s e r ' s  manual conta ins  in fo rmat ion  r e l a t i n g  t o  o n l y  those methods recomnended 
f o r  use a t  t h i s  t ime  i n  t h e  m in ing  indus t ry .  Add i t i ona l  methods may be useful 
i n  t h e  f u t u r e  as mine safe ty  personnel ga in  more e x p e r t i s e  and experience i n  
implementing formal  s a f e t y  ana lys i  s  technology. These methods are described i n  
t h e  p r o j e c t  f i n a l  repor t .  
Sections i n  t h i s  manual a re  prov ided f o r  each o f  t h e  recommended sa fe ty  
ana lys i s  methods. Each sec t ion  conta ins  a  general d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  the  method, a  
d e t a i  l e d  d iscuss ion of t h e  ana lys i s  procedure, advantages and disadvantages o f  
t h e  method, an example problem t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  ana lys i s  procedure, and an 
es t imate  o f  t h e  costs  requ i red  t o  perform t h e  ana lys is .  
A f u r t h e r  o b j e c t i v e  o f  t h i s  study was t o  eva luate  t h e  a d a p t a b i l i t y  of t h e  
recommended methods t o  a  u s e r - i n t e r a c t i v e  computer system. A computerized 
s a f e t y  ana lys i s  program cou ld  b e n e f i t  t h e  m in ing  i n d u s t r y  by inc reas ing  the  
e f f i c i e n c y  of mine s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s ,  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  comprehensiveness o f  t h e  
ana lys i s  w i t h o u t  l a r g e  increases i n  costs,  and reduc ing t h e  amount o f  t ime 
r e q u i r e d  t o  perform and update t h e  ana lys is .  Conceptual computer f lowchar ts  
were developed f o r  each recommended method and a re  descr ibed i n  each sect ion.  
The s a f e t y  assessment methods descr ibed i n  t h i s  use r ' s  manual a r e  
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  many d i f f e r e n t  m in ing  s i t u a t i o n s  and cond i t ions.  Each method 
conta ins  fea tu res  t h a t  make i t  more appropr ia te  than o thers  f o r  ana lyz ing 
c e r t a i n  s i t u a t i o n s .  For example, one se lec ted method i s  human re1 i a b i  1  i t y  
ana lys i s  (HRA). As i t s  name impl ies ,  HRA i s  used p r i m a r i l y  t o  examine t h e  
human element o f  a  system t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  causes o f  human performance 
e r r o r s .  This ana lys i s  may focus on improv ing procedures o r  on a  b e t t e r  design 
o f  t h e  man-machine i n t e r f a c e  systems. A second se lec ted technique i s  c a l l e d  
Management Ove rs igh t  and R i s k  Tree (MORT) Ana lys is .  MORT i s  a  t o t a l  s a f e t y  
program concept  t h a t  focuses on programmatic c o n t r o l  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  s a f e t y  
hazards. It i s  designed t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n s  o f  t h e  complex management- 
worker-machine system t o  de te rmine  t h e  causes o f  t h e  c o n t r i  b u t i n g  f a c t o r s  t o  
p o t e n t i a l  acc iden ts .  A l though MORT was o r i g i n a l l y  designed as an acc iden t  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  t o o l ,  i t  has a l s o  found w ide  a p p l i c a t i o n  i n  t h e  development and 
e v a l u a t i o n  o f  system s a f e t y  programs and procedures. 
The s e l e c t i o n  o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  s a f e t y  assessment method shou ld  cons ide r  
what k i n d s  o f  m i n i n g  s i t u a t i o n s  a r e  t o  be ana lyzed and what r e s u l t s  a r e  
r e q u i r e d  f rom t h e  a n a l y s i s .  Tab le  1 c o n t a i n s  a  l i s t i n g  o f  t h e  recomnended 
s a f e t y  a n a l y s i s  methods i n  t h i s  u s e r ' s  manual, t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n s  each method i s  
b e s t  designed t o  examine, and t h e  expec ted  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s  methods. 
The reade r  i s  u rged t o  c o n s u l t  t h i s  t a b l e  f o r  t h e  purposes o f  choosing t h e  most 
u s e f u l  and a p p r o p r i a t e  system s a f e t y  a n a l y s i s  method f o r  s p e c i f i c  a p p l i c a t i o n s .  
It shou ld  be no ted  t h a t  t h e  method d e s c r i p t i o n s  p r o v i d e d  i n  t h i s  u s e r ' s  
manual a r e  i n  some cases n o t  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  mine s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s  t o  pe r fo rm  
t h e  ana lyses  w i t h o u t  f u r t h e r  i n fo rma t i on .  MORT a n a l y s i s  and human r e 1  i a b i  l i t y  
a n a l y s i s  techn iques  a r e  complex and r e q u i r e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  more i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  
pe r fo rm  them adequate ly  t han  t h i  s  document can p rov ide .  Therefore,  t h e  
d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  t hese  methods a r e  1  i m i  t e d  t o  i n t r o d u c t o r y - l e v e l  t u t o r i a l  - t ype  
i n f o r m a t i o n .  The d e t a i  1s o f  t h e  techn iques  f i l l  e n t i r e  t ex tbooks  and cannot  be 
repea ted  i n  f u l l  here. If t h e  reade r  wishes f u r t h e r  i n f o r m a t i o n  r e g a r d i n g  
t h e s e  methods, a p p r o p r i a t e  re fe rences  t o  documents and s h o r t  -courses a r e  
p rov ided .  These methods c o n t a i n  many s u b t l e  i t ems  and m i n u t e  d e t a i l s  t h a t  a r e  
desc r i bed  and d iscussed t o  a  g r e a t  e x t e n t  i n  t h e  r e f e r e n c e  documents and s h o r t -  
courses.  A  thorough unde rs tand ing  o f  t hese  d e t a i l s  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  pe r fo rm  
these  methods e f f e c t i v e l y  and adequate ly .  The i n f o r m a t i o n  p resented  i n  t h i s  
u s e r ' s  manual f o r  MORT and human r e l i a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  i s  i n tended  t o  summarize 
t h e  most i m p o r t a n t  aspec ts  o f  t h e  method and prompt t h e  reader  t o  o b t a i n  
f u r t h e r  i n f o r m a t i o n .  The d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  p r e l i m i n a r y  hazards a n a l y s i s ,  f a i l u r e  
modes and e f f e c t s  a n a l y s i  s, b i n a r y  ma t r i ces ,  and consequence a n a l y s i s  a r e  
s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  t h e  a n a l y s t  t o  use i n  p e r f o r m i n g  t h e  analyses.  
One f u r t h e r  p o i n t  t h a t  shou ld  be emphasized b e f o r e  t h e  methods a r e  
p resen ted  and d iscussed i s  t h a t  t h e  methods a r e  t o o l s  t h a t  h e l p  t h e  a n a l y s t  
t o  o r g a n i z e  a  s a f e t y  ana l ys i s .  The t o o l s  a r e  used t o  make a  good sa fe t y  
o f f i c i a l  b e t t e r  by enhancing t h e  completeness o f  t h e  s a f e t y  program and 
f o c u s i n g  f u r t h e r  s a f e t y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  on impo r tan t  areas. The s a f e t y  program 
s t i l l  r e q u i r e s  a  ded i ca ted  and knowledgeable a n a l y s t  f o r  i t  t o  be implemented 
s u c c e s s f u l l y .  Use o f  t h e  methods w i l l  make t h e  s a f e t y  program more s t r u c t u r e d  
and t hus ,  t h e r e  w i l l  be l e s s  chance o f  o m i t t i n g  impo r tan t  s a f e t y  concerns. 
TABLE 1. - Cross-reference of recommended safety analysis methods, thei r 
applications and expected results 
SAFETY 
ASSCGSPWNT 
NETllOD SUGGESTED APPLICATIONS EXPECTED RESlJLTS 
Pre l i r inary  llazards . Appl lcable t o  a l l  types o f  nines and a l l  mining sl tua- , Tabular compllatlon of hazards, potent lal  accidents, 
Analysis tlons. effects, and ex ls t ing and/or potent la l  preventlve o r  
correct lve measures. 
. Inexpensive but comprehensive analysls. 
. Checkl 1st o r  hazardous condl tlons. 
. Ident l f lcat lon o f  hazardous condltlons. potent lal  
accidents and result lng effects on plant personnel and . Ident l f lcat lon of ways t o  reduce occurrence o f  severe 
property. accidents wi th  less mpliasls on n l t l g a t l o n  o f  alnor 
accldents. 
. Useful f o r  ident i fy ing broad areas o r  functions 
requir ing accident prevent ion o r  mi t lgat  ion masures. 
Fai lure llodes and . Applicable to  a l l  types o f  nlnes and a l l  ml t~ lng , Tabular c ~ l l a t l o n  o f  the causes o f  equipment mal- 
Etfects Analysis s i  tuatlons. functions and the i r  resu l t lng ef fects  on the system 
C, 
C, 
. Ilardriare- and equlpulrnt-oriented approacli. . Checklist o f  c r i t i c a l  Items whose f a l l u r e  w l l l  pro- 
duce hazardous condltlons. 
. Ident i f ies  effects of potent lal  equipment malfunctlons 
oti the operation of tlie sys tm and safety o f  personnel. . Ident l f lcat lon o f  ways t o  reduce occurrence o f  accl- 
dents caused bJt equipment malfunctlons. 
. Useful fo r  Ident i fy ing Jeta l led design areas requlr lng 
accident prevention or  mi t igat ion measures. 
Consequence Analysls . Applicable to  a l l  types o f  nlnes and a l l  mlnlng sl tua- . Estimated severlty o f  potent lal  accldents. 
tlons. 
Estimates sever1 ty  o f  accldents , Could be qual l ta t lve o r  quant l tat lve. 
. Requires other type o f  analysls t o  Iden t i f y  potent la l  
accident sequences. 
TABLE 1. - (continued) 
Bit~ary Matrices 
HORT Analysis 
. Applicable to  a l l  types of mines and a l l  mininq si tua- . Two dimensional matrix Indicat ing whether par t icu lar  
t lons. cwnponents interact  w l th  each o t l ~ e r  conrponent l n  the 
system. 
. Ident i f les  interactions between compo~ients o r  sub- 
systems f o r  system description purposes. . Can be used as a self-checking device t o  ensure that a l l  
potent la l  Interactions between cnmponents have been con- 
. Usually applies t o  hardware - oriented si tuat ions but sidered i n  other analysts techniques. 
sui table f o r  examining human interactions and task 
procedures. 
. Usually performed i n  conjunction w i th  other safety 
analysis methods. 
. Useful f o r  reviewing resul ts from other analysis tech- 
niques t o  determine potent ia l  e f fec ts  o f  accidents on 
other parts o f  a system. 
. Evaluation o f  managevent safety practices, specif l c  . Ident i f  l ca t ion  o f  management strengths and weaknesses 
accident control practlces. task procedures. and I n  the safety area. 
hunan ermrs.  
Accident investigation techniq~te . Ident i f i ca t ion  o f  causes o f  speci f ic  accidents related to  
Technique t o  enhance and improve safety t ra in ing management practices. human errors. task procedure errors. 
and hardware fai lures.  
Helps to  plan accident prevention program 
. Ident i f i ca t ion  o f  potent la l  system changes that can prevent 
or reduce the severity o f  accldents. 
Human Re l i ab i l i t y  , Applicable to  mining situations where human er ror  i s  . Cmpl la t ion  o f  tasks. steps i n  task. and performance 
a potent ia l  cause o f  accidents o r  can contribute t o  shaping factors associated with each functioa i n  the 
inadequate accident mitigation. system. 
. Applicable t o  a l l  types o f  mines. . L is t i ng  o f  e r ro r - l i ke l y  situations. 
. Ident i f ies  human and si tuat lonal  character ist ics . Identification o f  potent ia l  causes o f  h w 1 1  errors. 
that  can cont r ib~t te  t o  accident i n l t i a t l o n  or  pro- 
pagatlon. . Ident i f i ca t ion  o f  cl~anjes i n  procedures o r  the design o f  
the w r k  s ta t ion  (including equipment) that can reduce 
. Examines hunan performance shaplng factors that  can e r ro r - l i ke l y  situations. 
contribute t o  the occurrence o f  hazardous conditions 
and accidents. . Ident i f i ca t fon  of ways t o  reduce a c i d  t s  involving human error.  including many minor (injuges and 
"material hand1 ing" accldents. 
PRELIMINARY HAZARDS ANALYSIS 
Pre l im ina ry  hazards a n a l y s i s  (PHA) i s  a  use fu l  s a f e t y  assessment method i n  
which p o t e n t i a l  hazards i nhe ren t  i n  a  system and t h e i r  e f f e c t s  a r e  evaluated. 
PHA i s  a  broad, al l-encompassing study, u s u a l l y  performed e a r l y  i n  t h e  design 
stages of f a c i  1  i t i e s  t o  i d e n t i f y  hazards be fo re  c o n s t r u c t i o n  i s  s t a r t e d ,  t h e r e -  
by a l l o w i n g  changes f o r  improved s a f e t y  a t  r e l a t i v e l y  low cos t  be fo re  t h e  
system o r  component has been completed o r  i n s t a l l e d .  However, PHA can be 
performed a t  any t i m e  and i s  a  p a r t i c u l a r l y  usefu l  t o o l  f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  areas 
o f  concern f o r  a  s a f e t y  program. A  major  goal o f  PHA i n  t h i s  a p p l i c a t i o n  i s  t o  
prevent  acc iden ts  t h a t  have occur red i n  i d e n t i c a l  o r  s im i  l a r  systems. 
The o b j e c t i v e s  o f  a  PHA a r e  t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  hazardous cond i t i ons  
i n  a  system and eva luate  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  p o t e n t i a l  accidents.  From t h e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  developed d u r i n g  a  PHA, design and procedural  s a f e t y  requirements 
can be e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  w i l l  h e l p  prevent  o r  c o n t r o l  these hazardous 
cond i t i ons .  Performance o f  a  PHA on an opera t i ng  m in ing  system would h e l p  t h e  
mine s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s  t o  foresee hardware, procedur.al , and system i n t e r f a c e  
problem areas. Resu l t s  o f  a  PHA can a l s o  h e l p  t o  i d e n t i f y  areas t h a t  need 
f u r t h e r  a n a l y s i s  and p o i n t  o u t  ways i n  which t o  m i t i g a t e  hazardous cond i t i ons ,  
thereby improv ing operat ions.  
Anal v s i  s  Procedure 
The procedure f o r  per forming a  p r e l i m i n a r y  hazards a n a l y s i s  i s  descr ibed 
i n  t h i s  sec t ion .  The reader should recognize t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  s tep i n  per forming 
a  PHA, o r  any o t h e r  s a f e t y  technique,  i s  t o  o b t a i n  a thorough working knowledge 
of t h e  system under ana lys is .  It i s  use fu l  t o  break t h e  system down i n t o  major  
subsystems o r  func t i ons .  Funct iona l  diagrams can be drawn t h a t  show t h e  
process f low of ma te r ia l s .  For example, o re  haulage a t  some mines cons is t s  o f  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  sequence o f  opera t ions :  (1) l o a d  o r e  i n t o  s h u t t l e  car ,  ( 2 )  move 
t h e  s h u t t l e  c a r  t o  dumping s t a t i o n ,  ( 3 )  dump ore  i n t o  o r e  chute l ead ing  t o  
h o i s t i n g  bucket, ( 4 )  h o i s t  bucket  t o  sur face,  ( 5 )  dump o re  i n t o  sur face 
conveyor b e l t ,  and (6 )  move o r e  t o  m i l l  o r  r a i l  c a r  l o a d i n g  s t a t i o n .  
Funct iona l  diagrams a l s o  show t h e  i n t e r f a c e s  between elements o f  a  system. It 
i s  a l s o  use fu l  t o  prepare n a r r a t i v e  d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  t h e  func t i ons  and 
opera t ions  of a1 1  subsystems and components. I n t e r f a c e s  w i t h  o the r  subsystems 
and components should be c l e a r l y  def ined.  Often, t h e  process o f  go ing through 
these two system d e s c r i p t i o n  exerc ises  he lps  t o  i d e n t i f y  p o t e n t i a l  s a f e t y  
problem areas. 
The second s tep  i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s  procedure i s  t o  s e l e c t  t h e  format f o r  t h e  
ana lys is .  A  common format f o r  a  PHA i s  a  columnar form w i t h  s p e c i f i c  e n t r i e s  
t h a t  r e f l e c t  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  determined from each s tep  o f  t h e  ana lys is .  This 
t ype  o f  format i s  used because i t  a l l ows  a  way t o  search and. record  s p e c i f i c  
i n f o r m a t i o n  rega rd ing  t h e  system and i s  a l s o  a  c h e c k l i s t  t h a t  guides and 
s i m p l i f i e s  t h e  a n a l y s i s  process. In format ion  i n  a  t a b u l a r  format i s  e a s i l y  
r e t r i e v a b l e  once i t  has been recorded. Th is  makes i t  simple t o  search f o r  
s p e c i f i c  areas t o  reco rd  a d d i t i o n a l  o r  updated i n f o r m a t i o n  as i t  becomes 
a v a i l a b l e .  Table 2 con ta ins  an example format f o r  a  PHA. I n s t r u c t i o n s  given 
on Table 2  a r e  in tended t o  descr ibe  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  requ i red  i n  each column. 
There have been many PHA formats used i n  t h e  past ;  some have as few as f o u r  
TABLE 2. - P r e l i m i n a r y  hazards a n a l y s i s  f o rma t  
-- - 
P R ~  u ~ r ~ i  i i i i i i ~ X  
MEASURES 
- - - - -  
l h l s  c o l u n  I l s t r  
ex l s t i ng  pnven- 
t l v e o r c ~ t m l  
sasu res  that  
m l t l p t e  l den t l -  
f l ed  hazardous 
condl t Ions and/or 
po len t l a l  accl- 
Qn ts .  I t  m y  
a lso be used f o r  
m c o u ~ n d l n g  
wasures t o r  
ml t lga t lan.  
l le lght o f  operator's 
cab. as we l l  as 
shielding. should 
9 r o tec t  afety glasses operators. 
should be worn. 
Machlnery I s  &st@ 
t o  wl thsland 
l rpact  fmw 
f ragun ts  . 
- - - - - - -- - 
POTENTIAL -+ 
IAZARMUS CONDJTI(W 
--- -- -. - - 
I h l s  c o l t r n  
I Jen t l f l es  
hdzardouscwrdl- 
t lons that could 
resu l t  f r ov  the 
In terac t  lo11 o f  
tire systew and 
each hazardnus 
e l rw r~c t  Ira the 
sy s t e r  
F ly lng luck 
fragments 
COIIWEWT 
- - ----- 
fh ls  colum J I t r t l f l e s  
tlte Itarbtare o r  
functlunal e leur~ct  





I h l s  c o l u n  lden- 
t l f l r s  the posslble 
t f f e c t s o f t h e  
potentla) accl-  
dent. should I t  
occuc 
Injury;  possible 
m c h l n t  Lmge 
. - E"Eicu 
POTENTIAL ACCIDfNT 
- -- ---- -- 
I h l s  c o l m t  
l den t l f l es  un- 
des l redeven tso r  
fau l ts  that could 
cause the hazar- 
dous condl t i on  
t o  be transfonred 
i n t o  the l h n t l -  
f l e d  p o t c r ~ t l r l  
accident 
Operator donnlrole 
I--- -  - ---- 
POTENT~ AI 
ACCIDENT 
I h l s  c o l u n  l L n -  
t i  f l us  potent la l  
acc lden ts tha t  
could resu l t  fmm 
the l k n t l f l e d  
hazardous 
condl t lons 
Operator h l  t by 
f l y l n g  rock 
f raylae~tts 
M ~ R R ~ S  
ELEIYNT 
TJtls c o l u n  
lc lent l f les 
hazardous 
elene~tts 
present I n  
the h a r k r r e  
o r  funct lon 
Rock 
-- 
EVENT c r r t d i n ~  
IIAZARWUS COHDITIW 
- -- ---- --- 
l h l s  colmm ldmtl- 
f i es  condltlons. 
undeslredevents. 
o r  f au l t s  that 
could cause the 
hazardous e leaaent 
t o  be t ransformd 
I n t o  tha l d e n t l f l e d  
hazardous condl t l on  
i rpact  h w m r  
fracturing rock 
columns and o the rs  have up t o  t e n  columns o r  more. It i s  be l i eved  t h a t  use of 
t h e  8-column format shown i n  Table 2 i s  a  good t r a d e - o f f  between p o s s i b l y  
o v e r s i m p l i f y i n g  t h e  ana lys i s  (and t h e r e f o r e  o m i t t i n g  some d e t a i l  ) and i n c l u d i n g  
such a  great  amount of d e t a i l  t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t s  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  locate .  
S e t t i n g  up t h e  format f o r  t h e  a n a l y s i s  can be f a c i l i t a t e d  by break ing t h e  
o v e r a l l  system down i n t o  subsystems as was descr ibed p rev ious l y .  The a n a l y s i s  
fo rmat  can a l s o  f o l l o w  t h i s  subd iv i s ion .  I n  o t h e r  words, t h e  ana lys t  breaks 
t h e  m i n i n g  system down i n t o  subsystems, such as v e n t i l a t i o n ,  h o i s t i n g ,  o re  
haulage, r a i l c a r  load ing,  etc., and examines each subsystem one a t  a  t ime. It 
i s  usefu l  t o  i d e n t i f y  each component o f  each subsystem and address t h e  
hazardous c o n d i t i o n s  assoc ia ted w i t h  them, no ma t te r  how u n l i k e l y  o r  minor they  
appear. Th is  i s  t o  ensure t h a t  t h e  a n a l y s t  thorough ly  examines each s i t u a t i o n  
and so i s  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  over look  some hidden i n t e r a c t i o n  o r  hazard. 
The nex t  s tep i s  t o  beg in  ana lyz ing  t h e  m in ing  system one i t e m  a t  a  t ime. 
The a n a l y s t  begins by i d e n t i f y i n g  p o t e n t i a l l y  hazardous elements o r  components 
i n  t h e  system. Hazardous elements a r e  de f i ned  as any i t e m  o r  f u n c t i o n  which 
th rea tens  something o f  value. The key idea i s  t h a t  something i s  a t  r i s k  when 
t h e  hazardous element i s  w i t h i n  t h e  system. Th is  something may be personnel, 
ope ra t i ng  cos ts ,  p roper t y ,  p roduc t i on  schedules, etc., a l though t h e  method i s  
u s u a l l y  used f o r  de termin ing t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  i n j u r y  t o  persons o r  damage t o  
proper ty .  Hazardous elements a r e  o f t e n  ca tegor i zed  as e i t h e r  hazardous energy 
sources o r  hazardous processes and events, as shown i n  t h e  c h e c k l i s t  i n  Table 3 
(Lambert 1975, Hammer 1972). Hazardous energy sources a r e  hazardous by 
themselves when re leased i n  a  system; i .e., t h e  f low o f  energy from these 
sources causes personnel i n j u r y  and p r o p e r t y  damage. Hazardous processes and 
events a r e  e i t h e r  phys i ca l  o r  chemical processes t h a t  produce hazardous 
c o n d i t i o n s  when they  i n t e r a c t  w i t h  t h e  system. The c h e c k l i s t s  shown i n  Table 3 
a r e  useful  t o o l s  f o r  the' i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  bas i c  hazards t h a t  may be 
assoc ia ted w i t h  a  m in ing  system. 
The nex t  s tep i n  t h e  PHA procedure i s  t o  i d e n t i f y  events t h a t  cou ld  
p o s s i b l y  t rans fo rm t h e  hazardous elements i n t o  p o t e n t i a l  accidents.  These 
events a re  c a l l e d  " t r i g g e r i n g  events"  o r  "causat ive  f a c t o r s "  and can be 
cond i t i ons ,  undesired events, o r  f a u l t s  w i t h i n  t h e  system. For example, a  
s p i l l  o f  a  flammable l i q u i d  such as d i e s e l  f u e l  o i l  does n o t  cause a  f i r e  by 
i t s e l f .  However, i f  an i g n i t i o n  source i s  present ,  such as a  bare e l e c t r i c a l  
w i re ,  a  spark can t r i g g e r  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f i r e  accident .  T r i g g e r i n g  events a r e  
impor tant  f a c t o r s  i n  a  PHA. Experience i n  t h e  aerospace and nuc lear  i n d u s t r i e s  
has shown t h a t  acc idents  o f t e n  do n o t  have a  s i n g l e  random event as t h e i r  
cause, bu t  a r e  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  a  sequence o f  events which together  generate t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  accident .  Th is  general p r i n c i p l e  a l s o  a p p l i e s  t o  acc idents  i n  t h e  
m in ing  i ndus t r y .  
The framework f o r  PHA of ten  i nc ludes  some eva lua t i on  o f  t h e  importance o f  
each hazard. Th is  i s  commonly done by rank ing  hazards accord ing t o  t h e i r  
e f fec ts .  Hazards a r e  ca tegor i zed  by some rank ing  scheme t h a t  considers t h e  
magnitude o f  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  accidents.  Many rank ing  schemes have been used i n  
t h e  past .  Some were developed f o r  a  s p e c i f i c  system and a r e  n o t  d i r e c t l y  
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  mining. One t h a t  i s  s imple  bu t  s t i l l  p rov ides f l e x i b i l i t y  and i s  
TABLE 3. - Check l i s t s  of p o t e n t i a l  hazards 
HAZARDOUS ENERGY SOURCES 
Fuel s  
Exp los ive  Charges 
Charged e l e c t r i c a l  capac i to rs  
Storage b a t t e r i e s  
Pressure conta iners  
Spring-1 oaded devi  ces 
Suspension systems 
Mechanical equipment 
9. Mine Gases 
10. E l e c t r i c a l  generators 
11. Radioact ive  energy sources 
12. F a l l i n g  o b j e c t s  
13. Heat ing devices 
14. Pumps, blowers, fans 
15. R o t a t i n g  machinery 
16. Impact ing machinery 
HAZARDOUS PROCESSES AND EVENTS 
Acce le ra t i on  
Conveying 
Corrosion 
E l e c t r i c a l  
shock 
thermal 
i nadver ten t  a c t i v a t i o n  
power source f a i  l u r e  
e lec t romagnet ic  r a d i a t i o n  
Explosion 
F i r e  
Heat and temperature 
h igh  temperature 
1  ow temperature 
temperature v a r i a t i o n s  
D r i l l i n g  
Excavation 
Mois ture  - h i  gh humid i ty  
V i b r a t i o n  
Ox idat ion  
Pressure 
h i  gh pressure 
1  ow pressure 
r a p i d l y  changing pressure 
Rad ia t ion  
thermal 
e lectromagnet i  c  
i o n i z i n g  
u l t r a v i o l e t  
Mechanical shock 
Chemi c a l  rep1 acement , etc .  
H o i s t i n g  ( k i n e t i c  energy) 
C l  imbi  ng 
usefu l  f o r  t h e  m in ing  i n d u s t r y  i s  shown i n  Table 4. It i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
d i s t i n g u i s h  between some o f  t h e  ca tegor ies  shown on t h i s  tab le .  The boundaries 
between t h e  ca tegor ies  a re  n o t  w e l l  def ined.  Thus, which category a  p a r t i c u l a r  
hazard i s  p laced i n  depends upon t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  ana lys t .  The hazard 
r a n k i n g  i s  p laced i n  t h e  column l a b e l e d  "e f fec t . "  
The next  s tep  i n  t h e  PHA i s  t o  determine what acc ident  prevent ion  measures 
a re  present ,  whether p reven t i ve  measures should be taken, and what p reven t i ve  
measures cou ld  be o r  should be used. The rank ing  scheme descr ibed above shows 
which hazards and p o t e n t i a l  acc idents  should be r e c e i v i n g  p reven t i ve  o r  
c o r r e c t i v e  ac t i on .  I f  no p reven t i ve  measures a r e  prov ided f o r  a  Class 111 o r  
Class I V  hazard, t h e  ana lys t  must decide on t h e  measures t o  be taken. Two 
courses o f  a c t i o n  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  (Lambert 1975) : ( 1 )  c o r r e c t i v e  ac t i on ,  which 
TABLE 4. - Categories f o r  rank ing  t he  seve r i t y  of hazards (James (ed) 1969) 
HAZARD CATEGORY EFFECT ON SYSTEM 
Class I 
Class I 1  
Class 111 
Class I V  
Ne li i b l e  - l oss  of funct ion t h a t  has 
--e9Tf no e e c t  on system 
Marginal - degrades system t o  some 
ex ten t  bu t  does no t  cause system t o  be 
unavai l a b l e  
C r i t i c a l  - t h i s  hazard w i l l  completely 
degrade t h e  system 
Catastrophic - t h i s  f a u l t  w i l l  produce 
severe consequences 
can take  t he  form of design changes, procedural changes, or  changes i n  t he  
mission goals (such as s lowing a process down s l i g h t l y  t o  reduce t r a f f i c -  
r e l a t e d  hazards), and (2 )  contingency ac t i on  which can take  t he  form of 
p r o t e c t i v e  systems reac t i ng  t o  various accidents o r  t r a i n i n g  o f  personnel. 
Some examples of p ro tec t i ve  systems i n  the  min ing i ndus t r y  are methane 
detectors,  oxygen detectors,  f i r e  detectors,  and automatic s p r l  nk l e r  systems. 
This e s s e n t i a l l y  completes t h e  procedure f o r  performing a PHA. A sumary 
o f  t h e  steps invo lved i n  a PHA i s  shown i n  Table 5. It should be noted t h a t  a 
PHA i s  a dynamic, con t inu ing  process. The PHA should be updated, revised, and 
expanded throughout t h e  l i f e - c y c l e  o f  t h e  system being analyzed. 
Advantages and Disadvantaqes 
PHA has t h e  advantage t h a t  i t  i s  a very simple sa fe ty  assessment method 
t h a t  q u a l i t a t i v e l y  considers a l l  aspects o f  a system. Almost anyone w i t h  a 
de ta i l ed  knowledge o f  t h e  system being analyzed can perform a thorough, 
comprehensive PHA. The PHA technique i s  r e l a t i v e l y  cos t - e f f ec t i ve  i n  t h a t  i t  
i s  no t  a time-consuming approach. A f u r t h e r  advantage i s  t h a t  PHA r e s u l t s  i n  
an easy-to-read, h i gh l y  v i s i b l e  record o f  t he  analysis.  
The greatest  disadvantage o f  a PHA us ing a columnar format i s  t h a t  t he  
analyst  may f a l l  i n t o  what i s  c a l l e d  a " f o r m - f i l l i n g  mode." This i s  where t he  
analys t  i s  simply f i l l i n g  out a form. There are many sub t le  items and minute 
d e t a i l s  t h a t  are important t o  t he  system operat ions t h a t  w i l l  be missed if the  
analys t  i s  performing a PHA i n  t h i s  manner. The analys t  i s  cautioned t o  
thoroughly examine each en t r y  on t h e  PHA t a b l e  i n  order t o  consider these 
de ta i l s .  A f u r t he r  disadvantage o f  PHA i s  t h a t  i t  i s  no t  quan t i ta t i ve .  For 
example, t h e  analys t  w i l l  no t  be ab le  t o  d i s t i ngu i sh  b z e e n  accidents t h a t  
cause one death o r  m u l t i p l e  deaths and frequent o r  infrequent accident 
occurrence ra tes  from in fo rmat ion  on t he  PHA tab le .  
TABLE 5. - Step-by-step procedure f o r  performing a 
p r e l i m i n a r y  hazards a n a l y s i s  
Step 1: Obtain an adequate working knowledge o f  the-  system. 
Step 2: Set up t h e  PHA format:  D i v i d i n g  t h e  l a r g e  system i n t o  subsystems, 
such as t h e  v e n t i l a t i o n  system, h o i s t i n g  system, etc., i s  he lp fu l .  
L i s t  t h e  components and equipment i n  each subsystem. 
Step 3: I d e n t i f y  p o t e n t i a l l y  hazardous elements o r  components i n  t h e  
system: The ana lys t  w i l l  f i n d  t h a t  c h e c k l i s t s  are  a u s e f u l  t o o l ,  
Step 4: Se lec t  a p a r t i c u l a r  subsystem. 
Step 5: I d e n t i f y  t r i g g e r i n g  events o r  causat ive  f a c t o r s  t h a t  cou ld  
t rans fo rm t h e  hazardous elements i n t o  p o t e n t i a l  accidents.  Begin 
w i t h  a p a r t i c u l a r  component o f  t h e  subsystem, analyze a l l  hazardous 
elements assoc ia ted w i t h  t h a t  component, and i d e n t i f y  t h e  t r i g g e r i n g  
events, Record on PHA tab le .  
Step 6: Evaluate " c r i t i c a l i t y "  o f  p o t e n t i a l  acc ident  sequences i d e n t i f i e d  
i n  Step 5. I n  o the r  words, rank t h e  hazards i n t o  t h e  ca tegor ies  
shown i n  Table 4. Record rank ings on PHA t a b l e  under " e f f e c t " ,  
Step 7: Determine p reven t i ve  o r  c o r r e c t i v e  measures t h a t  a re  present  and 
f u r t h e r  measures t h a t  c o u l d  o r  should be taken. Record these 
measures on t h e  PHA tab le .  
Step 8: Repeat steps 5, 6, and 7 f o r  each component and hazardous element 
i n  t h e  subsystem. The a n a l y s t  should complete t h e  examination o f  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  component be fo re  c o n t i n u i n g  t o  t h e  next. 
Step 9: Select  a second subsystem and repeat  t h e  ana lys i s  procedure, Steps 
9 6, /, 8. 
Step 10: Use t h e  r e s u l t s  t o  recommend design and procedural  s a f e t y  changes 
t h a t  can reduce acc idents ,  i n- jur ies ,  and p roper t y  damase. 
Example o f  Ana lys is  Procedure 
L e t  us now cons ider  an example t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  procedure and r e s u l t s  o f  
a PHA. The example system used here i s  a mine h o i s t i n g  system f o r  haulage o f  
men (see F igu re  1) .  Th i s  example assumes t h a t  t h e  h o i s t i n g  system i s  be ing  
used d u r i n g  s h a f t  s i n k i n g  operat ions.  The ana lys t  f i r s t  proceeds t o  l i s t  t h e  
subsystems and components t h a t  a r e  requ i red  f o r  t h e  h o i s t i n g  system t o  
func t i on .  I n  t h i s  case, t h e  component l i s t  i nc ludes  such i tems as t h e  bucket, 
w i r e  rope, headframe, sheaves, h o i s t ,  s h a f t  c o l l a r  doors, and t h e  c o n t r o l  

subsystem. Once a l l  o f  t h e  components have been i d e n t i f i e d ,  t h e  ana lys t  
consu l t s  t h e  hazardous element c h e c k l i s t  (see Table 3)  t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  
hazardous elements assoc ia ted w i t h  each component. For example, t h e  bucket i s  
a  moving ob jec t ;  thus  k i n e t i c  energy i s  one hazardous element. The bucket  i s  
a l s o  used t o  convey heavy ob jec ts  t h a t  may f a l l  ou t  o f  t h e  bucket. The 
hazardous element i n  t h i s  i ns tance  i s  p o t e n t i a l  energy. It i s  recomnended t h a t  
t h e  a n a l y s t  praceed t o  examine every column o f  t h e  PHA one component a t  a  
t ime. I n  t h i s  manner, t h e  a n a l y s t  does n o t  have t o  sw i t ch  h i s / h e r  t h i n k i n g  
about a  s p e c i f i c  hazard t o  go on t o  t h e  nex t  component, thereby i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  
chances of  o m i t t i n g  some d e t a i l s .  I n  o the r  words, t h e  PHA form should be 
f i l l e d  f rom l e f t  t o  r i g h t  r a t h e r  than from t o p  t o  bottom. 
The next  s tep  i s  t o  cons ider  t h e  hazardous c o n d i t i o n  and t h e  events which 
c o u l d  cause t h e  hazardous cond i t i on .  For t h e  personnel bucket, l ower ing  and 
r a i s i n g  t h e  bucket i s  an event  t h a t  cou ld  cause a  hazardous c o n d i t i o n  on ly  i f  
personnel a r e  w a i t i n g  f o r  t h e  bucket (i.e., i n  t h e  energy path). If proper t y  
damage was o f  concern, i tems o f  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  pa th  o f  t h e  bucket cou ld  be a  
p o t e n t i a l l y  hazardous c o n d i t i o n  b u t  does no t  become one unless t h e  bucket i s  
moving. Cont inuing across t h e  PHA t a b l e  (see Table Z ) ,  t h e  next  two columns 
a r e  f o r  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  acc ident  and t h e  event  t h a t  cou ld  cause t h e  p o t e n t i a l  
accident .  The event  causing t h e  p o t e n t i a l  acc ident  i s  one which i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  
t rans fo rm t h e  hazardous c o n d i t i o n  i n t o  an accident .  For t h e  above hazardous 
c o n d i t i o n  o f  people i n  t h e  path  o f  t h e  bucket, and t h e  bucket moving, t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  acc ident  i s  one where t h e  bucket s t r i k e s  personnel, caused by 
personnel near t h e  t r a v e l  pa th  o f  t h e  bucket be ing unaware o f  an approaching 
bucket. Th i s  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  recorded i n  app rop r ia te  columns o f  t h e  PHA tab le .  
The a n a l y s t ' s  nex t  s tep  i s  t o  examine t h e  f i n a l  two columns o f  t h e  PHA 
t a b l e ,  e f f e c t s  and p reven t i  v e / c o r r e c t i  ve measures o f  t h e  same p o t e n t i a l  
accident .  P o t e n t i a l  e f fec ts ,  i n  t h i s  case se r ious  i n j u r y ,  a r e  recorded i n  t h e  
former column. The l a t t e r  column l i s t s  e x i s t i n g  p reven t i ve  o r  c o r r e c t i v e  
measures t h a t  m i  t i  gate t h e  p o t e n t i  a1 hazardous cond i t i ons  and/or p o t e n t i  a1 
accidents.  I n  t h e  example case, warning l i g h t s  a r e  prov ided t h a t  warn people 
o f  t h e  approaching bucket. Th is  column can a l s o  be used f o r  recomnending 
a l t e r n a t i  ve o r  a d d i t i o n a l  p r e v e n t i  v e / c o r r e c t i  ve measures. 
The ana lys t  cont inues s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  examining every hazardous element o f  
every component under cons idera t ion .  The r e s u l t  i s  a  t a b u l a r  l i s t i n g  of 
p o t e n t i a l  acc idents  and t h e i r  e f f e c t s ,  such as t h e  example PHA shown i n  
Table 6. The goal o f  t h i s  t ype  o f  a n a l y s i s  i s  t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  
acc idents  which cou ld  cause se r ious  personnel i n j u r y  o r  death and w i t h  t h i s  
i n fo rma t ion ,  e l i m i n a t e  o r  m i t i  gate t h e  hazard through t r a i n i n g ,  sa fe  opera t i ng  
procedures, sa fe ty  equipment, desi  gn changes, o r  whatever means a r e  p r a c t i c a l  . 
Mine s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s ,  i f  they  had t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  such an ana lys i s ,  would be 
equipped w i t h  enough safe ty  i n fo rma t ion  and a  general knowledge o f  t h e  cos ts  
f o r  improv ing s a f e t y  i n  s p e c i f i c  areas t h a t  t hey  would be ab le  t o  eva luate  t h e  
cos ts  and b e n e f i t s  o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  sa fe ty  feature.  I f  t h e  a n a l y s t  wishes, cos t  
i n f o r m a t i o n  cou ld  be i nc luded  i n  t h e  column f o r  c o r r e c t i v e  and prevent ive  
measures. One o f  t h e  advantages of  a  PHA i s  t h a t  i t  does no t  i n v o l v e  complex 
mathematics o r  s t a t i s t i c s  and t h e r e f o r e  can be performed adequately by t h e  
people who know t h e  most about t h e i r  s p e c i f i c  mine, t h e  s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s ,  
TABLE 6 .  - Example page f rom a completed p r e l i m i n a r y  hazards 
Buc ktl t 
Shaft co l l a r  
b r  s 
Elect r lca l  
51 1.u~ tora 1 
fa i lure 
(.url.us lua 
Pc~wrrr source fa i l u re  
Personnel wait ing Personnel blear t ra -  
f o r  bucket vel path o f  bucket 
unaware o f  veblc l e  
approach 
Bucket lorded a) Palh o f  the 
Lucket obstructe 
b) Bucket overloaL 
I Ooors f a l l  t o  open a) Bucket (lorded) I caring up 
b) Bucket ( lwded)  
going dorm 
Hedkel~ed rofw Loaded bucket I 
Ueahelud r q w  I Loaded bucket 
b1g11 slrrface fray Lorded bucket 
o r  pinches rope 1 
ana lys i s  
- 7 n ~ i h i  i h i  P~TiTiif v 2 f l c t i i T C  
ACC l DENT 
- -- -- ------ 
EFFECT AASURES C---l-- 
Personnel struck by 
tho bucket 
h k e t  t i l t s ;  w n  
f a l l  f raa bucket 
Serious In ju ry  Approach warnlng 
l i g h t s  




Col l  ls ion o f  bucket Personnel in jury /  --- 
w i th  door/rope death 
fa i l u re  I I 
Fewpercelved 
obstacles I n  
pathway; bucket 
u s 1  t i l t  i n  
excess o f  60' 
t o  s p l l l  passea- 
Rope f a l l s  
Collision of bucket ILulses to  personnel Top lander I s  
wl th  door I I observing opera- t i o n  - can warn 
Rope fa l ls ;  bucket InJury/dortb t o  Factors o f  safetJ 
and personnel f a l l  personnel; equip- load l l m l t  
1 I aeo t davge I 
InJury/daath t o  
personnel 
ROW f a i l s  
1 
gers. 
L i d  ted cargo 
space; rope 
safety factors. 
Injury/death t o  Dai ly inspection/ 
personnel I ma l n t e ~ n c o .  Test run a t  s h i f t  s t a r t  
w i t h o u t  a great  deal o f  spec ia l  t r a i n i n g .  Furthermore, PHA i s  a comprehensive 
ana lys i s  t h a t  can be a p p l i e d  t o  a l l  p a r t s  o f  a m i n i n g  system i n  regard  t o  a l l  
k i nds  o f  hazardous cond i t ions .  
It i s  be l i eved  t h a t  PHA i s  adaptable t o  a computer system. With today ' s  
r e l a t i v e l y  compact computer systems, a computerized PHA would, a t  t h e  very  
l e a s t ,  increase t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  t h e  t i m e  s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s  spend a t  t h e i r  
desks. Moreover, w i t h  increased e f f i c i e n c y  a t  t h e i r  desks, t h e  s a f e t y  s t a f f  
would be f r e e  t o  devote more t i m e  t o  c o r r e c t i n g  and p reven t ing  hazardous 
cond i t i ons  a t  t h e  mine. According t o  mine s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s ,  computers a r e  
c u r r e n t l y  be ing  used a t  mines f o r  such purposes as long-term mine planning,  
maintenance planning,  accounting, and warehousing. More ex tens i ve  use o f  
computers i s be ing  planned f o r  t h e  coming years. Therefore, enough computer 
o p e r a t i n g  and programming c a p a b i l i t y  i s  i n  use a t  mines today t o  recommend t h a t  
t h e  computerized s a f e t y  a n a l y s i s  be considered. 
The authors  were no t  ab le  t o  i d e n t i f y  any computer programs which have 
been w r i t t e n  f o r  PHA. A conceptual computer f l owchar t  i s  descr ibed here f o r  
i 1 l u s t r a t i o n  purposes. More research i s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h e  development o f  t h i s  
program. 
As c u r r e n t l y  envis ioned,  t h e  conceptual PHA computer program cons is t s  o f  
two par ts .  The f i r s t  p a r t  i s  t h e  ac tua l  performance o f  a PHA on a computer and 
t h e  second p a r t  i s  t h e  use and upda t ing  o f  t h e  r e s u l t s .  The f i r s t  p a r t  i s  a 
u s e r - i n t e r a c t i  ve scheme where t h e  computer d i sp lays  quest ions i n  t h e i r  proper 
sequence corresponding t o  t h e  l a b e l s  o f  t h e  columns o f  t h e  PHA tab le .  I n  
a d d i t i o n  t o  i n p u t t i n g  t h e  hazard i n f o r m a t i o n  i n t o  t h e  computer memory, t h e  
ana lys t  i s  t o  index each component and some d e s c r i p t i v e  i n fo rma t ion  (such as 
work environment, l o c a t i o n ,  s i ze ,  weight ,  etc.).  The index ing  scheme w i l l  be 
used i n  t h e  second p a r t  o f  t h e  PHA computer program. 
Table 7 shows an example t h a t  i l l u s t r a t e s  how t h i s  process would work. 
The computer asks t h e  ana lys t  t o  i n p u t  t h e  name o f  t h e  mine subsystem be ing 
analyzed (such as v e n t i l a t i o n  system, h o i s t i n g  system, etc. ) ,  t h e  component, 
component index number, and any impor tant  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  Next, t h e  computer 
asks t h e  ana lys t  t o  l i s t  t h e  hazardous elements assoc ia ted w i t h  t h e  component 
be ing  examined. The check l i s t  of hazardous elements (Table 3 )  cou ld  be 
d i sp layed  on t h e  computer mon i to r  t o  a s s i s t  t h e  a n a l y s t ' s  se lec t i on .  Then t h e  
computer asks t h e  ana lys t  t o  i n p u t  t h e  event causing t h e  hazardous cond i t i on ,  
t h e  p o t e n t i a l  acc ident ,  and so on, u n t i l  t h e  ana lys i s  i s  complete. The r e s u l t  
i s  a PHA t h a t  has been i n p u t  t o  a computer memory and thus  i s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  key- 
word searches, updates, and modi f ica t ions .  A conceptual f l o w  c h a r t  f o r  t h e  
computerized PHA i s  shown i n  F igu re  2. 
The second p a r t  o f  t h e  computerized PHA i s  t h e  use and updat ing  o f  t h e  
r e s u l t s .  F i r s t ,  impor tant  r e s u l t s  can be t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  a spec ia l  program 
module t h a t  s e l e c t s  and p r i n t s  impor tant  components, c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  and 
TABLE 7. - Conceptual i n p u t  format f o r  a  
computerized, u s e r - i  n t e r a c t i  ve PHA 
pppp - - - - -  - - - - - 
QUESTIONS ASKED BY COMPUTER ANALYST'S RESPONSE 
Subsystem name? Example: Mine v e n t i l a t i o n  system 
Component name? Example: V e n t i l a t i o n  fan  
Component index number? Analyst  i n p u t s  a  s e r i e s  o f  charac ters  
t h a t  i d e n t i f y  t h e  subsystem and 
component. 
Impor tant  component c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ?  Ana lys t  i n p u t s  p e r t i n e n t  component 
in format ion ,  i n c l u d i n g  o p e r a t i n g  data 
and env i  ronment . 
Regula t ions  and p o l i c i e s  
rega rd ing  component? 
Analyst  i n p u t s  a  c ross- re ference index 
o f  p o l i c i e s  and regu la t i ons .  
What a r e  t h e  hazardous elements Analyst  i n p u t s  hazardous elements. 
assoc ia ted w i t h  t h i s  component? Computer can be programmed t o  d i s p l a y  
hazardous element c h e c k l i s t  t o  a i d  t h e  
ana lys t .  
What a re  t h e  events t h a t  c o u l d  Analyst  i n p u t s  a  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  
cause t h e  hazardous element t o  be t r i g g e r i n g  event. 
t rans formed i n t o  a  hazardous 
c o n d i t i o n ?  
(.. . , computer cont inues ask ing  (. . . , ana lys t  cont inues answering t h e  
quest ions  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  columns quest ions  asked by t h e  computer.) 
o f  t h e  PHA t a b l e  shown i n  Table 4 
and then  r e t u r n s  t o  examine any 
o t h e r  hazardous elements assoc ia ted 
w i t h  t h i s  component. A f t e r  
comple t ing  t h e  PHA o f  t h e  f i r s t  
component, a  second component may 
be examined, and a  t h i r d ,  and so 
on .) 
hazards so t h e  ana lys t  has a  c h e c k l i s t  t h a t  can be c a r r i e d  anywhere. Second, 
t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  t h e  computer memory can be searched f o r  key words and t h e  
component index number. Thus, t h e  i n fo rma t ion  i s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  updates, 
r e v i s i o n s ,  and changes t h a t  can be i n p u t  i n  a  s h o r t  p e r i o d  o f  t ime. S p e c i f i c  
i n f o r m a t i o n  regard ing any component o r  p o t e n t i a l  hazard can be made avai l a b l e .  

A f u r t h e r  i t e m  t h a t  mine s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s  have . ind icated would be useful  t o  
them i s  a  cross-reference t o  m in ing  r e g u l a t i o n s  and mine p o l i c y  statements. 
For instance,  i f  t h e  sub jec t  o f  some s a f e t y  concern i s  f i r e  ex t ingu ishers ,  t h e  
s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s  would l i k e  t o  be ab le  t o  go t o  t h e  computer and i n  a  shor t  
t ime  f i n d  out  where t o  look f o r  s p e c i f i c  r e g u l a t i o n s  and p o l i c i e s  regard ing 
f i r e  ex t ingu ishers .  Th is  e x t r a  program module has been inc luded  i n  Table 7  and 
F igu re  2. 
Estimated Costs o f  I m ~ l e m e n t a t i o n  
The cos ts  f o r  implementing a  PHA s a f e t y  program a t  a  mine are  est imated as 
fo l l ows .  F i r s t ,  t h e  cos ts  f o r  implementing a  PHA-type program w i thou t  
computers i s  dominated by t h e  cos ts  o f  labor.  It i s  est imated t h a t  a  d e t a i l e d  
PHA o f  a  m in ing  system would r e q u i r e  about 0.5 man-years o f  s a f e t y  s t a f f  
labor.  Assuming t h e  unburdened s a f e t y  s t a f f  l a b o r  r a t e  i s  $15.00/hr and adding 
overhead expenses, taxes, bene f i t s ,  and a  l a r g e  uncer ta in ty ,  l abo r  cos ts  t o t a l  
$23,000 t o  $30,000 f o r  performance o f  t h e  PHA. Since PHA i s  a  dynamic ana lys i s  
t h a t  must be updated and rev i sed  p e r i o d i c a l l y ,  i t  i s  est imated t h a t  3 t o  4  man- 
months/yr must be spent on t h i s  a c t i v i t y .  Thus, t o t a l  opera t ing  costs  
( i n c l u d i n g  u n c e r t a i n t y )  a r e  es t imated t o  be about $10,00O/yr-$15,00O/yr. 
The est imated cos ts  f o r  implementing a  computerized PHA inc ludes t h e  
c a p i t a l  cos ts  and i n s t a l l a t i o n  o f  t h e  computer system and sof tware i n  a d d i t i o n  
t o  s t a f f  l a b o r  costs. Costs o f  computer systems were developed from a  survey 
of a v a i l a b l e  microcomputer systems and a re  conserva t i ve l y  est imated t o  be about 
$5,000, i n c l u d i n g  d e l i  very, i n s t a l  l a t i o n  and suppl ies.  Annual supp l ies  and 
maintenance costs  a r e  assumed t o  be 10% per year  o f  t h e  i n i t i a l  c a p i t a l  costs.  
Also inc luded  i n  t h e  es t imated cos ts  f o r  a  computerized s a f e t y  program are  
costs  f o r  t h e  s a f e t y  s t a f f  t o  a t t e n d  short-courses on sa fe ty  ana lys i s  t r a i n i n g  
and computer t r a i n i n g  ( i n c l u d i n g  r e g i s t r a t i o n  fees, t r a v e l ,  1  i v i n g  expenses, 
and wages). These costs  a r e  developed i n  t h e  f i n a l  r e p o r t  o f  t h i s  study and 
t h e  assumptions and bases w i l l  n o t  be repeated here. The t o t a l  f i x e d  and 
opera t ing  costs  are  summarized below: 
FIXED COSTS 
Computer system purchase 
a n d i n s t a l l a t i o n .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  $5,000 
Short course attendance 
and expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  $ 9,000-12,000 
Ana lys t ' s  burdened l a b o r  costs  
I n i t i a t e  Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  $10,000-15,000 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Perform Analysi  s  $23,000-30,000 
TOTAL $47,000-62,000 
ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS 
Computer System Maintenance . .  . .  . . . . . . . .  $ 500/yr 
. . . . . . . . . . .  Ana lys t ' s  burdened l a b o r  cos ts  $10,000-15,00O/yr 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  TOTAL $10,500-15,500/yr 
Note t h a t  these est imates do n o t  con ta in  t h e  cos ts  f o r  developing t h e  computer 
sof tware.  These cos ts  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  es t imate  and i t  i s  no t  known a t  t h i s  
t i m e  whether they  w i l l  be p a i d  by t h e  m in ing  i n d u s t r y  o r  by government. There- 
f o r e ,  so f tware  development cos ts  w i l l  n o t  be i nc luded  i n  t h i s  ana lys is .  The 
reader should recognize t h a t  sof tware development cos ts  a re  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  
es t imated imp1 ementation cos ts  presented above. It should a l s o  be noted t h a t  
these cos ts  i nc lude  t h e  wages o f  mine s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s  and a re  thus  n o t  an 
a d d i t i o n a l  c o s t  f o r  mine operators. General ly ,  t h e  t ime  spent work ing on t h e  
s a f e t y  assessment would rep lace t h e  t ime  s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s  c u r r e n t l y  spend a t  
t h e i r  desks. 
FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
F a i l u r e  Modes and E f f e c t s  Ana lys is  (FMEA) i s  a  s a f e t y  assessment technique 
t h a t  was developed as a  means o f  assu r ing  t h a t  hardware and equipment a re  
r e l i a b l e  (Jordan 1972). FMEA i s  a  q u a l i t a t i v e  technique t h a t  i s  used t o  
analyze t h e  ways i n  which p a r t i c u l a r  p ieces o f  equipment can f a i l  ( f a i l u r e  
modes) and t h e  r e s u l t i n g  e f f e c t s  on t h e  system and personnel. Th is  technique 
i s  o f t e n  used t o  analyze a  system design t o  enable t h e  designer t o  l o c a t e  and 
i d e n t i f y  f a i l u r e  modes whose occurrence can cause l o s s  o f  system func t i on ,  
personnel i n  j u r y  and death, o r  p r o p e r t y  damage. Once these " c r i t i c a l  " f a 1  l u r e  
modes have been i d e n t i f i e d ,  t h e  designer i s  a b l e  t o  m i t i g a t e  t h e  s a f e t y  
problem through u t i  1  i z i n g  redundant components, p r o v i d i n g  a l t e r n a t e  opera t i ng  
modes, personnel t r a i n i n g  o r  o t h e r  a v a i l a b l e  means. Th is  technique i s  be ing  
used more and more e x t e n s i v e l y  t o  eva lua te  e x i s t i n g  and opera t i ng  i n d u s t r i a l  
processes and can be b e n e f i c i a l  i f  a p p l i e d  t o  a  m i n i n g  system. 
FMEA can be a p p l i e d  t o  a l l  types o f  mines and t o  a l l  m in ing s i t u a t i o n s .  
The tech ique  i s  comprehensive and simple. It can be performed adequately w i t h  
r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  t r a i n i n g .  The technique r e q u i r e s  a  d e t a i l e d  knowledge of t h e  
system be ing  analyzed, and t h u s  i s  most s u i t a b l e  f o r  t h e  mine safe ty  o f f i c i a l s  
t o  perform. The technique i s  useful  because i t  i s  a  systemat ic method t h a t  
i d e n t i f i e s  and eva luates  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  hazardous cond i t i ons ,  which a l l ows  t h e  
mine s a f e t y  people t o  p l a n  f o r  sa fe ty  and remove o r  c o r r e c t  hazards as they  a r e  
found. FMEA examines t h e  f a i l u r e s  o f  components o f  t h e  m in ing  system and 
eva luates  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  f a i l u r e s  on persons and o b j e c t s  a t  t h e  mine. The 
r e s u l t s  can be used as a  c h e c k l i s t  o f  hazards t h a t  t h e  mine s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l  can 
use t o  p l a n  c o r r e c t i v e  and p reven t i ve  measures t h a t  w i l l  e l i m i n a t e  o r  m i t i g a t e  
t h e  hazards. For these reasons, FMEA was se lec ted  as a  s u i t a b l e  sa fe ty  
a n a l y s i s  method f o r  technology t r a n s f e r  t o  t h e  m in ing  i ndus t r y .  
Analys i  s  Procedure 
The purpose o f  t h i s  subsect ion i s  t o  descr ibe  t h e  procedure f o r  performing 
an FMEA. The f i r s t  s tep  i n  t h e  performance o f  an FMEA i s  t o  o b t a i n  a  thorough 
knowledge of t h e  system. It i s  o f t e n  useful  i n  complex systems t o  break them 
down i n t o  major  subsystems and components. Funct iona l  diagrams t h a t  i d e n t i  fy  
t h e  subsystems accord ing t o  t h e i r  purpose o r  f u n c t i o n  a r e  a  most use fu l  way o f  
d e f i n i n g  t h e  system under ana lys is .  It i s  a l s o  extremely use fu l  t o  prepare 
d e s c r i p t i o n s  of  t h e  func t ions  o f  a1 1  subsystems and components. I n t e r f a c e s  
w i t h  o the r  components and subsystems should a l s o  be c l e a r l y  defined. The 
amount o f  d e t a i l  r e q u i r e d  depends upon t h e  uniqueness o f  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  
performed o r  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  item. An example o f  a  
func t i ona l  statement i s  presented l a t e r  i n  t h i s  sec t ion .  
The nex t  s tep  i s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  format t h a t  w i l l  be used i n  t h e  
ana lys i s .  The most comnonly used format i s  a  t a b u l a r  format w i t h  l abe led  
columns f o r  s p e c i f i c  e n t r i e s .  Many FMEA formats have been developed i n  t h e  
pas t  and some a re  more u s e f u l  than others. One format t h a t  i s  recomnended f o r  
use i n  t h e  m in ing  i n d u s t r y  i s  shown i n  'Table 8. Th is  format i s  r e l a t i v e l y  
s imple and con ta ins  t h e  i tems o f  most i n t e r e s t  t o  t h e  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y .  A lso  
i nc luded  on t h i s  t a b l e  i s  a  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  i n fo rma t ion  t h a t  should be 
TABLE 8. - Recommended format fo r  guiding and recording a  f a i l u r e  modes 
and e f f ec t s  analysis 
L 
D 
8. Exis t ing o r  
Recommended 
Correct i  ve 
Actions 
1. Name o f  element o r  component under analysis. Can use symbols and abbreviations t o  i d e n t i f y  components. 
2. Concise statement o f  the funct ion performed. 
3. Description o f  the f a i l u r e  mode (see Table 9) .  
4. Estimate the f a i l u r e  occurrence rate.  Usually t h i s  i s  a  numerical value, although descr ip t i ve  en t r ies  
may be used such as frequent, infrequent, not expected t o  occur, etc. 
5. A b r i e f  descr ipt ion o f  the e f f e c t  o f  the f a i l u r e  on the system, subsystem, and p lan t  personnel. 
6. Statement o f  the c r i  t i c a l  i t y  category (see Table lo). 
7. A descr ipt ion o f  the methods by which occurrence o f  the f a i l u r e  mode i s  detected. I f  not r ead i l y  
detectable, ind icate how tes t ing  o r  inspect ion could lead t o  detection. 
8. A descr ipt ion o f  the ex is t ing  o r  recommended correct ive actions t ha t  can el iminate the f a i l u r e  mode 
o r  minimize i t s  e f fec t .  
7. Detection 
Method 
5. Fa i lure 
E f fec t  
1. Item 
Iden t i f i ca t i on  
6. C r i t i c a l i t y  3. Fa i lure 
Mode 
2. Function 4. Fa i lure 
Rate 
recorded i n  each column. Th is  form i s  used as a  c h e c k l i s t  t o  guide t h e  
a n a l y s i s  and enables t h e  a n a l y s t  t o  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  and thorough ly  eva luate  t h e  
p l a n t  o r  process under cons idera t ion .  
The nex t  s tep  i n  t h e  FMEA i s  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  f a i l u r e  modes and t h e i r  
e f f e c t s .  The a n a l y s t  begins by s e l e c t i n g  a  s p e c i f i c  subsystem and l i s t i n g  t h e  
components of t h e  subsystem i n  t h e  f i r s t  column o f  t h e  FMEA tab le .  Next, t h e  
a n a l y s t  p i c k s  a  s p e c i f i c  component and w r i t e s  a  c l e a r ,  concise statement of t h e  
func t i on  t h e  component performs i n  column 2. I n  column 3, t h e  a n a l y s t  records  
t h e  s p e c i f i c  f a i l u r e  modes rega rd ing  t h e  component. Th i s  process can be a ided 
by c o n s u l t i n g  t h e  l i s t  o f  component f a i l u r e  modes shown i n  Table 9. Next, t h e  
a n a l y s t  es t imates  t h e  f a i l u r e  occurrence r a t e  f o r  t h e  f a i l u r e  mode o f  t h e  
component under ana lys is .  Th is  can be done by r e f e r r i n g  t o  handbooks o f  
f a i l u r e  r a t e  data o r  by u s i n g  a  d e s c r i p t i v e  appra i sa l  o f  t h e  f a i l u r e  r a t e  such 
as " f requent ,"  " inf requent ,"  "expected once pe r  year," o r  "not  expected t o  
The a n a l y s t  cont inues t o  column 5 o f  t h e  FMEA t a b l e  and records  a  
d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  f a i l u r e  on t h e  system, subsystem, and 
workers assoc ia ted w i t h  t h e  component. Th i s  column i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  u s e f u l  f o r  
i d e n t i f y i n g  i n t e r a c t i o n s  and i n t e r f a c e s  o f  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  component w i t h  o the r  
aspects o f  t h e  system under ana lys is .  A d e t a i l e d  knowledge o f  t h e  system i s  
r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h i s  step. It may be u s e f u l  f o r  t h e  a n a l y s t  t o  subd iv ide  column 5 
i n t o  t h r e e  columns, one f o r  system e f f e c t s ,  one f o r  subsystem ef fec ts , .  and one 
f o r  human e f f e c t s  t o  f u r t h e r  organize t h e  t h i n k i n g  process. Next, t h e  ana lys t  
eva luates  t h e  " c r i t i c a l i t y "  o r  importance o f  t h e  f a i l u r e .  Th is  process i s  
f a c i  1  i t a t e d  by t h e  use o f  " c r i t i c a l i t y  categor ies,"  which s imply c l a s s i f y  t h e  
s e v e r i t y  o f  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  f a i l u r e s .  A hazard c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  system 
TABLE 9. - L i s t i n g  o f  p o t e n t i a l  component f a i l u r e  modes (Gar r i ck  e t  a1 1967) 
Fa i  l u r e  t o  open 
F a i l u r e  t o  c lose  
F a i l u r e  t o  s t a r t  
Fai  1  u re  t o  cont inue opera t i on  
F a i l u r e  t o  s top 
Spurious f a i l u r e ,  i .e., premature opera t i on  o f  a  component 
when n o t  c a l l e d  f o r  
Degradation 
E r r a t i c  opera t ions  
Scheduled s e r v i c e  
Scheduled replacement 
recommended f o r  use by mine s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s  i s  shown i n  Table 10. See t h e  
s e c t i o n  d e s c r i b i n g  consequence a n a l y s i s  l a t e r  i n  t h i s  manual f o r  a d d i t i o n a l  
in format ion .  The ana lys t  eva luates  t h e  f a i l u r e  e f f e c t s  and assigns each 
component f a i l u r e  t o  a  c r i t i c a l i t y  category. Then t h e  ana lys t  records  t h e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  column 6 o f  t h e  FMEA tab le .  It should be noted t h a t  an FMEA 
does no t  normal ly  cons ider  "consequences" except i n  terms o f  system 
degradation. FMEA can do no more than spec i fy  t h e  degree of system (o r  
f u n c t i o n )  degradation. Thus, t h i s  column may be e m i t t e d  t o  a v o i d  con fus ing  t h e  
ana lys i  s. 
The a n a l y s t ' s  nex t  s tep  i s  t o  i d e n t i f y  and descr ibe  t h e  methods used t o  
de tec t  t h e  component f a i l u r e s .  I n  some cases, t h e  components a re  prov ided w i t h  
sensors t h a t  a l e r t  opera tors  o f  s p e c i f i c  problems. I n  o t h e r  cases, no sensing 
system i s  prov ided and f a i l u r e  i s  detec ted by i nspec t i on ,  t e s t i n g  and operator  
a t t e n t i o n .  I n  e i t h e r  case, t h e  a n a l y s t  should reco rd  t h i s  i n fo rma t ion  i n  
column 7. The f i n a l  column o f  t h e  suggested FMEA t a b l e  i s  used t o  reco rd  
d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  e x i s t i n g  o r  recommended c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  t h a t  can e l i m i n a t e  
t h e  f a i l u r e  mode o r  minimize i t s  e f f e c t .  Th is  i n f o r m a t i o n  can be determined 
u s i n g  t h e  a n a l y s t ' s  knowledge and experience, system designs, and c o r r e c t i v e  
measures used i n  r e l a t e d  systems. Vendor ca ta logs,  t r a d e  shows, i n d u s t r y  
p u b l i c a t i o n s ,  such as those pub l ished by t h e  American I n s t i t u t e  o f  Min ing 
Engineers (AIME) , and eng ineer ing  designs a re  p a r t i c u l a r l y  use fu l  sources o f  
p o t e n t i a l  p reven t i ve  and c o r r e c t i  ve measures. 
It i s  recommended t h a t  t h e  ana lys t  per form t h e  FMEA steps i n  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  order.  The t a b l e  should be completed f rom l e f t - t o - r i g h t  and no t  
f rom top-to-bottom. I n  o t h e r  words, t h e  ana lys t  should perform t h e  eva lua t i on  
and complete t h e  FMEA t a b l e  f o r  one component be fo re  c o n t i n u i n g  t o  a  second 
component. There are  many s u b t l e  i tems and d e t a i l s  t h a t  cou ld  be f o r g o t t e n  if 
t h e  ana lys t  swi tches from one component t o  another be fo re  comple t ing  t h e  
- 
e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  f i r s t .  I f  a  l e f t - t o - r i g h t  approach i s  used, t h e  ana lys t  i s  
TABLE 10. - Categories f o r  rank ing  t h e  s e v e r i t y  o r  " c r i t i c a l i t y "  
o f  p o t e n t i a l  acc idents  
HAZARD CATEGORY EFFECT ON SYSTEM 
Class I 
Class I 1  
Class 111 
Class I V  
Ne li i b l e  - l o s s  o f  f unc t i on  t h a t  has 
&%&-on system 
Mar i n a l  - degrades system t o  some 
ex ten t  u t  does no t  cause system t o  be -%
unava i lab le  
C r i t i c a l  - t h i s  hazard w i l l  complete ly 
degrade t h e  system 
Catastrophic - t h i s  f a u l t  w i l l  produce 
severe consequences 
l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  omi t  s u b t l e  d e t a i l s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  d e t a i l s  o f  t h e  component 
i n t e r f a c e s  and i n t e r a c t i o n s  w i t h  o the r  areas. 
The nex t  s tep  i n  t h e  performance o f  an FMEA i s  p repara t i on  of a  " C r i t i c a l  
Items L i s t . "  Th i s  l i s t  f a c i l i t a t e s  communication o f  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e s u l t s  
o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s  t o  management. The C r i t i c a l  I tems L i s t  i s  a l s o  useful  f o r  t h e  
sa fe ty  o f f i c i a l s  t o  c a r r y  w i t h  them on p e r i o d i c  i nspec t i ons  o f  t h e  m in ing  
system. The i n f o r m a t i o n  p laced on t h e  l i s t  c o n s i s t s  o f  components whose 
f a i l u r e  wi 11 produce hazardous c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  t h e  persons and p roper t y  
invo lved.  Th is  l i s t  i s  extremely u s e f u l  f o r  h e l p i n g  t h e  mine safe ty  o f f i c i a l  
i d e n t i f y  and c o r r e c t  hazardous c o n d i t i o n s  be fo re  they  r e s u l t  i n  an accident ,  
i.e., he lps  them t o  p l a n  f o r  sa fe ty .  A t y p i c a l  C r i t i c a l  I tems L i s t  conta ins  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i n fo rma t ion  f o r  each c r i t i c a l  component f a i l u r e :  
a I tem - I d e n t i f y  f u n c t i o n / i t e m  by name 
a F a i l u r e  mode - Concise statement o f  f a i l u r e  mode(s) (see Table 8) 
a F a i l u r e  r a t e  - L i s t  p r o b a b i l i t y  s t a t e d  i n  FMEA, such as probable, 
poss ib le ,  f requent ,  etc., o r  numeric f a i l u r e  r a t e  data i f  desired.  One 
c o u l d  ass ign gener ic number ranges t o  these terms; e.g., probable = 0.1 t o  
1 occurrence pe r  year ,  poss ib le  = 0.01 t o  0.1 p e r  year ,  e tc .  
a L i s t  page number o f  FMEA 
a C r i t i c a l i t y  category - Enter  t h e  a p p l i c a b l e  c r i t i c a l i t y  category s t a t e d  i n  
t h e  FMEA 
a Prevent ion /Cor rec t ion  - L i s t  e x i s t i n g  o r  recommended means f o r  e l i m i n a t i n g  
t h e  hazard o r  e x p l a i n  why t h e  c r i t i c a l  c o n d i t i o n  i s  n o t  o r  cannot be 
e l i m i n a t e d  o r  m i t i g a t e d .  
The p repara t i on  o f  t h e  C r i t i c a l  Items L i s t  i s  t h e  f i n a l  s tep  i n  per forming 
an FMEA. The r e s u l t s  a re  e s s e n t i a l l y  documented as t h e  a n a l y s i s  i s  performed. 
F i n a l  documentation of t h e  FMEA process should i n c l u d e  t h e  d e t a i l e d  system 
d e s c r i p t i o n ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  d e s c r i p t i o n s  and f l o w  diagrams, t h e  
completed FMEA tab les ,  and t h e  C r i t i c a l  Items L i s t .  A sumary  o f  t h e  FMEA 
a n a l y s i s  procedure i s  presented i n  Table 11. It should be noted t h a t  FMEA i s  a  
dynamic process t h a t  can and should accomnodate updates and r e v i s i o n s  t o  t h e  
system under ana lys i s .  Since a  m in ing  system i s  a l s o  cons tan t l y  changing, t h e  
FMEA approach i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s u i t a b l e  f o r  i n c o r p o r a t i n g  t h e  modi f ied  
i n fo rma t ion .  
Advantaqes and D i  sadvantaaes 
One o f  t h e  pr imary  advantages o f  t h e  FMEA i n  regard  t o  t h e  m in ing  i n d u s t r y  
i s  t h e  s i m p l i c i t y  o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s  procedure. No complex mathematics o r  
s p e c i a l i z e d  t r a i n i n g  i s  r e q u i r e d  o f  t h e  ana lys t .  Thus, t h i s  method can be 
learned and performed e f f e c t i v e l y  by mine safe ty  o f f i c i a l s  i n  a  sho r t  p e r i o d  of 
t ime. FMEA can be used i n  a l l  t ypes of m in ing  systems and i n  re ference t o  a l l  
k i nds  o f  s a f e t y  problems. The FMEA format prov ides an o r d e r l y  and s t r u c t u r e d  
TABLE 11. - Step-by-step procedure f o r  pe r fo rm ing  a  f a i l u r e  




Obta in  adequate wo rk ing  knowledge o f  t h e  system: 
H e l p f u l  t o  break system down i n t o  l a r g e  b locks .  Prepare 
f u n c t i o n a l  f l o w  diagrams and f u n c t i o n a l  statements. ' 
E s t a b l i s h  FMEA fo rmat :  Recommended fo rmat  shown i n  
T a b l e  1. 
S e l e c t  f i r s t  subsystem t o  be analyzed and l i s t  
components o f  subsystem i n  column 1 o f  FMEA t a b l e .  
Step 4 Se lec t  f i r s t  component f o r  a n a l y s i s .  
Step 5 Analyze f a i l u r e  modes o f  i n i t i a l  comoonent and t h e i r  
e t t e c t s :  Complete a n a l y s i s  o t  t h e  i n i t i a l  component by 
r e c o r d i n g  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  r e q u i r e d  i n  columns 2 th rough 8 
o f  t h e  FMEA t a b l e .  
Step 6 S e l e c t  and ana lyze  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  components o f  t h e  
f i r s t  subsystem: Repeat s t e p  5  f o r  each component. 
Step 7 Cont inue u n t i l  a l l  subsystems and components have been 
analyzed: Repeat s teps  4, 5, and 6 f o r  each subsystem. 
Step 8 Prepare C r i t i c a l  I tems L i s t :  For  components whose 
f a i l u r e  produces d e t r i m e n t a l  e f f e c t s  on t h e  subsystem 
f u n c t i o n  o r  personnel  ; c o n t a i n s  i n f o r m a t i o n  such as t h e  
c r i t i c a l  component, f a i l u r e  mode, f a i l u r e  rate,,page 
number where i t e m  i s  eva lua ted  on t h e  FMEA, c r i t i c a l i t y  
ca tegory ,  and p r e v e n t i  v e / c o r r e c t i  ve measures. 
examina t ion  o f  t h e  hazardous c o n d i t i o n s  i n h e r e n t  i n  an i n d u s t r i  a1 process.  
The advantage here  i s  t h a t  w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  an FMEA, t h e  mine s a f e t y  
o f f i c i a l s  may beg in  t o  p l a n  f o r  s a f e t y  by p r e v e n t i n g  o r  c o r r e c t i n g  hazardous 
c o n d i t i o n s  b e f o r e  t h e y  cause acc iden ts .  FMEA r e s u l t s  i n  a  h i g h l y  v i s i b l e  and 
o r d e r l y  d i s p l a y  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h a t  can accommodate updates and r e v i s i o n s  t o  
t h e  system under  ana l ys i s .  A f u r t h e r  advantage o f  FMEA i s  t h a t  t h e  C r i t i c a l  
I tems L i s t  p repared  f rom t h e  r e s u l t s  i s  a  u s e f u l  format f o r  communicat ing 
hazard  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  management and can a l s o  be used by mine s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s  
as a  c h e c k l i s t  t o  a s s i s t  i n  wa lk - th rough i n s p e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  m i n i n g  system. 
The main d isadvantage of FMEA i s  t h a t  i t  cons ide rs  o n l y  one f a i l u r e  d t  a  
t ime.  M u l t i p l e  and p r e - e x i s t i n g  f a i  l u r e s  a r e  n o t  no rma l l y  considered.  
However, t h e  a n a l y s t  can e n t e r  dual  component f a i l u r e s  i n  column 1 o f  t h e  FMEA 
t a b l e  and proceed as w i t h  any o t h e r  e n t r y .  There i s  no l i m i t a t i o n  on t h e  
number of com onents t h a t  can be cons ide red  s imu l taneous ly .  The a n a l y s t  i s  
a l s o  cau t i one  +T- o a v o i d  t h e  " f o r m - f i l l i n g  mode" i n  which t h e  a n a l y s t  t akes  t h e  
a t t i t u d e  t h a t  he o r  she i s  s imp l y  f i l l i n g  o u t  a  form. Many d e t a i l s  and s u b t l e  
i tems a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be o m i t t e d  i f  t h e  a n a l y s t  i s  pe r fo rm ing  t h e  FMEA i n  t h i s  
manner. 
E x a m ~ l e  o f  Ana lvs i  s  Procedure 
Th is  s e c t i o n  presents and discusses an example FMEA t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  
a n a l y s i s  procedure and r e s u l t s .  The example presented i s  a  p a r t i a l  a n a l y s i s  of 
an underground coa l  m in ing  system. The complete FMEA cannot be shown due t o  
i t s  length ;  thus  one page w i l l  be shown t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  mine 
v e n t i  l a t i o n  system. 
The f i r s t  s tep i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  mine v e n t i l a t i o n  system i s  t o  
desc r ibe  t h e  system under ana lys is .  One u s e f u l  method i s  t o  break t h e  
v e n t i l a t i o n  system down i n t o  major  b locks.  A b lock can be a  l a r g e  component 
(such as a  v e n t i l a t i o n  f a n  i n c l u d i n g  i t s  assoc ia ted connect ions),  f unc t i ona l  
subsystem (an arrangement o f  components t h a t  performs a speci  f i c  f u n c t i o n ;  f o r  
example an e l e c t r i c  subs ta t i on  o r  v e n t i l a t i o n  ductwork), l o c a t i o n  (such as a  
s p e c i f i c  l e v e l  o r  b u i l d i n g  o f  t h e  mine), s a f e t y  system, o r  o t h e r  major  p a r t  of 
t h e  mine. A s i m p l i f i e d  example o f  a  b lock  diagram o f  t h e  mine v e n t i l a t i o n  
system i s  shown i n  F igu re  3. 
As can be seen on F igu re  3, t h e  example v e n t i l a t i o n  system operates u s i n g  
t h e  exhaust p r i n c i p l e  where f r e s h  a i r  i s  drawn downward through t h e  i n t a k e  
tunne l  t o  t h e  underground areas by t h e  s u c t i o n  c rea ted  by a  l a r g e  exhaust fan 
a t  t h e  surface. There i s  one pr imary  f a n  and an i d e n t i c a l  standby fan  i n  case 
t h e  pr imary  f a n  f a i l s .  There i s .  a l s o  a booster  f a n  s t a t i o n  a t  an underground 
l e v e l  t h a t  reduces t h e  l o a d  and power requirements of t h e  l a r g e r  pr imary  fan 
The booster  f a n  a l s o  prov ides c h i l l e d  a i r  v i a  hard  p i p i n g  and c o l l a p s i b l e  
t u b i n g  d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  rock faces where coa l  i s  ex t rac ted.  I n  a  d e t a i l e d  
ana lys i s ,  t h e  design of  d r i f t s  and a i r  f l o w  separa t ion  techniques, such as 
regu la to rs ,  overcasts,  and stoppings, may be o f  i n t e r e s t .  For t h e  purposes of 
t h i s  i l l u s t r a t i o n ,  t h e  d e t a i  1s o f  t h e  underground a i r f l o w  paths and t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  e f f e c t s  o f  f u g i t i v e  a i r  losses w i l l  n o t  be examined. 
It i s  a l s o  useful  t o  prepare n a r r a t i v e  d e s c r i p t i o n s  of t h e  func t i ons  o f  
a l l  subsystems and components. The f u n c t i o n a l  statements should con ta in  c l e a r ,  
concise d e s c r i p t i o n s  of t h e  opera t i on  of each i tem. I n t e r f a c e s  and 
in te rconnec t ions  w i t h  o t h e r  components o r  subsystems a r e  impor tant  i tems and 
should be c l e a r l y  defined. An example o f  a  f u n c t i o n a l  statement i s  as f o l l o w s :  
Primary V e n t i l a t i o n  Fan: 
Provides f resh a i r  t o  miners w h i l e  downhole. A lso  requ i red  f o r  
d i l u t i o n  o f  p o t e n t i a l l y  harmful and exp los i ve  gases which a r e  l i b e r a t e d  by 
m in ing  a c t i v i t i e s .  Spec i f i ca t i ons :  240,000 cu.ft./min., 2000 hp, 
e l e c t r i c - d r i  ven, two-blade, prope l  l e r - t y p e  fan. Alarm a t  h i g h  motor 
temperature, low a i r  f low, and e l e c t r i c  power f a i l u r e .  Redundant standby 
f a n  provided. I n t e r f a c e d  w i t h  e l e c t r i c  power supply ( o f f - s i t e  and 
emergency standby on -s i te ) ,  v e n t i l a t i o n  exhaust shaf t , .  and f a n  exhaust 
tunne l .  
Th is  i n fo rma t ion  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  useful  f o r  e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  component 
f a i l u r e s .  

The next  s tep i n  t h e  ana lys is  i s  t o  es tab l i sh  t he  FMEA format t o  be used. 
The recomnended format was shown i n  Table 8. The analys t  i s  now ready t o  
analyze t h e  f a i l u r e  modes and t h e i r  e f fec ts .  The FMEA t h i s  example i s  based 
upon i s  shown i n  Table 12 f o r  t h e  reader t o  fo l low.  The process t he  analys t  
should go through t o  eva luate t he  pr imary v e n t i l a t i o n  exhaust fan ( f i r s t  i tem 
shown on Table 12) i s  as fo l lows.  F i r s t ,  t he  component name i s  recorded i n  
column 1. I n  column 2, the  analys t  records "Supply f r esh  a i r  downhole" f o r  
t h e  funct ion o f  t h e  fan. Next, t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f a i l u r e  modes of t he  pr imary fan 
a re  i d e n t i f i e d  us ing  the check l i s t  shown i n  Table 9. This fan can no t  be 
performing i t s  intended func t ion  i f  i t  1) does no t  cont inue t o  operate o r  2) i s  
down f o r  service.  These two f a i l u r e  modes are recorded i n  column 3. Next, the  
analys t  evaluates t he  f a i l u r e  r a t e  f o r  t he  f i r s t  f a i l u r e  mode o f  t he  fan. 
These p a r t i c u l a r  fans a re  requi red t o  be we l l  maintained and h i gh l y  r e l i a b l e  so 
f a i l u r e  t o  cont inue operat ion i s  a r e l a t i v e l y  in f requent  occurrence. The 
analys t  may record " in f requent"  i n  column 4 ins tead  o f  record ing actua l  
numerical f a i l u r e  rates.  
The analys t  i s  now ready t o  examine t he  ef fec ts  of t he  f a i l u r e  mode. I n  
the  example case, a b r i e f  pe r iod  o f  t ime would elapse a f t e r  t h e  primary fan 
stopped operat ing before the  standby fan  i s  started. I f  t h i s  per iod  of t ime i s  
shor t ,  no ad,verse consequences are l i k e l y  t o  occur. I f  t h e  standby fan cannot 
be s t a r t e d  f o r  a r e l a t i v e l y  l ong  per iod  o f  time, t he  temperature and humidi ty 
downhole can b u i l d  up t o  uncomfortable leve ls ,  oxygen may become depleted, and 
po ten t i  a 1 l y  harmful o r  exp los ive mine gases can reach dangerous concentra- 
t i ons .  However, i t  i s  extremely u n l i k e l y  t h a t  t h i s  f a i l u r e  would cause 
personnel i n j u r y  o r  death because o f  t h e  l ong  t ime delay t h a t  can be used t o  
evacuate t he  mine o r  r e p a i r  t h e  fans. This in fo rmat ion  i s  summarized and 
recorded i n  column 5 o f  t h e  FMEA tab le .  Based on t h e  above discussion, t h i s  
f a i l u r e  was placed i n  hazard category I 1  because even though t h i s  fan i s  
c r u c i a l  t o  t he  min ing operation, i t s  f a i l u r e  does no t  d i r e c t l y  cause i n j u r y  o r  
damage (see Table 9 f o r  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  t h e  hazard categor ies).  The analys t  
must r e s i s t  t h e  temptat ion of cons ider ing fan f a i l u r e  i n  con junct ion w i t h  the  
h o i s t  f a i l u r e  (which would prevent evacuation of t he  mine). Only one f a i l u r e  
a t  a t ime can r e a d i l y  be considered, us ing t h i s  technique. However, s i t ua t i ons  
such as t h i s  should be noted by t h e  analys t  and examined more c l ose l y  t o  
determine if a s i ng le  f a i l u r e  event cou ld  cause both systems t o  be inoperable 
simultaneously. This type o f  f a i l u r e  i s  c a l l e d  a common cause f a i l u r e .  
Furthermore, if the  analys t  wi,shes, these combined f a i l u r e s  cou ld  be entered as 
one t ime on t he  FMEA so t h a t  they cou ld  be considered. 
The f i n a l  two items on t h e  FMEA t a b l e  are fo r  t he  method(s) o f  de tec t ing  
f an  f a i l u r e  and p reven t i ve /co r rec t i ve  meausures. Several methods are ava i lab le  
t h a t  detect  and warn operators o f  t he  fan f a i l i n g  t o  cont inue operating. Often 
fans a re  equipped wi t h  temperature sensors, a i  r - f l ow ind ica to rs ,  and other 
sensing. devices t h a t  are connected t o  an alarm o r  annunciator system. These 
fans a re  a l so  l a rge  endugh and create so much no ise t h a t  t h e i r  f a i l u r e  would be 
immediately no t i ced  by operators. Detect ion methods a re  recorded i n  column 7. 
Column 8 i s  f o r  t he  analys t  t o  record e x i s t i n g  measures which are employed t o  
e l im ina te  o r  m i t i g a t e  t he  hazardous condi t ion.  The hazardous cond i t i on  o f  a 
lack o f  f r esh  a i r  downhole can be corrected by s imply s t a r t i n g  t he  standby 
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p e r i o d i c  t e s t i n g  and maintenance o f  bo th  t h e  pr imary  and standby fans. I n  
a d d i t i o n ,  i n  t h e  event o f  l o s s  o f  o f f - s i t e  e l e c t r i c  power, these fans  rece ive  
h i  gh . p r i o r i t y  f o r  t h e  e l e c t r i c i t y  generated by t h e  emergency d iese l  e l e c t r i c  
power supply system. 
Th is  completes t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  pr imary  f a n  t o  cont inue 
operat ion.  The a n a l y s t  cont inues examining t h e  next  f a i l u r e  mode of t h e  
v e n t i l a t i o n  fan, i.e., scheduled serv ice .  The process f o r  comple t ing  t h e  FMEA 
i s  repeated f o r  t h i s  mode o f  f a n  f a i l u r e .  When a l l  o f  t h e  f a i l u r e  modes of t h e  
pr imary  fan have been examined, t h e  a n a l y s t  cont inues t o  t h e  next  component, 
and so on, u n t i l  a l l  i tems assoc ia ted w i t h  t h e  underground v e n t i l a t i o n  system 
have been examined. Then t h e  ana lys t  can cont inue t h e  a n a l y s i s  by examining 
o t h e r  subsystems, one a t  a  t ime, u n t i l  t h e  e n t i r e  mine system has been analyzed. 
Th is  example has served t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  procedure f o r  per forming an FMEA 
and r e c o r d i n g  t h e  r e s u l t s .  The nex t  s tep  i s  t o  develop a  C r i t i c a l  Items L i s t  
f rom t h e  FMEA r e s u l t s .  Th i s  l i s t  c o n s i s t s  o f  components whose f a i l u r e  w i l l  
produce hazardous cond i t i ons ,  o r  i n  o t h e r  words, p o t e n t i a l l y  dangerous 
s i t u a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  persons o r  p roper t y  invo lved.  The format f o r  d i s p l a y i n g  
t h i s  i n f o r m a t i o n  was shown p r e v i o u s l y  and inc ludes  t h e  i t e m  name, func t i on ,  
f a i l u r e  mode, f a i l u r e  r a t e ,  page number where found on t h e  FMEA tab les ,  
c r i t i c a l i t y  category,  and p r e v e n t i  v e / c o r r e c t i  ve measures. The C r i t i c a l  Items 
L i s t  serves two purposes. F i r s t ,  i t  i s  a  t o o l  t o  be used f o r  communicating 
s i g n i f i c a n t  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s  t o  management. Second, i t  can be used as a  
c h e c k l i s t  f o r  mine s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s  t o  c a r r y  w i t h  them on inspect ions .  Used i n  
t h i s  manner, t h e  c h e c k l i s t  i s  a  t o o l  t h a t  he lps  mine s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s  and 
management t o  p lan  and execute a  hazard p reven t ion  program. Some example 
e n t r i e s  on a  C r i t i c a l  Items L i s t  a r e  shown i n  Table 13. It i s  a l s o  b e n e f i c i a l  
t o  show i f  f a i l u r e s  o f  a d d i t i o n a l  i tems i n  con junc t i on  w i t h  t h e  c r i t i c a l  i t e m  
cou ld  p o t e n t i a l l y  have severe consequences, such as f a i l u r e  o f  bo th  t h e  pr imary  
and standby fans i n  con junc t i on  w i t h  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  h o i s t i n g  system. Again, 
m u l t i p l e  f a i l u r e s  can be handled d i r e c t l y  as a  s i n g l e  i t e m  i n  t h e  FMEA. 
Computer A d a p t a b i l i t y  
Resu l ts  o f  t h e  eva lua t i on  o f  t h e  a d a p t a b i l i t y  o f  FMEA t o  a  user-  
i n t e r a c t i v e  computer program i n d i c a t e  t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  and des i rab le  t o  do 
so. No complex mathematics o r  l o g i c  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  perform an FMEA so i t  i s  
b e l i e v e d  t h a t  i t  would be r e l a t i v e l y  s imple  t o  develop t h i s  computer program. 
Furthermore, i t  i s  be1 i eved t h a t  devel opment of  a  u s e r - i  n t e r a c t i  ve program as 
a  guide t o  t h e  performance o f  t h e  FMEA would simp1 i f y  t h e  a n a l y s i s  procedure. 
There a re  no FMEA computer programs a t  t h i s  t ime  t o  draw conclusions about 
t h e i r  u t i l i t y  and e f fec t i veness .  However, i t  i s  be l i eved  t h a t  implementation 
o f  an FMEA computer program w i l l  i nc rease t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  t h e  t ime  s a f e t y  
o f f i c i a l s  spend a t  t h e i r  desks, thus  a l l o w i n g  more t i m e  t o  be spent p reven t ing  
o r  c o r r e c t i n g  hazardous c o n d i t i o n s  a t  t h e  mine. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  FMEA and 
r e l a t e d  C r i t i c a l  Items L i s t  p rov ide  new i n s i g h t s  t o  t h e  mine s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s  
and management on t h e  causes of p o t e n t i a l  accidents,  and thus  can l e a d  t o  
e l  i m i n a t i o n  o r  reduct ions  o f  t h e  acc idents  by e l  i m i n a t i n g  t h e i r  causes. 
TABLE 13. - Example e n t r i e s  on t h e  c r i t i c a l  i tems l i s t  
I t em/ func t i on  : Primary v e n t i l a t i o n  fan lp rov ides  f r e s h  a i r  t o  miners 
and d i l u t i o n  o f  mine gases 
F a i l u r e  Mode: Fai l u r e  t o  cont inue opera t i on  
F a i l u r e  Rate: I n f requen t  
FMEA Page No. : A- 1 
Class 1  I; p o t e n t i a l  c o n t r i b u t o r  t o  c a t a s t r o p h i c  
acc ident  i f  evacuat ion of  mine i s  h indered o r  n o t  
p o s s i b l e  (no t  1  i k e l y )  
Prevent ion /  Redundant standby fan, re1 i a b l e  and we1 1  main ta ined 
Cor rec t ion  : pr imary and standby fans, f a i l u r e  mode r e a d i l y  detec ted 
I t e m l f u n c t i  on : Vent fan e l e c t r i c a l  connect ions/ t ransmi t s  o f f  - s i t e  
power t o  pr imary  and standby fans 
F a i l u r e  Mode: F a i l u r e  t o  cont inue opera t i on  
Fai  l u r e  Rate: I n f requen t  
FMEA Page No. : A-2 
Class 1  I ; p o t e n t i a l  c o n t r i b u t o r  t o  ca tas t roph ic  
acc ident  i f  h o i s t i n g  system i s  unava i lab le ,  a l though 
t h i s  f a i l u r e  has minor e f f e c t s  i n  i t s e l f  
Prevent ion /  Re1 i able  equipment and o f f - s i t e  power supply, 
Correct  i on : standby d i e s e l  generator  on-s i te ,  delay t ime before  
oxygen i s  depleted and gases reach dangerous 
concent ra t ions .  
A conceptual computer program u t i  1  i z i n g  t h e  FMEA method01 ogy was developed 
f o r  t h i s  study. A  r e l a t i v e l y  smal l  computer system i s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h i s  
conceptual program. As c u r r e n t l y  envis ioned,  t h e  conceptual FMEA program 
c o n s i s t s  o f  t h r e e  stages as shown i n  F igu re  4. Stage 1 i s  a  u s e r - i n t e r a c t i v e  
scheme t h a t  guides t h e  a n a l y s i s  procedure by ask ing  approp r ia te  quest ions f o r  
t h e  ana lys t  t o  respond to .  The computer d i sp lays  quest ions  i n  t h e  same 
sequence t h e  ana lys t  would ask h imse l f  i f  he were per forming t h e  ana lys i s  
w i t h o u t  t h e  computer. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  ana lys t  w i l l  index t h e  components and 
subsystems t o  a i d  Stages I 1  and I 1 1  of t h e  program. 
An example t h a t  i l l u s t r a t e s  how t h e  Stage I a n a l y s i s  w i l l  work i s  t h e  same 
as t h a t  p r e v i o u s l y  shown f o r  a  computerized p r e l i m i n a r y  hazards ana lys i s  i n  
Table 7. The computer d i sp lays  a  quest ion  ask ing t h e  ana lys t  t o  i d e n t i f y  a  
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FIGURE 4. - Conceptual flow chart for a computerized FMEA 
subsystem and ass ign an index number, such as " v e n t i l a t i o n  subsystem" and 
ass ign t h e  l e t t e r  " A "  t o  represent  t h i s  subsystem. Next, t h e  computer w i l l  ask 
t h e  a n a l y s t  t o  i d e n t i f y  a  component o f  t h e  subsystem and assign a  second index 
t o  t h i s  component. For example, t h e  ana lys t  w i l l  i n p u t  "Primary v e n t i l a t i o n  
fan" and ass ign index Ala. The i n d i c e s  represent  t h e  subsystem and t h e  
component i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  number, respec t i ve l y .  The small  "a" i n  t h e  index 
i n d i c a t e s  t h e r e  i s  more than one v e n t i l a t i o n  fan  i n  t h e  subsystem t h a t  i s  
capable of performing t h e  same func t i on .  I f  t h e r e  a r e  s i m i l a r  components t h a t  
perform d i f f e r e n t  func t ions ,  they  woul d  be assigned a separate numerical 
index. For example, t h e  downhole booster  f an  i n  t h e  example system i s  assigned 
t h e  index number u, r a t h e r  than A 1  L. The conceptual program i s  a l s o  
capable o f  d i s p l a y i n g  p a r t s  o f  t h e  FMEA t a b l e  where t h e  answers t o  t h e  
quest ions  a r e  being.recorded.  Th is  f e a t u r e  enables t h e  ana lys t  t o  keep t r a c k  
o f  where h i s  o r  her responses a r e  be ing  recorded and a l s o  t o  v i s u a l i z e  t h e  
a n a l y s i s  as i t  progresses across t h e  FMEA tab le .  
The nex t  quest ions  i n  t h e  conceptual FMEA computer program examine t h e  
component f a i l u r e  mode(s) and t h e  f a i l u r e  e f fec ts .  The computer w i l l  f o l l o w  the  
a n a l y s i s  sequence f rom l e f t - t o - r i g h t  on t h e  FMEA t a b l e  u n t i l  an examination of 
a  p a r t i c u l a r  f a i l u r e  mode has been completed. Then t h e  program r e t u r n s  and 
asks t h e  same quest ions  f o r  t h e  ana lys t  t o  answer rega rd ing  t h e  second, t h i r d ,  
o r  a d d i t i o n a l  f a i l u r e  modes. When a  p a r t i c u l a r  component and a l l  o f  i t s  
f a i  l u r e  modes and e f f e c t s  have been examined, t h e  ana lys t  s e l e c t s  a  second 
component f o r  ana lys is .  Th is  s e l e c t i o n  process can be a ided by l i s t s  o f  
components i n p u t  t o  t h e  computer memory be fo re  t h e  ana lys i s  begins. Th2 
ana lys t  would s imply ask t h e  computer t o  d i s p l a y  t h e  component l i s t  and then 
make a  s e l e c t i o n .  A s i m i l a r  procedure may be used t o  a s s i s t  i n  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  
of  component f a i l u r e  modes and hazard ca tegor ies  (see Tables 9 and 10). 
Stage I 1  of t h e  conceptual computer program i s  t h e  use o f  t h e  r e s u l t s .  
The computer can be used t o  search f o r  c r i t i c a l  i tems t h a t ,  if they  f a i l ,  can 
have adverse e f f e c t s  on personnel o r  p roper ty .  Th i s  procedure i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  
t h e  same as p repara t i on  o f  t h e  C r i t i c a l  Items L i s t .  Th is  can be done i n  two 
ways. F i r s t ,  t h e  computer can per form a  key word search o f  t h e  c r i t i c a l i t y  
category and i d e n t i f y  those i tems which a re  Class 111 o r  Class I V  hazards. The 
ana lys t  r i s k s  o m i t t i n g  some o f  t h e  Class I 1  i tems which a r e  a l s o  c r i t i c a l  i tems 
a t  t h e  mine bu t  do n o t  have adverse consequences due t o  a  requirement f o r  one 
o r  more a d d i t i o n a l  f a i l u r e s ,  de lay  t ime  o r  some o ther  m i t i g a t i n g  cond i t ion .  I n  
t h e  example presented, t h e  pr imary  v e n t i l a t i o n  exhaust f an  would have been 
omi t ted  because i t ' s  f a i l u r e  i s  a  Class I 1  i t e m  f o r  t h e  reason t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  
l o n g  de lay  t ime  before  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  fan  produces personnel i n j u r y  and 
p roper t y  damage. However, t h e  v e n t i l a t i o n  fans a re  c r i t i c a l  t o  t h e  m in ing  
process because w i t h o u t  them, product ion  must be i n t e r r u p t e d  u n t i  1  r e p a i r  i s  
e f fec ted .  The second way t o  prepare t h e  C r i t i c a l  I tems L i s t  i s  f o r  t h e  ana lys t  
t o  i n d i c a t e  which i tems should be i nc luded  on t h e  l i s t  as t h e  ana lys i s  
progresses. I n  f a c t ,  t h e  u s e r - i n t e r a c t i v e  computer program can be i n s t r u c t e d  
t o  ask t h e  ana lys t  if a  p a r t i c u l a r  component i s  t o  be i nc luded  on t h e  l i s t  
a f t e r  each f a i l u r e  mode i s  evaluated. I f  t h e  component and f a i l u r e  mode a re  
judged t o  be c r i t i c a l ,  t h e  computer au tomat i ca l l y  commits t h i s  t o  memory. Once 
t h e  a n a l y s i s  has beem completed, t h e  ana lys t  would i n p u t  a  command t o  d i s p l a y  
o r  p r i n t  t h e  C r i t i c a l  I tems L i s t  and t h e  computer would scan i t s  memory and 
output  t h i s  l i s t .  The computer can a l s o  be programmed t o  d i s p l a y  o r  p r i n t  a l l  
component d e t a i l s  on t h e  C r i t i c a l  Items L i s t  format, shown prev ious ly .  
FMEA, l i k e  many s a f e t y  a n a l y s i s  techniques, i s  a  dynamic process. 
Therefore,  t h e  conceptual computer program should i n c l u d e  a  means t o  rev i se ,  
update, and modify t h e  FMEA o f  t h e  m in ing  system. Stage 111 o f  t h e  conceptual 
computer program combines key-word search capabi 1  i t i e s  and d e l e t i o n / c o r r e c t i o n  
capabi l i t i e s  of c u r r e n t  micro-computer systems t o  accomplish t h i s .  The ana lys t  
w i l l  s imply i n p u t  a  key-word o r  component i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  number and i n p u t  t h e  
"search" command. Then t h e  computer w i l l  scan i t s  memory f o r  t h e  appropr ia te  
combinations o f  l e t t e r s  and symbols and d i sp lay  e x a c t l y  where they were found. 
Then t h e  ana lys t  can have these e n t r i e s  d isp layed on a  moni tor  and u s i n g  t h e  
d e l e t i o n / c o r r e c t i o n  capabi 1  i t i e s  o f  modern word processing software, make t h e  
r e v i s i o n s  o r  mod i f i ca t ions  i n  appropr ia te  l oca t ions .  
Est imated Costs o f  Implementation 
Th is  sec t ion  conta ins  est imates o f  t h e  cos ts  f o r  implementing an FMEA-type 
safe ty  program a t  a  t y p i c a l  m in ing  system. Est imated cos ts  were developed f o r  
two cases: 1 )  f o r  an FMEA-type paper study and, 2 )  f o r  a  computerized FMEA 
program. The bases f o r  these cos t  est imates are  contained i n  t h e  f i n a l  repor t  
f o r  t h i s  study and w i l l  no t  be repeated here. 
The est imated costs  f o r  implementing a  paper-study FMEA sa fe ty  program are  
dominated by t h e  cos ts  of labor .  It i s  est imated t h a t  approximately 1.0 man- 
year  i s  requ i red  t o  perform a  thorough FMEA o f  a  m in ing  system. Assuming t h e  
mine safe ty  o f f i c i a l s  a r e  p a i d  about $15.@O/hr, and adding a  50% burden f o r  
overheads, occasional overt ime, and supp l ies ,  t h e  est imated d i r e c t  l abo r  costs,  
i n c l u d i n g  uncer ta in ty ,  a re  between $45,000 and $65,000. It i s  est imated t h a t  3 
t o  4 man-months/yr a re  requ i red  t o  p e r i o d i c a l l y  review, update, and r e v i s e  t h e  
in fo rmat ion  on t h e  FMEA tab les .  Thus, t o t a l  opera t ing  costs  are  est imated t o  
be about $10,000-$15,00O/yr. 
The est imated costs  f o r  implementing a  computerized safe ty  program based 
on t h e  FMEA technique inc lude  t h e  c a p i t a l  and i n s t a l l a t i o n  costs  of t h e  
computer system i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  s t a f f  l a b o r  costs. Costs o f  p o t e n t i a l  
computer systems are  est imated a t  $5,000, bu t  t h i s  can most l i k e l y  be reduced 
t o  about $3,000 due t o  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  small  computer c a p a b i l i t i e s  requ i red  f o r  
t h i s  t ype  o f  ana lys is .  The $5,000 est imated cos t  inc ludes purchase o f  the 
complete computer system ( i n c l u d i n g  t h e  processor, moni tor ,  d i sk  d r i ve ,  
keyboard, and p r i n t e r ) ,  d e l i  very, i n s t a l  l a t i o n ,  and suppl ies.  Annual 
maintenance costs  are  assumed t o  be 10% of t h e  i n i t i a l  c a p i t a l  cos ts  per year. 
Also inc luded  i n  t h e  est imated costs  f o r  a  computerized FMEA s a f e t y  program a re  
t h e  cos ts  f o r  t h e  s a f e t y  s t a f f  t o  a t t e n d  short-courses on computer t r a i n i n g  and 
safe ty  ana lys i s  t r a i n i n g  ( i n c l u d i n g  r e g i s t r a t i o n  fees, wages, 1  i v ing  expenses, 
and t r a v e l  cos ts ) .  These cos ts  a re  developed i n  t h e  companion document t o  
t h i s  u s e r ' s  manual and w i l l  n o t  be repeated here. The est imated t o t a l  f i x e d  
and opera t ing  costs  are  sumnarized below: 
FIXED COSTS 
Computer system purchase and i n s t a l l a t i o n  . . . . . .  $ 5,000 
Shor t  course attendance and expenses . . . . . . . .  $ 9,000-12,000 
Ana lys t ' s  burdened l a b o r  charges 
I n i t i a t e  program . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ; . .  $10,000-15,000 
Perform ana lys i s  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  $45,000-65,000 
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  $69,000-78,000 
OPERATING COSTS 
Computer system maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . .  $ 500/yr 
A n a l y s t ' s  burdened l a b o r  charges. . . . . . . . . . .  $10,000-15,000/yr 
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  $10,500-15,50O/yr 
Note t h a t  these est imates do n o t  c o n t a i n  t h e  cos ts  f o r  development o f  t h e  
computer program. These cos ts  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  es t imate  and i t  i s  n o t  known 
whether t h e  computer so f tware  w i l l  be developed by t h e  government o r  t h e  min ing 
i ndus t r y .  Thus, t h e  reader should be aware t h a t  software development cos ts  a r e  
i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  est imated implementat ion cos ts  presented above. Also, these 
cos ts  do n o t  represent  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  cos ts  f o r  implementing a  formal  s a f e t y  
program. Mine s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s  would be per forming t h e  sa fe ty  assessment 
r a t h e r  than  t h e i r  c u r r e n t  d u t i e s  i n  some ins tances and thus  t h e  ac tua l  
a d d i t i o n a l  cos ts  t h a t  would be p a i d  by mine opera tors  a re  l e s s  than t h e  
cos ts  presented here. 
BINARY MATRICES 
Many systems safe ty  a n a l y s i s  techniques do n o t  adequately address i n t e r -  
a c t i o n s  among t h e  components o r  subsystems o f  an o v e r a l l  system. A  b i n a r y  
m a t r i x  (Cybulskis,  e t  a1 1981) represents  a  l o g i c a l ,  q u a l i t a t i v e  approach t o  
h e l p  i d e n t i f y  systems i n t e r a c t i o n s .  Th is  a n a l y s i s  t o o l  can be a p p l i e d  d u r i n g  
t h e  system d e s c r i p t i o n  stage of s a f e t y  a n a l y s i s  o r  as a  f i n a l  checkpoint  i n  an 
FMEA o r  PHA t o  ensure t h a t  a l l  impor tant  systems dependencies have been 
addressed i n  t h e  ana lys is .  
The s p e c i f i c  t o o l  u t i l i z e d  i n  t h i s  techn ique i s  t h e  b i n a r y  ma t r i x .  The 
b i n a r y  m a t r i x  con ta ins  i n f o r m a t i o n  on t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between t h e  elements of 
a  system o r  systems. The purpose o f  t h e  m a t r i x  i s  t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  one-on-one 
dependencies t h a t  e x i s t  between these elements o f  a  system. These elements can 
be any e n t i t i e s  o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  t h e  a n a l y s t :  e n t i r e  systems, system func t i ons ,  
subsystems, components, phys i ca l  l oca t i ons ,  maintenance crews, e l e c t r i c a l  
connections, e t c .  Elements o f  any l e v e l  of  d e t a i l  can be in termixed.  The 
impor tant  t h i n g  i s  t o  i d e n t i f y  which elements a f f e c t  o the rs  i n  some dependency 
r e l a t i o n s h i p .  Usua l ly  t h i s  i s  a  " subord ina t i on "  r e l a t i o n s h i p  where t h e  ana lys t  
i n d i c a t e s  t h e  sequence o f  opera t ions  by i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  events o r  opera t ions  
t h a t  must occur p r i o r  t o  a  s p e c i f i c  event. Th is  i s  u s u a l l y  done by p l a c i n g  a  
"1" i n  t h e  b i n a r y  m a t r i x  t o  i n d i c a t e  p r i o r  occurrence i s  requ i red  and a  "0"  t o  
i n d i c a t e  t h e r e  i s  no f u n c t i o n a l  o r  ope ra t i ona l  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  Then, i n  
per forming t h e  chosen s a f e t y  ana lys i s ,  when an acc ident  sequence o r  f a i l u r e  
mode has been i d e n t i f i e d  f o r  a  p a r t i c u l a r  system, t h e  a n a l y s t  can review t h e  
m a t r i x  t o  determine whether t h e  f a i l u r e  under cons ide ra t i on  can have 
repercussions i n  o the r  p a r t s  o f  t h e  o v e r a l l  system. I n  t h i s  sense, t h e  m a t r i x  
serves merely as a t o o l  t o  "remind" t h e  ana lys t  t h a t  f a i l u r e s  i n  one p a r t  o f  a  
system may a f f e c t  t h e  opera t i on  o f  o ther ,  seemingly unre la ted,  subsyStems i n  
another area. 
An example o f  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  b i n a r y  m a t r i x  t o  two simple, l i n k e d  
f l o w  systems (shown i n  F igu re  5 )  i s  presented1 below. I n  these f low systems, 
each f l ow  l i n e  has a  sensor ( S l ,  S2) and a  c o n t r o l  va lve  (V l ,  V2) a t tached t o  
i t .  The sensors r e l y  on a  common power source ( IP ) .  At tached t o  each valve i s  
a  motor (MI, M2) ,  each o f  which has i t s  own A C  power (AC1, AC2). Each va lve  
sensor system i s  c o n t r o l l e d  by a  c o n t r o l l e r  (C l ,  C2) which has i t s  own D C  power 
source DC1 and DC2. 
Table 14 i s  a  b i n a r y  m a t r i x  t h a t  dep ic t s  t h e  dependencies among t h e  
elements o f  t h e  f l o w  system. The r e l a t i o n s h i p  i d e n t i f i e d  between components 
can be any area o f  i n t e r e s t .  Th i s  dependency can be assigned by f l o w  d i r e c t i o n  
o r  by dependency on power sources, f o r  example. The purpose o f  t h e  m a t r i x  i s  
t o  h i g h l i g h t  f o r  t h e  ana lys t  these k inds  of i n t e r a c t i o n s  w i t h i n  an opera t i ng  
system. I n  t h i s  example, t h e  a n a l y s i s  has been performed a t t h e  component 
l e v e l .  Each separate component of  t h e  system i s  used t o  cons t ruc t  t h e  format 
o f  t h e  ma t r i x .  The m a t r i x  i t s e l f  i s  f i l l e d  i n  by p l a c i n g  a "1" i n  t h e  m a t r i x  
c e l l  if a dependency e x i s t s  between t h e  elements and a  "0" i f  no r e l a t i o n s h i p  
seems t o  e x i s t .  I n  comple t ing  t h e  m a t r i x ,  one always works across t h e  re levan t  
rows, r a t h e r  than down t h e  v e r t i c a l  column. When complete, t h e  m a t r i x  presents 
a u s e f u l  t o o l  i n  ana lyz ing  system interdependencies. For example, i f  one 
examines t h e  row f o r  F02 i n  Table 14, i t  becomes ev iden t  t h a t  t h i s  f l o w  i s  
- Motor 1, Motor 2 
- AC Power Source 1 and Source 2 
- Control 1 and Control 2 
- Sensor 1 and Sensor 2 
- Valve 1 and Valve 2 
- Instrument Power 
- DC Power Source 1 and 2 
- Flow In 
- Flow Out at 1 and at 2 
F I G U R E  5 .  - Sample flow circuit with common power ( I P )  
TABLE 14. - B inary  m a t r i x  f o r  two l i n k e d  f l o w  systems w i t h  comnon power 
dependent on f l o w  a t  F I  ( i n p u t  f l o w  o c c u r r i n g ) ,  power by I P ,  AC2 and DC2, t h e  
va l ve  V2 opera t i ng  p roper l y ,  t h e  motor M2 opera t ing ,  and t h e  c o n t r o l  C2 and 
sensor S2 opera t i ng  proper ly .  
Al though t h i s  example has concent ra ted on s p e c i f i c  components w i t h i n  a  
p a r t i c u l a r  subsystem, t h e  a n a l y s i s  may a l s o  be performed a t  a  broader l e v e l  by 
examining f u n c t i o n s  w i t h i n  t h e  system. For example, one can i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  
i n t e r a c t i o n s  among t h e  d i f f e r e n t  opera t ions ,  l o c a t i o n s ,  etc., w i t h i n  an o v e r a l l  
m in ing  system. The a n a l y s i s  would be performed i n  t h e  same way as f o r  t h e  
example presented above. Note t h a t  a  good understanding o f  t h e  system under 
cons ide ra t i on  i s  necessary t o  successfu l ly  perform t h i s  ana lys i s .  
CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 
Consequence a n a l y s i s  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  determinat ion  o f  a  s p e c i f i c  p iece  o f  
i n f o r m a t i o n  - t h e  degree o f  s e v e r i t y  o f  an accident .  There i s  no genera l l y  
a p p l i c a b l e  method f o r  de termin ing t h a t  i n fo rma t ion ,  s ince each s p e c i f i c  
acc ident  may r e s u l t  i n  a  d i f f e r e n t  t y p e  o f  consequence, depending on t h e  
m a t e r i a l s  o r  opera t ions  invo lved.  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  ana lys t  o f t e n  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
l i m i t s  t h e  scope o f  t h e  s a f e t y  a n a l y s i s  e f f o r t  by d e l i b e r a t e l y  ana lyz ing  i n  
d e t a i l  on l y  those acc ident  sequences t h a t  a r e  be l i eved  t o  have a  s p e c i f i c  
consequence o f  i n t e r e s t ,  e.g., i n  j u r i e s ,  f a t a l i t i e s ,  p roper t y  damage i n  
d o l l a r s ,  e t c .  Consequence a n a l y s i s  methods a re  then chosen o r  developed t o  
determine t h e  magnitude o f  consequence from a  p a r t i c u l a r  acc ident  once t h e  t ype  
o f  consequence has been decided. 
Consequence a n a l y s i s  i s  one of t h e  i n te rmed ia te  steps o f  a  s a f e t y  
ana lys i s .  Accident  sequences a re  u s u a l l y  determined i n i t i a l l y  us ing  methods 
such as PHA o r  FMEA. Consequences a re  then examined f o r  each acc ident ,  e i t h e r  
w i t h i n  t h e  scope o f  t h e  o r i g i n a l l y  used a n a l y s i s  technique o r  as a  separate 
step. F i n a l l y ,  some measure of magnitude i s  assigned t o  t h e  consequence and 
some measure o f  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  occurrence t o  t h e  acc ident  sequence t o  
p r i o r i t i z e  system hazards and/or r e q u i r e d  mi t i  ga t ion  measures i n  a  meaningful 
way. Accident  sequences w i t h  low l e v e l s  o f  consequence may be ranked lower i n  
o v e r a l l  hazards, a1 l ow ing  mine opera tors  t o  concent ra te  t h e i r  resources on 
m i t i g a t i n g  hazards w i t h  l a r g e r  p o t e n t i a l  consequence l e v e l s .  
Because t h e  methodology employed i s  so dependent on t h e  t ype  of acc ident  
sequences and consequences i d e n t i f i e d ,  t h e r e  a re  no r i go rous  guide1 ines  
a v a i l a b l e  f o r  per forming a  consequence ana lys i s .  However, t h e r e  a re  a  few 
general approaches t h a t  may be use fu l  i n  determin ing t h e  p o t e n t i a l  magnitudes 
of i dent i f i ed consequences. 
The pr imary  consequences o f  concern i n  a  m in ing  system i n c l u d e  i n j u r i e s ,  
f a t a l i t i e s ,  and losses due t o  p roper t y  damage and opera t i ona l  downtime. These 
may be eva luated e i t h e r  q u a l i t a t i v e l y  o r  i n  a  q u a n t i t a t i v e  manner. O u a l i t a t i v e  
measures can be very use fu l  i n  genera l l y  de termin ing which areas o f  t he  
opera t i on  a re  most i n  need o f  s a f e t y  improvements and f o r  rank ing  o f  hazard 
types. Tn t h i s  method, consequences may be ranked s imply as n e g l i g i b l e ,  low, 
moderate and h igh,  u s i n g  a  fou r -c lass  system f o r  a l l  consequence types. An 
example o f  t h i s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  scheme i s  shown i n  Table 15. A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  t h e  
same method can be used w i t h  each t y p e  o f  consequence c a l l e d  ou t  separa te l y  
(see Table 16). When u s i n g  t h i s  method, some q u a n t i t a t i v e  o r  exp lanatory  
measure i s  necessary t o  p roper l y  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  among t h e  f o u r  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
ca tegor ies .  Judgement o f  t h e  ana lys t  i s  then used t o  determine i n  which 
category each acc ident  sequence f a l l s .  Th is  method i s  u s e f u l  i n  t h a t  i t  
prov ides a  rank ing  o f  hazards w i t h o u t  r e q u i r i n g  d e t a i  l e d  numerical .  ana lys i s  of 
each acc ident  sequence. For most purposes, such as i d e n t i f y i n g  areas o f  s a f e t y  
improvement a t  a  mine, t h i  s  technique shoul d  prove adequate, p r o v i  d ing  
meaningful r e s u l t s  i n  a c o s t - e f f e c t i v e  manner. Of ten t h e r e  are  p rov i s ions  made 
i n  p r e l i m i n a r y  hazards a n a l y s i s  and f a i l u r e  modes and e f f e c t s  f o r  an eva lua t i on  
o f  t h e  consequences o f  p o t e n t i a l  hazards. 
TABLE 15. - Four-category qua1 i t a t i  ve c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
scheme f o r  consequence a n a l y s i  s 
Category of Consequence A t t r i b u t e s  o f  Category 




Minor equipment damage/downt ime 
e.g., $100 
Moderate equipment damage/downtime 
e.g., $100-$3000; p o t e n t i a l  f o r  
mi nor i n j u r i e s  
Moderate equipment damage/downtime; 
p o t e n t i a l  f o r  major  i n j u r i e s / l o s t  t ime  
Major equipment damage; h a l t  t o  system 
opera t ion ;  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  f a t a l i t i e s  
Q u a n t i t a t i v e  consequence a n a l y s i s  b r i n g s  another l e v e l  o f  d e t a i  1 t o  t h e  
s a f e t y  assessment. Th i s  method b a s i c a l l y  assigns s p e c i f i c  a t t r i b u t e s  o f  t h e  
consequence category d i  r e c t l y  t o  t h e  acc ident  sequence, r a t h e r  than c l a s s i f y i n g  
t h a t  sequence w i t h  o the rs  i n  a group t h a t  a1 1 have genera l l y  t h e  same range of 
a t t r i b u t e s .  Th is  method i s  somewhat more complex, i n  t h a t  each acc ident  
sequence may have a d i f f e r e n t  consequence magnitude ( o r  even type) .  However, 
i t  a l s o  a l l ows  more d e t a i l e d  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  among acc ident  sequences i f  t h i s  
i s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h e  a n a l y s t ' s  purposes. H i s t o r i c a l  acc ident  data as catalogued 
a t  t h e  mine o r  a t  t h e  Mine Safe ty  and Heal th  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  Hea l th  and Safety 
Ana lys is  Center i n  Denver, Colorado, may be used t o  h e l p  determine approp r ia te  
numbers f o r  use as consequence magnitudes w i t h  s p e c i f i c  acc ident  sequences. 
Mathematical models may a l s o  be requ i red  t o  p r e d i c t  t h e  consequences of a 
p a r t i c u l a r  accident .  These models can vary from d i s p e r s i o n  ana lys i s  and 
i n h a l a t i o n  models i n  t h e  case o f  smoke i n h a l a t i o n  and i t s  e f f e c t s  underground 
t o  r a d i a t i o n  dose model ing i n  p r e d i c t i n g  consequences o f  a f a i l u r e  i n  t h e  
v e n t i l a t i o n  system o f  a uranium mine. 
The s p e c i f i c  consequence a n a l y s i s  techniques chosen w i  11 be h i g h l y  
v a r i a b l e ,  dependent on t h e  mine system be ing  analyzed, t h e  l e v e l  o f  d e t a i l  
r e q u i r e d  i n  t h e  ana lys i s ,  and t h e  s p e c i f i c  acc ident  scenar ios under 
cons idera t ion .  For most purposes, p a r t i c u l a r l y  when u t i  1 i z e d  i n  con junc t i on  
w i t h  a PHA o r  FMEA technique, q u a l i t a t i v e  consequence a n a l y s i s  should be 
s u f f i c i e n t .  More d e t a i l e d  q u a n t i t a t i v e  techniques a re  genera l l y  u t i  1 i z e d  i n  
con junc t i on  w i t h  a more d e t a i l e d ,  q u a n t i t a t i v e  s a f e t y  a n a l y s i s  methodology, 
such as f a u l t  t r e e  ana lys is .  Education l e v e l  and t i m e  requirements o f  
consequence ana lys i s  a r e  h i g h l y  dependent on t h e  s p e c i f i c  requirements o f  t h e  
o v e r a l l  s a f e t y  a n a l y s i s  task  purpose, and w i l l  vary accord ing t o  t h e  complexi ty  
and degree o f  d e t a i l  r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h e  ana lys is .  
TABLE 16. - Expanded four -ca tegory  q u a l i t a t i v e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
scheme f o r  consequence a n a l y s i s  
Consequent (ia 1 Consequence TY pe Categories (a A t t r i b u t e s  o f  Category 
PERSONNEL INJURY Negl i g i  b l e  
(mi nor /or  non- 
d i s a b l i n g  
i n j u r i e s )  
Average days l o s t  (b 
LOW 6- 15 
(major i n j u r i e s )  
Moderate 
(permanent 
d i s a b i l i t i e s )  
H i  gh 
( f a t a l i t i e s )  
D o l l a r s  
6000 o r  more 




100 o r  l e s s  
100-1000 
1000-5000 
5000 o r  more 
( a )  Other consequence types and categor ies  may be const ruc ted as approp r ia te  
f o r  t h e  purposes o f  t h e  ana lys is .  A t t r i b u t e s  o f  each category may be 
assigned based on importance f o r  s p e c i f i c  m in ing  operat ions.  
( b )  This f i g u r e  may be based on standard values u t i l i z e d  i n  Mine Safety and 
Hea l th  Admini s t r a t i o n  repor ts .  
MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND RISK TREE (MORT) ANALYSIS 
Management Oversi ght and Risk Tree (MORT) a n a l y s i s  i s  a  comprehensi ve 
sa fe ty  assessment method appl  i c a b l e  t o  any mine s a f e t y  program. MORT ana lys i  s 
i s  a  very s t r u c t u r e d  and formal  s a f e t y  technique t h a t  was designed o r i g i n a l l y  
as an acc iden t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  t o o l .  MORT a n a l y s i s  has a l s o  been used as a  
s a f e t y  program p lann ing  t o o l  and as an a i d  i n  deve lop ing t r a i n i n g  programs. 
Th is  techn ique was chosen f o r  t r a n s f e r  t o  t h e  m in ing  i n d u s t r y  because i t  
requ i res  l i t t l e  s p e c i a l i z e d  t r a i n i n g  and c o u l d  be l ea rned  and performed by mine 
safe ty  o f f i c i a l s  i n  a  r e l a t i v e l y  s h o r t  p e r i o d  o f  t ime. . MORT a n a l y s i s  appears 
t o  be r e a d i l y  adaptable t o  t h e  computer, be ing e s p e c i a l l y  va luab le  as a  user -  
i n t e r a c t i v e  a i d  t o  guide t h e  ana lys is .  For these reasons, MORT a n a l y s i s  i s  
chosen f o r  technology t r a n s f e r  t o  t h e  m in ing  i ndus t r y .  
MORT i s  a  t o t a l  s a f e t y  program concept t h a t  focuses on a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  o r  
programmatic c o n t r o l  of hazardous cond i t i ons .  Th is  techn ique has been desi  gned 
t o  i d e n t i f y ,  evaluate,  and prevent  s a f e t y - r e l a t e d  ove rs i  ghts, e r r o r s ,  and 
omi s s i  ons by management and workers t h a t  can cause acc i  dents. MORT recogni zes 
t h a t  i n  any i n d u s t r i a l  s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e r e  w i l l  be hazardous c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  can- 
n o t  be prevented o r  co r rec ted  due t o  economic o r  techno1 o g i c a l  cons idera t ions .  
The MORT a n a l y s i s  technique i s  designed t o  i d e n t i f y  t h i s  t ype  o f  hazard and 
r e f e r  i t  t o  proper management l e v e l s .  With t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  obta ined by MORT 
ana lys i s ,  mine management w i l l  be a b l e  t o  a l l o c a t e  resources i n  a  manner t h a t  
w i l l  b e n e f i t  t h e  s a f e t y  program t h e  most, which i s  reduc ing  i n j u r i e s  t o  t h e  
m in ing  personnel and downtime due t o  equipment damage and accidents.  
The MORT technique i s  t h e  most optimum s a f e t y  assessment method t h a t  i s  
s u i t a b l e  f o r  e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  t h r e e  main f a c t o r s  t h a t  a f f e c t  s a f e t y  i n  an 
i n d u s t r i a l  s i t u a t i o n ;  t echno log ica l  f a c t o r s  (such as t h e  p l a n t  and hardware), 
human f a c t o r s  (such as personal  a b i l i t i e s  and t r a i n i n g ) ,  and o rgan iza t i ona l  
f a c t o r s  (such as management c o n t r o l  s  and procedures). MORT ana lys i  s  evaluates 
these f a c t o r s  bo th  i n d i v i d u a l l y  and as they  i n t e r a c t  t oge the r  i n  a  s a f e t y  
program. No o the r  s a f e t y  technique, by i t s e l f ,  has t h i s  c a p a b i l i t y .  
The MORT technique i s  based p r i m a r i l y  on a  document w r i t t e n  by 
W .  R. Johnson (1973), h e r e i n a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  t o  as t h e  "MORT t e x t  ." The MORT 
t e x t  con ta ins  many s a f e t y  system concepts and s a f e t y  program elements which 
toge the r  produce t h e  MORT s a f e t y  program model. The MORT model i s  composed o f  
sa fe ty  concepts and elements such as human f a c t o r s ,  hazard ana lys is ,  management 
systems, i n f o r m a t i o n  systems, i n s p e c t i o n  and maintenance programs, and 
serv ices .  The d e t a i  1s o f  these concepts f i l l  a  textbook and thus  cannot be 
repeated here. MORT ana lys i  s  cannot be performed adequately w i thou t  t h e  MORT 
t e x t ,  so t h e  m in ing  i n d u s t r y ,  i f  they  w ish  t o  perform t h i s  a n a l y s i s  themselves, 
w i l l  most l i k e l y  have t o  o b t a i n  t h i s  document. It i s  a v a i l a b l e  f rom Nat iona l  
Technical  I n fo rma t ion  Serv ice  i n  S p r i n g f i e l d ,  V i r g i n i a .  Supplementary MORT- 
r e l a t e d  documents a re  l i s t e d  i n  Table 17. These documents a r e  extremely u s e f u l  
f o r  h e l p i n g  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s  technique and s p e c i f i c  s a f e t y  program 
concepts. I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  these documents, a  one-week short -course on MORT 
a n a l y s i s  i s  taught  under t h e  sponsorship o f  t h e  System Safe ty  Development 
Center, operated f o r  t h e  Department o f  Energy by E.G. and G. Idaho, Inc.  It 
i s  recommended t h a t  t h e  mine s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s  who may be performing t h i s  
TABLE 17. - L i s t i n g  o f  MORT analys is- re la ted doc m n ts  published Y 9  by the system sa fe ty  development center (SSDC) a 
DOCUMENT NUMBER TITLE 
ERDA-76-45-1 SSDC-1 Occupancy-Use Readiness Manual 
ERDA-76-45-2 SSDC-2 Human Fac to rs  i n  Design 
ERDA-76-45-3 SSDC-3 A Cont rac tor  Gui de t o  Advance P repa ra t i on  f o r  Acci dent 
I n v e s t i  g a t i  on 
ERDA-76-45-4 SSDC-4 MORT Use r ' s  Manual 
ERnA-76-45-5 SSDC-5 Reported S i g n i f i c a n t  Observa t ion  (RSO) Stud ies  
ERDA-76-45-6 SSDC-6 T r a i n i n g  as Re1 a t e d  t o  Behav iora l  Change 
ERDA-76-45-7 SSDC-7 ERDA Guide t o  t h e  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of  Occupat ional  
I n j u r i e s  & I 1  1 nesses 
ERDA-76-45-8 SSDC-8 S tanda rd i za t i on  Guide f o r  Cons t ruc t i on  8 Use o f  MORT- 
Type A n a l y t i c  Trees 
EROA-76-45-9 SSDC-9 Safe ty  I n f o r m a t i  on System Gui de 
ERDA-76-45-10 SSnC-10 Sa fe t y  I n f o r m a t i o n  System Cata log ing  
ERDA-76-45-11 SSDC-11 Risk Management Gui de 
DOE-76-45-12 SSDC-12 Safety Consi de ra t i ons  i n Eva lua t i on  o f  Maintenance 
Programs 
DOE-76-45-13 SSDC-13 Management Fac to rs  i n Acc ident  /Tnci dents ( l n c l  ud i  ng  
Management S e l f - E v a l u a t i o n  Checksheets) 
DOE-76-45-14 SSDC-14 Events & Causal Fac to rs  Cha r t i ng  
DOE-76-45-15 SSDC-15 Work Process Cont ro l  Gui de 
DOE-76-45-16 SSDC-16 SPRO D r i  11 i n g  8 Completion Operat ions 
DOE-76-45-17 SSDC-17 Appl i c a t i  ons o f  MORT t o  Review o f  Safety Analyses 
DOE-76-45-18 SS3C-18 Safe ty  Performance Measurement System 
DOE-76-45-18 SSDC-19 Job Sa fe t y  Ana l ys i s  
DOE-76-45-20 SSDC-20 Management Eva lua t i on  8 Cont ro l  o f  Release o f  Hazardous 
Ma te r i a  1s 
DOE-76-45-21 SSDC-21 Change Cont ro l  and Ana l ys i s  
DOE-76-45-22 SSDC-22 R e l i a b i l i t y  & F a u l t  Tree Ana l ys i s  
( a )  SSDC i s  c u r r e n t l y  opera ted  f o r  t h e  U.S. Department of Energy by E.G. and G. 
Idaho, Inc., Idaho F a l l s ,  Idaho. 
a n a l y s i s  on t h e i r  mines have copies of these documents and a t t e n d  t h e  s h o r t  
course. Valuable i n s i g h t s  on t h e  procedure and on t h e  t o t a l  s a f e t y  program 
concept a r e  revea led i n  these sources t h a t  cannot be presented i n  t h i s  
document due t o  t h e  l e n g t h  o f  t h e  d iscuss ion.  
The MORT a n a l y s i  s  technique was o r i  g ina l  l y  devel oped as an acc ident  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  t o o l .  It c o u l d  be used s u c c e s s f u l l y  i n  t h e  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y  f o r  
t h i s  a p p l i c a t i o n .  MORT i s  designed t o  determine t h e  bas i c  events assoc ia ted 
w i t h  an acc ident  and thus,  i f  used i n  t h i s  manner, cou ld  prevent  t h e  recurrence 
o f  many min ing accidents.  However, MORT a n a l y s i s  has been i n c r e a s i n g l y  
u t i l i z e d  as a  p lann ing  t o o l  f o r  deve lop ing s a f e t y  and t r a i n i n g  programs. The 
MORT methodology i s  an i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  hundreds o f  s a f e t y  program elements and 
can be used as a  c h e c k l i s t  f o r  ensu r ing  t h a t  as many s a f e t y  concepts as 
p o s s i b l e  a r e  considered. Used i n  t h i s  manner, implementaton o f  MORT ana lys i s  
techniques would b e n e f i t  t h e  m in ing  i n d u s t r y  by s t r u c t u r i n g  t h e  p lann ing  o f  an 
acc ident  p reven t ion  program i n t o  a  l o g i c a l  format. It i s  be l i eved  t h a t  t h i s  
cou ld  reduce t h e  numbers o f  bo th  se r ious  and minor  acc idents  a t  mines which n o t  
o n l y  improves s a f e t y  bu t  a l s o  reduces t h e  medical and l o s t  work-t ime expenses 
p a i d  by mine opera tors  and increases p r o d u c t i v i t y .  
A n a l - ~ s i   Procedure 
The acronym MORT i s  t h e  name g iven t o  t h e  l o g i c  diagram t h a t  d i sp lays  t h e  
elements and concepts o f  t h e  MORT s a f e t y  program. A u n i v e r s a l  l o g i c  diagram i s  
used i n  MORT ana lys i s  as a  master "work sheet"  t o  examine a  s p e c i f i c  acc ident  
o r  t o  eva luate  e x i s t i n g  o r  developing s a f e t y  programs. The MORT diagram i s  
very  l a r g e  and d i s p l a y s  over 1500 s a f e t y  program elements o r  "bas ic  events"  i n  
an o r d e r l y  and s t r u c t u r e d  manner. It i d e n t i f i e s  t h e  de ta i  1s and r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
t h a t  must be considered t o  . i d e n t i f y  p o t e n t i a l  hazards and prevent  ove rs igh ts  
and omissions t h a t  cou ld  l e a d  t o  accidents.  The MORT diagram and a n a l y s i s  
technique can be a p p l i e d  i n  some form t o  a l l  t ypes o f  s a f e t y  concerns i n  a l l  
areas o f  t h e  m in ing  i ndus t r y .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  i d e n t i f y i n g  and e v a l u a t i n g  
p o t e n t i a l  s a f e t y  problems, MORT a n a l y s i s  i d e n t i f i e s  t h e  management system's 
weaknesses and s t reng ths  i n  regard  t o  t h e  s a f e t y  program and prov ides a  bas is  
f o r  management t o  make r a t i o n a l  and in formed dec is ions  concerning acc ident  
prevent ion .  
MORT ana lys i s  uses t h e  concept o f  unwanted energy f l ows  and b a r r i e r s  t o  
t h e  energy f lows t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  many f a c t o r s  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  a  p o t e n t i a l  
acc ident .  Energy f l ows  a r e  normal ly  c l a s s i f i e d  i n t o  ca tegor ies  o f  energy 
forms, such as thermal ,  e l e c t r i c a l ,  o r  k i n e t i c .  For example, i f  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  
acc iden t  under cons ide ra t i on  i s  a  person be ing  s t ruck  by a  moving f ron t -end  
loader ,  t h e  unwanted energy f low i s  a  f l o w  of k i n e t i c  energy, o r  t h e  energy o f  
moving ob jec ts .  Examples of  energy forms present  a t  a  m in ing  s i t e  a re  shown i n  
Table 18. Accidents a r e  caused by some i n t e r a c t i o n  o f  these energy f lows w i t h  
persons and ob jec ts .  Accidents u s u a l l y  occur because o f  a  l a c k  o f  adequate 
b a r r i e r s  and/or c o n t r o l s  assoc ia ted w i t h  t h e  unwanted energy f low.  
Th is  b r i ngs  up t h e  concept of  b a r r i e r s .  B a r r i e r s  a r e  prov ided t o  prevent  
t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  unwanted energy from i t s  source t o  a  t a r g e t  (persons o r  
o b j e c t s ) .  Some examples o f  energy b a r r i e r s  a t  t y p i c a l  m in ing  s i t e s  a re  shown 
. -0 
TABLE 18, - Energy forms p resen t  a t  t y p i c a l  m i n i n g  s i t e s  
ELECTRICAL 
Transformers 
W i r i n g  
Power t o o l s  
Pumps 
H o i s t i n g  equipment 
Crane l oads  i n  mo t i on  
Moving v e h i c l e s  
H igh  p ressure  a i  r 1  i nes 
H igh  p ressu re  o i l  l i n e s  




R o t a t i n g  components 
H o i s t i n g  Equipment 
FLAMMABLE MATERIALS 
D i e s e l  f u e l  (emergency 
genera to rs  and s to rage )  
Gaso l ine  ( v e h i c l e s  and 
s to rage )  
L u b r i c a t i o n  o i  1  
Grease 
Rags and waste 
THERMAL 
Con vec t  i on 
Conduct ion 
F i r e  
CORROSIVE 
Aci ds 
Caus t ics  
N a t u r a l  chemicals  ( a i r ,  water ,  s o i l  ) 
Excavated m a t e r i a l  ( l e a c h i n g )  
POTENTIAL (Fa1 1  s  and D r o ~ s l  
Human e f f o r t  
S t a i r s ,  l adde rs ,  s c a f f o l d s  
Excavat ion  
POTENTIAL (Cranes and L i f t s  1 
Cranes 
S l i n g s  
Hoi s t s  
E l e v a t o r s  
TOX I UPATHOGEN1 C 
Carbon monoxide 
Dust  and p a r t i c u l a t e s  
Oxygen d e f i c i e n c y  
Rad ioac t i ve  p a r t i c u l a t e s  
Mine gases 
Dynami t e  
caps 
Pr imer Cord 
Dust  
Fuel o i  1  and g a s o l i n e  t r u c k s  
Mine gases 
i n  Tab le  19. B a r r i e r s  may be p h y s i c a l  des ign  f e a t u r e s ,  p r o t e c t i v e  equipment, 
s a f e t y  devices,  warn ings o f  hazardous c o n d i t i o n s ,  s a f e  o p e r a t i n g  procedures, 
and personnel  exper ience,  The MORT techn ique  a l l o w s  t h e  a n a l y s t  t o  e v a l u a t e  
t h e  adequacy o f  b a r r i e r s  t o  each p o t e n t i a l  a c c i d e n t  sequence t o  determine i f  
t h e r e  a r e  f a i l e d  b a r r i e r s ,  b a r r i e r s  wh ich  a r e  n o t  p rov ided ,  a v a i l a b l e  b a r r i e r s  
wh ich  were n o t  used, o r  no b a r r i e r s  poss ib l e ,  
TABLE 19. - Examples o f  energy b a r r i e r s  f o r  t y p i c a l  m in ing  s i t e s  
TY pe Example B a r r i e r s  
L i m i t  energy source Motor speed c o n t r o l  l e r s  
Prevent bu i l d -up  o f  energy form Pressure r e l i e f  valve, b u r s t  d i sc  
Prevent re lease o f  energy source E l e c t r i c a l  i n s u l a t i o n  
Separate o r  channel away energy E l e c t r i c a l  groundi ng 
source 
Physical  b a r r i e r s  
- Placed on source Guards on fans, motors, e tc .  
- Placed between personnel R a i l  on s c a f f o l d  
and source 
- Placed on Personnel Hard ha t  
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  examining unwanted energy f l ows  and b a r r i e r s ,  MORT ana lys i s  
examines t h e  t h i r d  f a c t o r  i n  a  p o t e n t i a l  acc ident  sequence, i .e., t h e  persons/ 
o b j e c t s  t h a t  may be injured/damaged by i n t e r a c t i n g  w i t h  t h e  unwanted energy. 
These persons/objects are  s a i d  t o  be i n  t h e  energy "channel ." MORT ana lys i s  
examines t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  presence o f  persons o r  ob jec ts  i n  t h e  energy channel, 
i .em, t h e  ana lys t  must answer t h e  quest ion,  "For what reasons are  these persons 
o r  ob jec ts  i nvo lved  i n  t h i s  l o c a t i o n ? "  The MORT technique evaluates the  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o n t r o l s  on and evasive a c t i o n s  t h a t  cou ld  be taken by 
p a r t i c u l a r  persons o r  ob jec ts  i n  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  accident .  Ana lys is  o f  t h i s  
t h i r d  f a c t o r  i n  a p o t e n t i a l  acc ident  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  use fu l  f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  
sa fe  opera t ing  procedures f o r  personnel and f o r  eva lua t ing  one aspect o f  
management's preparat ion f o r  emergency s i t u a t i o n s  where a  l a r g e  f r a c t i o n  o f  t h e  
mine personnel might  be i n  t h e  energy channel. 
MORT ana lys i s  i nvo lves  t h e  use o f  what are  c a l l e d  " a n a l y t i c a l  t rees."  
These a re  s imply a  convenient way o f  d i s p l a y i n g  a  l a r g e  amount o f  i n fo rmat ion  
on a  diagram. A n a l y t i c a l  t r e e s  are  shaped l i k e  t r e e s  i n  t h a t  they s t a r t  a t  t h e  
t o p  w i t h  a  s i n g l e  undesired event and branch out  below u n t i l  t h e  basic events, 
which a re  t h e  under l y ing  causes o f  t h e  t o p  event, a re  determined. I n  an 
a n a l y t i c a l  t r e e ,  t h e  t o p  o r  major event o r  outcome i s  stated.  On t h e  next  
lower t i e r  are  l i s t e d  those events t h a t  cou ld  l e a d  t o  occurrence o f  t h e  t o p  
event. Each o f  these i s  broken down i n t o  more and more bas ic  events t o  reveal  
t h e  sources t h a t  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  t o p  event. 
To i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  t h i n k i n g  process behind t h i s  l o g i c ,  consider a  mine 
v e n t i l a t i o n  system. F a i l u r e  of t h i s  system t o  prov ide f r e s h  a i r  t o  miners 
downhole cou ld  cause su f foca t ion  and bu i ld -up o f  harmful o r  exp los ive  gases. 
The t o p  event f o r  t h i s  i l l u s t r a t i o n  i s  assumed t o  be f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  mine 
v e n t i l a t i o n  system t o  p rov ide  s u f f i c i e n t  f r e s h  a i r  downhole. The t h i n k i n g  
process t h e  ana lys t  goes through t o  cons t ruc t  an a n a l y t i c a l  t r e e  f o r  t h i s  t o p  
event  i s  as fo l l ows .  F i r s t ,  t h e  a n a l y s t  considers t h e  t o p  event and asks t h e  
t e s t  quest ion,  "How cou ld  t h i s  happen?" Some o f  t h e  answers might  be f a i l u r e  
of  t h e  e l e c t r i c  power supply system o r  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  v e n t i l a t i o n  fan. Next, 
t h e  ana lys t  asks t h e  t e s t  quest ion  rega rd ing  t h e  second t i e r  o f  events. The 
a n a l y s i s  cont inues u n t i l  t h e  s p e c i f i c  causes and e n t i r e  range o f  accident  
"sequences" have been i den t i  f ied.  
To understand t h e  MORT ana lys i s  procedure and t h e  techniques f o r  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  and use o f  a n a l y t i c a l  t r e e s ,  t h e  reader must become fami 1  i a r  w i t h  
t h e  symbols and abbrev ia t i ons  used i n  MORT ana lys is .  The symbols (sometimes 
r e f e r r e d  t o  as "gates" )  a r e  used t o  represent  t h e  l o g i c  f o r  combining events 
i n t o  acc ident  sequences. For example, t h e  mine v e n t i l a t i o n  system cou ld  f a i  1  
i f  e i t h e r  e l e c t r i c  power i s  unava i l ab le  OR i f  t h e  fan  system f a i l s  t o  operate. 
Thus a  symbol i s  needed t o  represent  t h e a ~  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  which means t h a t  t h e  
output  event (i.e., mine v e n t i l a t i o n  s y s t G  f a i l u r e )  can r e s u l t  i f  any o f  t h e  
i n p u t  events occur. A second symbol used e x t e n s i v e l y  i n  a n a l y t i c a l  t r e e s  i s  
t h e  - AND symbol. This symbol represents  t h e  l o g i c  where a1 1  o f  t h e  i n p u t  events 
must occur f o r  t h e  output  event  t o  occur. For example, i n  order  f o r  a  mine 
ho i  s t i n g  bucket t o  fa1  1  uncont ro l  l e d  down t h e  s h a f t  (ou tput  event ) ,  t h e  
bucke t ' s  pr imary b r a k i n g  system AND t h e  emergency b rak ing  system must bo th  
- 
f a i  1  a t  t h e  same time. Therefore, t h e  l a t t e r  two events, which are  i n p u t  
events t o  t h e  u n c o n t r o l l e d  f a l l i n g  bucket event, a re  connected w i t h  an AND 
- 
symbol, These symbols a re  presented and descr ibed i n  F igu re  6. 
The - AND and - OR symbols are  used t h e  most o f t e n  when c o n s t r u c t i n g  
a n a l y t i c a l  t rees .  Two o the r  l o g i c  symbols o r  gates t h a t  a re  used occas iona l l y  
i n  s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n s ,  as shown i n  F igu re  6, a re  t h e  "INHIBIT-gate" and t h e  
"DELAY-gate." The INHIBIT-gate i s  a  spec ia l  case o f  t h e  AND-gate, where some 
q u a l i f y i n g  c o n d i t i o n  must be s a t i s f i e d  before  t h e  i n p u t  can produce t h e  
output. A hexagon i s  used t o  represent  t h e  INHIBIT-gate and t h e  c o n d i t i o n a l  
i n p u t  i s  s p e l l e d  out  i n  an e l l i p s e  drawn t o  t h e  r i g h t  o f  t h e  gate. As an 
example o f  an a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  t ype  o f  gate, cons ider  t h e  event " F i r e  occurs 
i n  a  d iese l  e l e c t r i c  generator." One o f  t h e  causes o f  t h i s  event might  be a  
leak  i n  t h e  f u e l  system t h a t  i g n i t e s  when t h e  generator i s  energized. One 
c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  must be s a t i s f i e d  i n  order  f o r  t h i s  f i r e  t o  occur i s  t h a t  
cu r ren t  must be supp l i ed  t o  t h e  d i e s e l  engine s t a r t e r  system i n  order  f o r  an 
e l e c t r i c a l  spark t o  i g n i t e  t h e  l e a k i n g  f u e l .  This i s  an example o f  an INHIBIT- 
gate f o r  i 1 l u s t r a t i o n  purposes only.  
The DELAY-gate, shown i n  F igu re  6, i s  represented by an e l l i p s e  a t tached 
beneath an event  symbol. Th is  gate i s  used t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  output  occurs 
o n l y  a f t e r  a  s p e c i f i e d  delay t ime has elapsed. To i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  use o f  t h i s  
gate, consider t h e  mine ven t i  l a t i o n  system which n o t  o n l y  supp l i es  b rea th ing  
a i r  f o r  miners downhole, bu t  a l s o  d i l u t e s  and c a r r i e s  away p o t e n t i a l l y  
exp los i ve  mine gases such as methane. Once t h e  v e n t i l a t i o n  system has f a i l e d ,  
i t  takes a  p e r i o d  o f  t ime before  t h e  mine gases can b u i l d  up t o  a  p o i n t  where 
they  are  p o t e n t i a l l y  exp los i ve  mixtures.  The DELAY-gate would be used i n  t h i s  
ins tance t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e  amount o f  t ime  t h a t  must e lapse a f t e r  t h e  v e n t i l a t i o n  
system f a i  1s ( i n p u t  event )  t o  produce t h e  p o t e n t i a l  exp los ion o f  mine gases 
(output  event) .  
fault 
lnput I fault I 
(cause) 
And-gate: Coexistence of all input events 
required to produce output event 
Or-gate: Output wi l l  occur if at least one input 
occurs 
Inhibit-gate: lnput produces output directly 
when conditional input is satisfied 
output Delay-gate: Output occurs after specified delay 
time has elapsed 
Priority and-gate: Output occurs only if all input events 
occur in a particular sequence ' 
FIGURE 6. - Logic symbols used in construction MORT-type analytical trees 
The e l l i p s e  symbol i s  used t o  i n d i c a t e  c o n d i t i o n s  o r  r e s t r i c t i o n s  t h a t  
apply t o  normal AND- and OR-gates. When a t tached t o  an OR-gate, t h e  new symbol 
i s  c a l l e d  an "EXCLUSIVE OR-gate." Th is  gate i s  used i n  t h e  spec ia l  case where 
t h e  ou tpu t  event occurs on l y  i f  e x a c t l y  one o f  t h e  i n p u t s  occur. Th i s  gate 
d i f f e r s  from t h e  usual  OR-gate i n  s i t u a t i o n s  where t h e  output  event w i l l  no t  
occur if more than one i n p u t  event occurs a t  t h e  same t ime. When t h e  e l l i p s e  
i s  a t tached t o  t h e  normal AND-gate, t h e  new symbol i s  c a l l e d  a "PRIORITY AND- 
gate." Th is  gate i s  used where t h e  output  event occurs on l y  if a l l  i n p u t  
events occur i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  sequence. The sequence i s  recorded w i t h i n  t h e  
e l l i p s e .  It i s  r a r e l y  necessary i n  p r a c t i c e  t o  have t o  use these symbols. 
Symbols a r e  a l s o  used t o  represent  events. The event symbols used f o r  
c o n s t r u c t i n g  a n a l y t i c a l  t r e e s  a r e  shown i n  F igu re  7. The d i f f e r e n t  event 
symbols a r e  used t o  represent  d i f f e r e n t  types o f  events. The CIRCLE denotes a 
bas i c  event t h a t  can no t  be developed f u r t h e r .  These a r e  t h e  under l y ing  causes 
o f  acc idents  t h a t  t h e  ana lys t  wishes t o  determine. Somewhat s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  
CIRCLE-symbol i s t h e  DIAMOND-symbol which a 1 so represents events t h a t  a r e  n o t  
developed f u r t h e r .  However, t h e  events w i t h i n  a DIAMOND a re  no t  f u l l y  
developed t o  t h e i r  bas i c  causes, e i t h e r  because t h e  event i s  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
impor tant  o r  because i n f o r m a t i o n  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  event i s  unava i lab le .  The 
HOUSE-symbol i s  used t o  s i g n i f y  an event t h a t  i s  normal ly  expected t o  occur and 
i s  thus  n o t  a f a u l t  o r  f a i l u r e  event. For example, cons ider  a f i r e  caused by 
f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  f i l l i n g  l i n e s  used t o  t r a n s p o r t  fue l  f rom s torage tanks  t o  
su r face  veh ic les  such as f ront-end- loaders.  Th is  f i r e  can on ly  occur du r ing  
f i l l i n g  opera t ions  as these l i n e s  have f u e l  i n  them o n l y  d u r i n g  t h i s  t ime. The 
HOUSE-symbol i s  used i n  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h i s  f i r e  can on ly  
occur w h i l e  a v e h i c l e  i s  be ing  re fue led.  The f i n a l  event symbol on F igure  7 i s  
t h e  RECTANGLE which i s  used t o  i d e n t i f y  events t h a t  a r e  combinations o f  more 
bas i c  events. The outputs  shown above t h e  l o g i c  gates p r e v i o u s l y  discussed 
must be w i t h i n  RECTANGLE symbols. 
A TRIANGLE symbol i s  a l s o  shown on F igu re  7 bu t  i s  n o t  a c t u a l l y  an event 
symbol. The TRIANGLE s i g n i f i e s  what i s  c a l l e d  t h e  " t r a n s f e r  operator." The 
t r a n s f e r  symbol i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a t ime-sav ing measure used t o  represent  exact  
r e p e t i t i o n s  o f  a branch o f  a t r e e  t h a t  i s  found elsewhere. For example, 
f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  e l e c t r i c  power supply a t  a mine i s  an event assoc ia ted w i t h  many 
system f a i  l u r e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  v e n t i l a t i o n  system and h o i s t i n g  system f a i l u r e .  Le t  
us say, f o r  instance,  t h a t  t h e  e l e c t r i c  power f a i l u r e  event i s  developed as one 
o f  t h e  causes o f  t h e  v e n t i l a t i o n  system f a i l u r e .  By u s i n g  t h e  t r a n s f e r  symbol, 
t h e  e n t i  r e  branch o f  t h e  t r e e  f o r  e l e c t r i c  power f a i l u r e  can be repeated under 
t h e  h o i s t i n g  system f a i l u r e  event  w i t h o u t  drawing t h e  e n t i r e  branch. Two 
TRIANGLE symbols a r e  r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h i s  opera t ion ;  a t r a n s f e r - i n  symbol i s  
p laced i n  t h e  l o c a t i o n  where t h e  branch o f  t h e  t r e e  w i l l  n o t  be drawn ( i  .em, 
under t h e  h o i s t i n g  system f a i l u r e  i n  t h e  above i l l u s t r a t i o n )  and t h e  t r a n s f e r -  
out, which i s  p laced i n  t h e  l o c a t i o n  where t h e  branch o f  t h e  t r e e  i s  drawn 
( i  .em, under t h e  v e n t i l a t i o n  system f a i l u r e ,  a t tached t o  t h e  e l e c t r i c  power 
f a i l u r e  event  t h a t  i s  assumed t o  be drawn i n  t h i s  l o c a t i o n ) .  Numbers o r  
l e t t e r s  are  normal ly  p laced insde t h e  t r i a n g l e  symbols t o  he lp  t h e  ana lys t  keep 
t r a c k  o f  t h e  t r a n s f e r s .  
n Event symbols [ ) Circle - Denotes basic initiating event req"iring no further 
development 
0 Diamond - Denotes undeveloped events which are not further developed because it is of insufficient consequence or because information is unavailable 
Rectangle - Denotes an intermediate event that occurs because of 
one or more prior causes acting through logic gates 
0 House - Denotes an event that is normally expected to occur 
0 Ellipse - Denotes a conditioning event or restrictions that apply to any logic gate (used with priority and inhibit gates) 
A Triangle - Transfer symbols; used to represent portions 
of the tree developed elsewhere 
'Common abbreviations used in  Mort analysis 
D/N Did not MGH Potential energy 
LT A Less than adequate SUPV Supervisor 
MGMT Management CONS Consequent 
W/  With PREC Precedent 
FIGURE 7. -   vent symbols and abbrev ia t i ons  used i n  c o n s t r u c t i n g  
MORT-type a n a l y t i c a l  t r e e s  
Many abbrev ia t ions  a r e  used i n  MORT ana l ys i s  t o  a i d  t he  ana l ys t  i n  f i t t i n g  
d e s c r i p t i v e  in fo rmat ion  i n t o  t he  event symbols. The most cormnonly used 
abbrev ia t ions  a r e  shown i n  F igure  7. 
T h i s  completes t he  d i scuss ion  o f  t h e  symbols t h e  a n a l y s t  uses when 
c o n s t r u c t i n g  a n a l y t i c a l  t r ees .  The s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  MORT-type a n a l y t i c a l  t r ee ,  
o r  MORT diagram, i s  shown i n  F i gu re  8. Th i s  f i g u r e  shows t h e  t o p  elements o f  
t h e  MORT diagram which i n  f u l l  i s  a  l a r g e  and d e t a i l e d  a n a l y t i c a l  t r e e .  A copy 
of t h e  e n t i r e  MORT diagram i s  a v a i l a b l e  f rom t h e  System Safety Development 
Center, E.G. and G., Idaho Inc., Idaho F a l l s ,  Idaho. The MORT diagram i s  t h e  
ac tua l  c h e c k l i s t  o f  s a f e t y  program concepts and elements t h a t  a r e  examined t o  
determine t h e  causes o f  acc idents .  A d e t a i l e d  d iscuss ion  o f  a l l  o f  these 
concepts f i l l s  severa l  l a r g e  documents and t hus  cannot be repeated here. For  
t h i s  r e p o r t ,  some genera l  i n f o r m a t i o n  concern ing t h e  t h r e e  main branches o f  
t h e  MORT diagram i s  s u f f i c i e n t .  The reader  i s  d i r e c t e d  t o  t h e  MORT t e x t  and 
suppor t ing  documents f o r  a  more d e t a i l e d  d iscuss ion.  
The s t r u c t u r e  of  t h e  t o p  of t h e  MORT diagram, as shown i n  F igure  8, i s  
composed o f  t h r e e  main branches. Assumed r i s k s  a re  shown on t he  r i g h t  and 
overs igh ts  and omi ss ions due t o  s p e c i f i c  c o n t r o l  fac to rs  and management system 
f a c t o r  a r e  shown on t h e  l e f t .  The MORT technique i s  based on t h e  premise t h a t  
a l l  acc iden ts  a re  a  r e s u l t  o f  e i t h e r  ove rs i gh t s  and omissions ( i  .e., mis takes)  
o r  assumed r i s k s .  Assumed r i s k s  a r e  those events t h a t  have been recognized 
and accepted by proper l e v e l s  of management as acc iden ts  o r  hazardous cond i -  
t i o n s  t h a t  cannot be prevented due t o  techno log ica l  o r  economic cons t ra in ts .  
Unknown o r  unanalyzed r i s k s  cannot be considered as assumed r i s k s .  The reader 
should recognize by inspecton o f  F igure  8 t h a t  t h e  occurrence o f  t h e  t o p  event 
of t h e  t r e e  i s  e i t h e r  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  assumed r i s k s  o r  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  overs igh ts  
and omissions from a  combinat ion o f  l e s s  than  adequate s p e c i f i c  c o n t r o l  fac to rs  
AND management system fac to rs ,  i.e., bo th  of t h e  l a t t e r  two fac to rs  a re  t o  
-
blame f o r  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  acc idents  under ana lys is .  
Analys is  of t h e  s p e c i f i c  c o n t r o l  f a c t o r s  branch o f  t h e  MORT diagram 
develops a  d e t a i l e d  understanding o f  t h e  acc ident  sequence. Th is  branch i s  
used t o  examine t h e  sources o f  unwanted energy f lows t o  determine if s p e c i f i c  
c o n t r o l  f a c t o r s  were overlooked o r  omit ted. Th is  branch a l s o  evaluates t he  
adequacy of t he  b a r r i e r s  prov ided and t h e  involvement o f  t h e  persons and/or 
ob jec t s  t h a t  may be i n j u r e d  o r  damaged. F i n a l l y ,  t h i s  branch examines t h e  
re1 a t  i onshi ps between t h e  sa fe t y  management system and t h e  acc ident  sequence. 
Examples o f  s a f e t y  program elements i n  t h i s  branch a re  i nspec t i on  and 
maintenance plans, superv is ion,  and t echn i ca l  i n f o rma t i on  systems. 
Overs ights  and omissions due t o  management system f a c t o r s  are broken down 
i n t o  t h r e e  main sub-branches. The idea  i s  t o  separa te ly  examine t h e  management 
system's s a f e t y  p o l i c i e s ,  t h e  implementat ion o r  f u l f i l l m e n t  o f  t h e  p o l i c y  
statements, and t h e  system used by management t o  assess t h e  r i s k  o f  personnel 
i n j u r y  o r  p rope r t y  damage and t ake  app rop r i a te  act ions.  The r i s k  assessment 
system i s  used by management t o  determine whether a  p a r t i c u l a r  acc ident  should 
be an assumed r i s k  o r  whether p reven t i ve  a c t i o n  i s  appropr ia te  and feas ib le .  
What and how large were the losses? 
Injuries, damage, other 
costs, performance lost 
or degraded undesired 
program/public impact 
------- 
Oversights e l  
I omissions I risks 
What happened? I Why 
I 1 
I Specific control factors LTA I system factors LTA 
SA1 SA2 MA1 MA2 MA3 
LTA-Less than adequate 









Amelioration Implementation LT A assessment 
system LTA 
r 
This  completes t h e  background in fo rmat ion  regarding MORT analys is  t h a t  
w i  11 be discussed. This in format ion i s  requ i red  t o  understand t he  analys is  
procedure t h a t  i s  the next t o p i c  o f  discussion. 
The MORT analys is  procedure invo lves a close, element-by-element 
examination of t h e  standard MORT diagram ( inc luded i n s i d e  back cover of t h i s  
repor t ) .  The analys is  procedure discussed i n  t h i s  sect ion i s  d i rec ted  towards 
planning o r  eva lua t ing  a sa fe ty  program, although MORT analys is  i s  a lso  used as 
an accident i nves t i ga t i on  t oo l .  Before beginning t he  MORT analysis, t he  
analys t  must become thoroughly f a m i l i a r  w i t h  t he  system under considerat ion and 
should a1 so ob ta in  t he  MORT documents discussed previously.  The analys is  
begins w i t h  se l ec t i on  o f  the  accident t o  be examined. This can be postu la ted 
us ing  t he  ana l ys t ' s  personal experience o r  us ing  some other  sa fe ty  assessment 
technique, such as Pre l iminary  Hazards Analysis. The accident sequence and 
associated unwanted energy f lows are recorded and examined under t he  event 
"ACCIDENT" (denoted SA1) shown on Figure 8. It i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  more than one 
energy f low i s  needed t o  cause t he  accident. I n  t h i s  case, t he  causes o f  each 
unwanted energy f low must be examined. The causes a re  categor ized i n t o  6 
classes, labe led SD1 t o  SD6 on t he  la rge  MORT diagram. Each o f  these 
categor ies  i s  i n  t u r n  broken down i n t o  more and more basic safety program 
elements which, i f  l ess  than adequate, could con t r ibu te  t o  t he  po ten t i a l  
accident. The shor t  statements w r i t t e n  i n  t he  event symbols o f  t h e  MORT 
diagram need more c l a r i f i c a t i o n  than can be given here. The best sources fo r  
more in format ion are t he  MORT User's Manual ( ~ n o x  and Eicher 1976) and MORT 
t e x t  (Johnson 1973). The user ' s  manual contains cross-referenced explanat ion 
of t he  shor t  statements and sa fe ty  program elements i n  t he  event symbols, 
indexed w i t h  t h e  numbers on t h e  MORT diagram (such as SC1, SD6, etc.) and 
appropr ia te  page references t o  t he  de ta i l ed  explanations presented i n  the  MORT 
tex t .  These two documents a re  requi red f o r  the  analys t  t o  perform an e f f e c t i v e  
analysis.  
Causes of the  unwanted energy f l ow (s )  a re  one o f  the  th ree  s p e c i f i c  
con t ro l s  associated w i t h  t he  po ten t i a l  accidents. The other two con t ro ls  are 
less  than adequate b a r r i e r s  (SR2) and less  than adequate con t ro l  o f  persons o r  
ob jects  i n  t he  energy channel (SB3). The analys t  evaluates these fac to rs  by 
examining the  safety concepts shown on t he  MORT diagram under these two 
"events." Again, t he  above referenced documents he lp  t o  make t he  short  "event" 
statements more c lear .  This completes t he  discussion o f  t he  analys is  procedure 
f o r  t he  s p e c i f i c  con t ro l  fac to rs  branch o f  t he  MORT diagram. 
Management system factors  t h a t  could con t r ibu te  t o  t he  po ten t i a l  accident 
a re  examined under t h e  branch labe led  "M". The analys t  considers the 
management system concepts, which, if less  than adequately def ined o r  
implemented, cou ld  con t r i bu te  t o  t he  occurrence o f  the  accident. These factors  
are considered i n  l i g h t  of t he  knowledge gained by analys is  o f  t h e  spec i f i c  
con t ro l  f ac to r s  branch. The analys is  procedure f o r  the  management systems 
branch i s  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t he  procedure fo r  t he  spec i f i c  con t ro l  f ac to r s  branch. 
Again, de ta i l ed  discussion o f  each management system f a c t o r  i s  beyond the  scope 
o f  t h i s  manual. 
Throughout t he  analys is ,  i t  w i l l  become obvious t h a t  some branches of t h e  
MORT diagram are more re levant  than others. The analys t  can a l so  i d e n t i f y  
sa fe t y  elements which, i f  l ess  than adequately implemented, cou ld  con t r i bu te  t o  
t h e  occurrence of t h e  p o t e n t i a l  accident. Therefore, some way of record ing t he  
in format ion obtained i s  required. One method t h a t  uses t he  l a rge  MORT diagram 
as a  worksheet i s  as fo l lows.  F i r s t ,  a  thorough examination of t he  major 
branches o f  t he  MORT diagram w i l l  reveal  branches t h a t  a re  no t  re levant  t o  the  
p o t e n t i a l  accident under considerat ion.  These branches can be marked w i t h  a  
large,  r ed  " X "  t o  i d e n t i f y  branches t h a t  need no f u r t h e r  considerat ion.  Next, 
t h e  analys t  examines t he  more bas ic  sa fe ty  concepts i n  d e t a i l .  Those t h a t  a re  
considered t o  be i r r e l e v a n t  should be i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  a  red c i r c l e .  Those 
elements and concepts t h a t  a re  re levan t  requ i re  f u r t h e r  cons iderat ion t o  
determine i f  they a re  con t r ibu to rs  t o  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  accident. A t  t h i s  po in t ,  
t he  analys t  evaluates t he  adequacy o f  t h e  sa fe ty  concepts on t h e  diagram i n  
regard t o  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  accident. Test questions t h a t  he lp  determine t h e i r  
adequacy are contained i n  t h e  MORT User's Manual (Knox and Eicher 1976). Those 
t h a t  a re  no t  adequate and a re  shown t o  be po ten t i a l  con t r i bu to r s  t o  t he  
occurrence o f  t he  accident should be marked w i t h  a  b lue  c i r c l e .  It i s  he lp fu l  
t o  record notes o f  t h i s  eva luat ion process t o  a i d  f u t u r e  use of these resu l t s .  
I n  fact ,  i t  i s  extremely use fu l  t o  fo rma l l y  describe t h i s  process i n  a  format 
t h a t  uses t h e  index number o f  each element o f  t h e  MORT diagram. An example t o  
i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  i s  presented l a t e r  i n  t h i s  manual. 
Next, t he  analys t  should d isp lay  t h e  r e s u l t s  by drawing a  MORT-type 
a n a l y t i c a l  t r e e  t h a t  i s  spec i f i c  t o  t he  accident be ing analyzed. The same 
format used i n  t h e  l a rge  MORT diagram can be used, but  on l y  t he  sa fe ty  elements 
and concepts t h a t  were determined t o  apply t o  t h e  accident sequence and are 
judged t o  be l ess  than adequate a re  included. The analys t  begins a t  the  top  o f  
t h e  t r e e  by i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  consequences o f  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  accident and 
continues downward. I t  w i  11 most l i k e l y  requ i re  more than one page t o  record 
t he  e n t i  r e  t r e e  so t r ans fe r  symbols should be used t o  i d e n t i f y  - interconnect ions 
between pages. Th is  completes t he  discussion o f  the  MORT ana lys is  procedure. 
The procedure i s  summarized i n  Table 20. 
Advantages and Disadvantages 
One advantage of MORT analys is  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  a  very comprehensive tech- 
nique t h a t  attempts t o  evaluate a l l  aspects o f  sa fe ty  i n  any type of work. It 
i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  on ly  method t h a t  examines a l l  th ree  aspects associated w i t h  
an i n d u s t r i a l  system (hardware, humans, and management systems) separately and 
as they ac t  together t o  cause accidents. MORT i s  a  s t r uc tu red  and systematic 
ana lys is  technique although i t  i s  f l e x i b l e  and a l lows incorpora t ion  o f  new 
ideas and concepts. MORT analys is  r e s u l t s  can suggest improvements t o  an 
e x i s t i n g  sa fe ty  program which could save l i v e s ,  reduce i n j u r i e s ,  and reduce 
p roper ty  damage. I n  addi t ion,  t he  technique i s  useful f o r - i d e n t i f y i n g  areas 
where f u r t h e r  use o f  safety systems (such as safety equipment, warning signs, 
and t r a i n i n g )  could reduce the  1  i ke l i hood  of accidents. Furthermore, much o f  
t h e  ana lys is  has been performed f o r  t he  analys t  i n  t h a t  t he  MORT diagram and 
reference documents conta in  a  wealth o f  i n fo rmat ion  t h a t  could a s s i s t  improving 
an e x i s t i n g  sa fe ty  program o r  developing a  new one.. 
TABLE 20. - Step by s tep  procedure f o r  performing 
a MORT ana lys i s  
Step 1: Obtain adequate working knowledge o f  t h e  system. 
Step 2: Se lec t  t h e  acc ident  t o  be analyzed: The s e l e c t i o n  process can be 
a ided by per forming a p r e l i m i n a r y  hazards ana lys i s  t o  i d e n t i f y  
p o t e n t i a l  acc ident  sequences. 
Step 3: I d e n t i f y  hazardous energy f lows and b a r r i e r s  associated w i t h  t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  acc ident  sequence: The ana lys t  may use c h e c k l i s t s  t o  
i d e n t i f y  these elements. 
Step 4: Record t h i s  i n fo rma t ion  i n  t h e  standard MORT-type a n a l y t i c a l  t r e e  
format: The ana lys t  should copy t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  standard MORT 
diagram and inco rpo ra te  t h e  unwanted energy f l o w  and b a r r i e r  
i n fo rma t ion .  Th is  i n fo rma t ion  i s  contained i n  t h e  s p e c i f i c  c o n t r o l  
f a c t o r s  branch o f  t h e  MORT diagram. 
Step 5: Evaluate t h e  causat ive  f a c t o r s  o f  t h e  i n i t i a l  unwanted energy 
f lows : Th is  i s  done by examining a l l  sa fe ty  program elements o f  t h e  
MORT diagram i n  regard  t o  t h e  unwanted energy f low. The technique 
asks quest ions about each safe ty  element t h a t  t h e  ana lys t  i s  t o  
answer. 
Step 6: Record t h e  sa fe ty  program elements which a r e  determined t o  be l e s s  
than adequate i n  regard  t o  t h e  unwanted energy f l ow :  Copy t h e  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  MORT diagram and inc lude  on ly  those elements t h a t  
a r e  determined t o  be l e s s  than adequate. 
Step 7: Continue ana lyz ing t h e  s a f e t y  program elements i n  regard  t o  t h e  
r e s t  o f  t h e  unwanted energy f lows ( i f  any): Repeat steps 5 and 6 f o r  
every unwanted energy t low. 
Step 9: Examine t h e  completed ana lys i s  f o r  s a f e t y  program elements 
t h a t c o u l d  reduce t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  acc ident  occurr ing.  
The MORT a n a l y s i s  technique has t h e  disadvantage t h a t  i t  creates  a vast  
amount of complex d e t a i  1. The ana lys t  should make a h a b i t  o f  reco rd ing  notes 
throughout t h e  a n a l y s i s  so he o r  she i s  no t  overcome by t h e  great  d e t a i l .  The 
techn ique i s  a l s o  time-consuming, a t  l e a s t  u n t i l  t h e  ana lys t  has gained 
experience. MORT ana lys i s  i s  a f l e x i b l e  technique, t hus  be ing harder t o  
per form than a "cookbook" t ype  o f  ana lys is .  Th is  technique i s  a l s o  a d i f f i c u l t  
one because i t  emphasizes management's responsi b i  l i t y  t o  p rov ide  a sa fe  work 
p lace.  Resu l ts  o f  t h i s  ana lys i s  can t e s t  t h e  understanding and commitment t o  
s a f e t y  t h a t  management must have t o  ensure a successful  s a f e t y  program. 
E x a m ~ l  e o f  Ana 1  v s i  s  Procedure 
Th is  s e c t i o n  presents an example t.o i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  MORT a n a l y s i s  
procedure. The pos tu la ted  acc ident  chosen f o r  t h i s  example i s  one where a  
h o i s t i n g  bucket  f a l l s  down a  mine sha f t .  The a n a l y s t  f i r s t  becomes f a m i l i a r  
w i t h  t h e  h o i s t i n g  system (see F igu re  1 shown p r e v i o u s l y )  and can q u i c k l y  
determine t h a t  t h i s  i s  a  low p r o b a b i l i t y  acc iden t  because o f  t h e  presence of  
many b a r r i e r s .  The p o s t u l a t e d  sequence o f  events l e a d i n g  up t o  rope f a i l u r e  
and a  f a l l i n g  bucket  i s  as fo l l ows .  F i r s t ,  t h e  hoistman must be l i f t i n g  
personnel f rom t h e  s h a f t  bottom w i t h  d e f e c t i v e  brakes. E i t h e r  t h e  brake 
h y d r a u l i c  pressure gauge i s  d e f e c t i v e  o r  has been disengaged r e s u l t i n g  i n  t h e  
bucket b e i n g  h o i s t e d  w i t h o u t  brakes. I n  conjuncton w i t h  t h i s ,  t h e  emergency 
brakes must be inoperable.  Another b a r r i e r  t o  t h e  acc iden t  i s  t h e  overwind 
c o n t r o l ,  which a l l ows  t h e  h o i s t  t o  be a u t o m a t i c a l l y  shut  down when t h e  t o p  
l i m i t  i s  reached, thus  a v o i d i n g  a  c o l l i s i o n  o f  t h e  bucket  w i t h  t h e  headframe 
and r e s u l t i n g  rope f a i l u r e .  I f  t h e  bucket i s  s t i l l  be ing  h o i s t e d  a t  t h i s  
p o i n t ,  a  c rash bar  i s  p rov ided t h a t  cou ld  s top t h e  bucket be fo re  i t  h i t s  t h e  
headframe. Two a d d i t i o n a l  b a r r i e r s  a r e  prov ided i n  case t h e  bucket reaches 
t h i s  p o i n t .  F i r s t ,  t h e  rope i s  designed w i t h  a  f a c t o r  o f  s a f e t y  t h a t  cou ld  
prevent  i t s  f a i l u r e  i f  t h e  c rash i s  n o t  t o o  v i o l e n t .  I f  t h e  rope does snap, a  
sa fe ty  ca tch  i s  prov ided t h a t  may be capable o f  s topp ing  t h e  bucket  f rom 
f a l l i n g  t o  t h e  s h a f t  bottom. It i s  due t o  these many s a f e t y  fea tu res  t h a t  t h i s  
acc ident  i s  assigned a  low p r o b a b l i t y  o f  occurrence. 
With t h e  above acc ident  sequence i n  mind, t h e  ana lys t  begins t o  i d e n t i f y  
and examine t h e  unwanted energy f l o w s  t h a t  caused t h e  accident .  F i r s t ,  t h e  
unwanted energy t h a t  causes t h e  bucket  t o  f a l l  down t h e  s h a f t  i s  p o t e n t i a l  
energy o r  t h e  increase i n  energy due t o  r a i s i n g  an o b j e c t  over some distance. 
P r i o r  t o  t h i s ,  t h e  k i n e t i c  energy (energy o f  a  moving o b j e c t )  o f  t h e  bucket 
causes i t  t o  s t r i k e  t h e  headframe. Before  t h i s  happens, t h e  bucket must be i n  
mot ion  ( k i n e t i c  energy) w i t h  d e f e c t i v e  brakes. The a n a l y s t  records t h i s  
i n fo rma t ion  by copying t h e  general s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  MORT diagram and incorpo-  
r a t i n g  t h i s  i n fo rma t ion ,  as shown i n  F igu re  9. Th is  i s  drawn under t h e  
s p e c i f i c  c o n t r o l  f a c t o r s  branch of  t h e  t ree .  Each o f  t h e  causes o f  t h e  
unwanted energy f lows a r e  then examined, i n c l u d i n g  an assessment o f  t h e  
adequacy of t h e  b a r r i e r s  t o  t h e  energy f lows.  The a n a l y s t  examines each safe ty  
element of  t h e  MORT diagram and i n d i c a t e s  which cou ld  be c o n t r i b u t i n g  f a c t o r s  
t o  t h e  p o s t u l a t e d  accident .  An example o f  a  branch f o r  t h e  f a l l i n g  bucket 
acc iden t  i s  shown i n  F igu re  10 f o r  i l l u s t r a t i o n  purposes (no te  t h e  use of t h e  
t r i a n g l e  t r a n s f e r  symbol on Figures 9 and 10). The branch o f  the  t r e e  
shown i n  F igu re  10 i s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s  t h a t  i d e n t i f i e s  p o t e n t i a l  
causes o f  t h e  f a l l i n g  bucket  accident .  The a n a l y s t  cont inues examining and 
reco rd ing  t h e  s p e c i f i c  c o n t r o l  f a c t o r s  shown on t h e  l a r g e  MORT diagram t h a t  
cou ld  cause t h e  unwanted energy flows. Then, w i t h  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  f rom t h i s  
procedure, t h e  a n a l y s t  i s  ready t o  eva luate  t h e  management system f a c t o r s  t h a t  
cou ld  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  acc ident .  The procedure f o r  t h i s  i s  
i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h e  procedure used t o  eva luate  t h e  s p e c i f i c  c o n t r o l  f a c t o r s  
branch, i .e., an element-by-el ement exami n a t i o n  o f  t h e  management system 
f a c t o r s  branch o f  t h e  l a r g e  MORT diagram. 
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FIGURE 10. - Example branch from t h e  MORT diagram f o r  t h e  example problem 
The r e s u l t  o f  t h e  above process i s  a  MORT-type a n a l y t i c a l  t r e e  spec i f i -  
c a l l y  fo r  t he  postu la ted accident. The ana l ys t ' s  next step i s  t o  record t he  
l o g i c  associated w i t h  t h e  po ten t i a l  accident sequence and t he  reasoning behind 
t h e  se lec t i on  of t h e  less  than adequate sa fe ty  elements included i n  t h e  MORT 
diagram. Th is  i s  no t  requi red but  i s  recommended f o r  t h e  analys t  t o  preserve 
d e t a i l s  of t he  eva lua t ion  fo r  fu tu re  use. A s t ruc tu red  format indexed t o  
proper loca t ions  on t h e  MORT diagram l i k e  t h a t  shown i n  Table 21 i s  useful .  
Resul ts of t h e  MORT analys is  i n d i c a t e  t h e  most important overs ights  t h a t  
cou ld  lead t o  t h i s  accident r e l a tes  t o  maintenance and inspect ion procedures. 
An inspect ion p lan  e x i s t s  t h a t  appears adequate t o  prevent t h i s  accident. 
However, supervisors should ensure t h a t  personnel performing these tasks do so 
i n  a  r igorous and thorough manner. Supervisors should a l s o  see t h a t  
maintenance-related a c t i v i t i e s  are performed e f f e c t i v e l y  and promptly. It i s  
recognized t h a t  t h e  dec is ion t o  change a h o i s t  rope i s  a  management 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  but  supervisors must see t h a t  management i s  n o t i f i e d  t h a t  a  rope 
i s  worn o r  damaged. The au tho r i t y  t o  r e p a i r  o r  replace h o i s t  safety systems 
could  be given t o  supervisors t o  assure prompt co r rec t ion  of hazards. 
Some other  safety program features t h a t  app l i ca t i on  o f  MORT analys is  t o  
t h e  example problem i d e n t i f i e d  a re  as fo l lows.  T ra in ing  of supervisors and 
inspec t ion  personnel i n  t he  area o f  h o i s t i n g  component degradation should be 
adequate so they can spot f a i l u res .  It i s  important t o  adhere t o  requirements 
f o r  a  t e s t  run of t h e  h o i s t  p r i o r  t o  each s h i f t  i n  case inspect ion o r  
maintenance personnel a re  no t  we1 1 - t ra ined  o r  moti vated. Management and 
supervisors must ensure t h a t  check l i s t s  a re  f i  1 l e d  out p r i o r  t o  each s h i f t  
i n d i c a t i n g  t h e  s ta tus  o f  h o i s t i n g  components and h o i s t  safety features. These 
procedures would take approximately f i f t e e n  minutes. 
Design personnel who have t h e  task o f  c a l c u l a t i n g  rope s t ress  and 
spec i f y ing  t he  proper ropes f o r  use should be we l l  - t ra ined  w i t h  a  thorough 
knowledge o f  t h e  task. I n  addi t ion,  these ca lcu la t ions  and spec i f i ca t ions  
should be reviewed thoroughly by competent personnel. Designs o f  safety 
systems o r  t h e  h o i s t i n g  equipment should incorporate  the  techno1 ogy , as much as 
possible,  t o  ensure r e l i a b i l i t y  and a v a i l a b i l i t y .  It i s  t he  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  
management t o  supply in format ion on the  l a t e s t  technology t o  designers and t o  
incorporate  i t  i n  f i n a l  designs. Supervisors should be aware o f  design and 
operat ing personnel discrepancies, such as personal c o n f l i c t s ,  lack of 
mot ivat ion,  or  d is regard o f  recomnended procedures. As mentioned e a r l i e r ,  t he  
most e f f e c t i v e  accident prevent ion and con t ro l  measure i s  t o  design t h e  system 
f o r  minimum hazard, as has been done f o r  t h i s  system. 
Th is  example has i l l u s t r a t e d  t h e  MORT analys is  procedure and has provided 
an example f o r  t he  reader t o  fo l low when a c t u a l l y  performing t h e  analysis. It 
has a l so  shown t h e  k i n d  o f  r e s u l t s  t o  expect from app l i ca t i on  o f  t h i s  tech- 
nique. The complete analys is  of t he  postu la ted accident can not  be shown due 
t o  i t s  length and l e v e l  o f  de ta i l .  
TABLE 21. - MORT l o g i c  f o r  muck bucket  f a1  1s t o  bot tom o f  s h a f t  
w h i l e  h o i s t i n q  personnel : example sheet 
SA1. Accident  : 
The bucket  f a l l s  t o  t h e  bot tom o f  t h e  s h a f t  w h i l e  h o i s t i n g  personnel. 
SB1. I n c i d e n t :  
Brake f a i l u r e  causes t h e  bucket  t o  over run t h e  t o p  l i m i t ,  s t r i k e  t h e  
headrame, and snap t h e  rope. 
SB2. B a r r i e r s  LTA: 
Two b a r r i e r s  a re  prov ided t o  prevent  t h e  bucket  f rom f a l l i n g  a f t e r  
s t r i k i n g  t h e  headframe. Both must f a i l  i n  o rde r  f o r  t h e  bucket t o  f a l l .  
a l .  The bucket w i l l  n o t  f a l l  un less  t h e  rope snaps. The rope i s  designed 
w i t h  a s a f e t y  f a c t o r .  
a2. I n  case t h e  rope snaps, a s a f e t y  ca tch  i s  p rov ided  t o  prevent  t h e  
bucket f rom f a l l i n g .  
SR3. Persons i n  Energy Channel : 
Persons are  i n s i d e  t h e  muck bucket when they  a re  be ing  ho is ted.  
NOTE: A s i m i l a r  acc ident  would be one where t h e  persons i n  t h e  energy 
channel a r e  underneath t h e  muck bucket on a gal loway deck o r  on t h e  s h a f t  
f l o o r  under t h e  muck bucket we l l s .  
a l .  Nonfunct ional  personnel may be i n  bucket, e.g., au tho r i zed  v i s i t o r s ,  
t respassers ,  etc.  
b l .  Contro l  o f  access t o  t h e  bucket  by non- func t i ona l  persons may be 
LTA. 
b2. Contro l  o f  access may be i m p r a c t i c a l .  
a2. Persons i n  bucket may be f u n c t i o n a l  (opera tors) .  
b l .  Contro l  o f  access t o  bucket by f u n c t i o n a l  personnel may be LTA. 
b2. Contro l  o f  access may be i m p r a c t i c a l .  
SC1. Consequent Unwanted Enerqv Flow : 
- 
MGH - bucket f a l l s  down sha f t .  
Eva lua t i on  of  t h e  computer a d a p t a b i l i t y  o f  MORT a n a l y s i s  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  i t  
i s  b o t h  f e a s i b l e  and des i rab le .  Since MORT has been reduced t o  a  l a rge ,  compre- 
hensive diagram, t h e  f e a s i b i l i t y  o f  adapt ing  i t  t o  t h e  computer i s  v i r t u a l l y  
ensured. It i s  d e s i r a b l e  t o  adapt t h e  MORT technique t o  t h e  computer f o r  t h e  
purposes of reduc ing t h e  amount o f  paperwork i n v o l v e d  and f o r  a s s i s t i n g  t h e  
a n a l y s t  t o  conduct t h e  assessment i n  a  s t r u c t u r e d  format,  thus  reducing t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of e r r o r  o r  omission. The s i z e  o f  t h e  computer program requ i red  t o  
adapt  MORT a n a l y s i  s  t o  a  u s e r - i n t e r a c t i  ve computer i s re1 a t i  ve l y  l a r g e  because 
t h e  techn ique i n t e g r a t e s  over 1500 s a f e t y  program elements and s a f e t y  concepts 
i n t o  t h e  l a r g e  MORT diagram. Th is  r e s u l t s  i n  a  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  l a r g e r  l abo r  
requirement t o  i n s t a l l  t h e  program i n i t i a l l y  and t o  perform t h e  f i r s t  stage 
o f  t h e  ana lys is .  
The conceptual computerized MORT s a f e t y  a n a l y s i s  program i s  env is ioned t o  
be a  2-stage approach as shown i n  F igu re  11. Stage 1 i s  a  computerized guide 
t o  t h e  a n a l y s i s  procedure, i n c l u d i n g  c h e c k l i s t s  and o t h e r  s p e c i a l i z e d  forms 
commonly used i n  MORT ana lys is .  The computer program cou ld  be made user-  
i n t e r a c t i v e  so t h e  computer would ask quest ions t h a t  t h e  user must answer. 
With t h e  a i d  o f  computer graphics,  p o r t i o n s  o f  t h e  MORT diagram cou ld  be 
d i sp layed  on t h e  screen t o  o f f e r  t h e  a n a l y s t  a  broad view o f  t h e  l o c a t i o n  o f  
s p e c i f i c  in format ion .  I n  o the r  words, t h e  conceptual computer program would be 
ab le  t o  ask a  quest ion  f o r  t h e  a n a l y s t  t o  answer rega rd ing  some element o f  t h e  
MORT diagram w h i l e  d i s p l a y i n g  t h e  immediate branch o f  t h e  t r e e  surrounding t h e  
element . 
Stage 1 of t h e  conceptual computer program i s  t h e  a c t u a l  performance and 
reco rd ing  o f  t h e ' a n a l y s i s .  The s t r u c t u r e  and framework o f  t h e  standard MORT 
diagram would be programmed i n t o  t h e  computer software. As discussed above, 
t h e  computer cou ld  d i s p l a y  t h e  t o p  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  MORT diagram and begin ask ing 
t h e  suggested quest ions  conta ined i n  t h e  event boxes, j u s t  as i n  t h e  paper-type 
study. P r i o r  t o  t h i s ,  t h e  ana lys t  must have chosen t h e  p o t e n t i a l  accident  
sequence t o  be analyzed and g iven some cons ide ra t i on  t o  t h e  hazardous energy 
f l ows  and b a r r i e r s .  The c h e c k l i s t s  shown i n  Tables 18 and 19 cou ld  be 
programmed i n t o  t h e  computer so f tware  and d i sp layed  when needed t o  r e f r e s h  t h e  
a n a l y s t ' s  memory. The a n a l y s i s  procedure begins w i t h  t h e  computer ask ing 
quest ions  rega rd ing  t h e  t o p  event o f  t h e  MORT diagram, then cont inues down t h e  
s p e c i f i c  c o n t r o l  f a c t o r s  branch o f  t h e  t r e e ,  and then analyzes t h e  management 
system f a c t o r s  branch. The standard r u l e s  and symbols o f  a n a l y t i c a l  t r e e  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  would be used, a l though o n l y  t h e  event statements o f  t h e  MORT 
diagram need be shown on t h e  d i sp layed  t r e e  branch. The answers t o  t h e  
quest ions  asked by t h e  event  statements would be typed i n t o  t h e  computer memory 
and d i sp layed  on t h e  screen. It may t a k e  a  spec ia l ,  l a r g e  screen t o  d i s p l a y  
t h i s  much in fo rma t ion ,  a l though i t  i s  be l i eved  i t  can be done. A drawing o f  
t h e  conceptual d i s p l a y  i s  shown i n  F igu re  12. Important  conclusions from t h e  
a n a l y s i s  may be i n p u t  t o  a  spec ia l  memory f i l e  t h a t  may be p r i n t e d  out  and 
u t i l i z e d  as a  c h e c k l i s t  f o r  f u t u r e  s a f e t y  inspect ions .  Th is  c h e c k l i s t  may 
c o n t a i n  t h e  hazardous elements and c o n t r i  bu to ry  causes t o  p o t e n t i a l  accidents.  
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F I G U R E  12 .  - Conceptual computer display for the MORT analysis procedure 
Stage I 1  of t h e  conceptual computer program i s  necessary because MORT 
a n a l y s i s  and m i n i n g  systems are  bo th  dynamic processes. The conceptual 
computer program i s  capable o f  d e l e t i n g  out-dated i n f o r m a t i o n  and i n s e r t i n g  
mod i f i ed  o r  r e v i s e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  rega rd ing  any s a f e t y  program element t h e  
a n a l y s t  wishes. It i s  env is ioned t h a t  t h e  program i s  p rov ided  w i t h  key-word 
search c a p a b i l i t i e s  and i n d i c e s  t o  a l l o w  t h e  a n a l y s t  t o  r a p i d l y  search and 
d i s p l a y  s p e c i f i c  e n t r i e s  conta ined i n  t h e  computer memory. The word process ing 
capabi 1  i t i e s  of c u r r e n t  computer systems enables t h e  a n a l y s t  t o  d e l e t e  and 
i n s e r t  i n fo rma t ion  as needed. Using these c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  t h e  MORT acc ident  
analyses cou ld  be r e v i s e d  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  c o n s t a n t l y  changing m in ing  system 
and t h e  p o t e n t i a l l y  new hazardous s i t u a t i o n s  c rea ted  by these changes. 
Est imated Costs o f  I m ~ l e m e n t a t i o n  
Th is  sec t i on  presents t h e  bases, assumptions and es t imated cos ts  f o r  
implementat ion o f  a  MORT-type s a f e t y  program a t  a  mine. Two est imated cos ts  
a r e  developed: 1 )  t h e  es t imated cos ts  f o r  implementing a  convent iona l  paper- 
t y p e  MORT a n a l y s i s  s a f e t y  program and 2)  es t imated cos ts  f o r  a  computerized 
MORT s a f e t y  program. The es t imated cos ts  developed i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  can be used 
by mine opera tors  t o  weigh t h e  cos ts  o f  u t i l i z i n g  t h e  MORT approach versus i t s  
b e n e f i t s  which have been discussed throughout t h i s  sec t ion .  
The es t imated cos ts  o f  a  MORT-type paper study were developed based on t h e  
assumption t h a t  t h e  a n a l y s i s  i s  performed by t h e  mine s a f e t y  s t a f f .  Thus t h e  
cos ts  a re  dominated by t h e  cos ts  f o r  t r a i n i n g  these people and t h e  l a b o r  cos ts  
f o r  t h e  t r a i n i n g  and f o r  per forming and upda t ing  t h e  ana lys is .  It i s  est imated 
t h a t  approximat ley 1 month i s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  MORT ana lys i s  t r a i n i n g  f o r  each 
i n d i v i d u a l  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  ana lys i s .  Th is  month i nc ludes  attendance a t  a  one- 
week s h o r t  course on MORT a n a l y s i s  and t h r e e  weeks t o  rev iew t h e  ana lys i s  
procedure and work some example problems. With t h i s  d e t a i l e d  t r a i n i n g ,  t h e  
MORT ana lys t  should be capable o f  complet ing t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  a  p o t e n t i a l  
acc ident  sequence r e l a t i v e l y  qu i ck l y .  Therefore, i t  i s  es t imated t h a t  1.0 man- 
years  o f  s t a f f  l a b o r  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  complete t h e  i n i t i a l  MORT a n a l y s i s  o f  a  
l a r g e  m in ing  system. Assuming t h e  s a f e t y  s t a f f  l a b o r  r a t e s  and overheads 
discussed i n  t h e  f i n a l  r e p o r t  f o r  t h i s  study, l a b o r  cos ts  t o t a l  $45,000 t o  
$65,000 f o r  performance o f  t h e  i n i t i a l  ana lys is .  The t o t a l  c o s t  o f  
implementat ion a l s o  i nc ludes  1 month's l a b o r  cos ts  fo r  t r a i n i n g  3 s a f e t y  people 
i n  t h e  MORT technique, i n c l u d i n g  2  s a f e t y  foremen and t h e i r  superv isor .  These 
es t imated cos ts  a r e  about $8,000 t o  $10,000. The es t imated cos ts  f o r  t h ree  
persons t o  a t t e n d  t h e  MORT a n a l y s i s  s h o r t  course i s  about $9,000 t o  $12,000 
i n c l u d i n g  attendance fees, a i r l i n e  t r a v e l  t o  t h e  short -course l o c a t i o n  and t h e  
t h r e e  persons' s a l a r i e s ,  l o d g i n g  and l i v i n g  expenses f o r  one week. The t o t a l  
est imated c o s t  o f  implementing a  MORT-type safe ty  program a t  a  mine are  thus  
$62,000 t o  $87,000. Since MORT i s  a  dynamic process t h a t  must be updated and 
r e v i s e d  p e r i o d i c a l l y ,  i t  i s  es t imated t h a t  3 t o  4 man-monthslyear i s  requ i red  
f o r  t h i s  a c t i v i t y .  Therefore, t h e  es t imated annual o p e r a t i n g  cos ts  o f  t h e  MORT 
s a f e t y  program a r e  about $10,000 t o  $15,@00/yr. Note t h a t  these cos ts  do n o t  
i n c l u d e  t h e  cos ts  f o r  an i n i t i a l  a n a l y s i s  (such as a  P re l im ina ry  Hazards 
Ana lys i s )  t o  i d e n t i f y  p o t e n t i a l  acc ident  sequences. Only t h e  cos ts  associated 
w i t h  per forming a  MORT ana lys i s  a re  i nc luded  i n  t h e  above est imate.  
The est imated costs  f o r  implementing a  computerized MORT ana lys i s  inc ludes 
t h e  c a p i t a l  cos ts  and i n s t a l l a t i o n  o f  t h e  computer system and sof tware i n  
a d d i t i o n  t o  s t a f f  l a b o r  costs. Costs f o r  an adequate computer system a re  based 
on a  survey of c u r r e n t l y  a v a i l a b l e  micro-computer systems and a r e  est imated t o  
be about $5,000, i n c l u d i n g  d e l i  very, i n s t a l  l a t i o n  and suppl ies.  Annual 
computer maintenance cos ts  a r e  es t imated t o  be 10% o f  t h e  i n i t i a l  c a p i t a l  cos t  
pe r  year,  o r  $500/yr. Also inc luded  i n  t h e  est imated costs  f o r  a  computerized 
safe ty  program a re  costs  fo r  t h e  s a f e t y  s t a f f  t o  a t t e n d  shor t  courses on MORT 
t r a i n i n g  and computer t r a i n i n g  ( i n c l u d i n g  r e g i s t r a t i o n  fees, t r a v e l ,  and l i v i n g  
expenses). These cos ts  a re  developed i n  t h e  companion t o  t h i s  document and t h e  
assumptions w i l l  n o t  be repeated here. It should be i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e  one- 
month MORT t r a i n i n g  p e r i o d  and s t a f f  l a b o r  requ i red  t o  l e a r n  t h e  paper-type 
a n a l y s i s  technique has been increased t o  3 t o  4 man-months t o  a l l o w  f o r  t h e  
computer program t o  be loaded onto  t h e  computer system and t h e  ana lys i s  t o  be 
i n i t i a t e d .  Also, note  t h a t  t h e  est imated costs  do no t  con ta in  t h e  costs  f o r  
developing t h e  computer software. These costs  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  es t imate  and i t  
i s  n o t  known i f  they  w i l l  be p a i d  by government o r  t h e  m in ing  indus t ry .  
Therefore, t h e  reader should recognize t h a t  sof tware development cos ts  a re  i n  
a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  est imated cos ts  f o r  imp1 ementing t h e  computerized MORT-type 
s a f e t y  program. The f i x e d  and opera t ing  cos ts  a re  s u m a r i z e d  below: 
F IXED COSTS 
. . . . . .  Computer system purchase and i n s t a l l a t i o n  $ 5,nOO 
Short course attendance and expenses . . . . . . . .  $ 9,000-12,000 
A n a l y s t ' s  burdened l a b o r  charges 
I n i t i a t e  ana lys i s  . . .  . .  . . . . . . . . . .  $10,000-15,000 
Perform ana lys i  s  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  $45,000-65,000 
TOTAL..  e e e e e . . . . . . e e e e e . . e . e e  $69r000-97,000 
ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS 
- 
. . . . . . . . . . . . .  Computer system maintenance $ 5OO/yr 
. . . . . . . . . .  A n a l y s t ' s  burdened labor  charges $10,000-15,00O/yr 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  TOTAL $10,500-15,50O/yr 
Since t h e  MORT s a f e t y  assessment program would be performed as a  
replacement t o  c u r r e n t  mine safety o f f i c i a l  du t ies ,  t h e  costs  shown above are  
n o t  a d d i t i o n a l  costs. The ac tua l  a d d i t i o n a l  cos ts  above t h e  costs  f o r  t h e  
c u r r e n t  mine sa fe ty  programs a re  lower. 
HUMAN-RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
The most d i f f i c u l t  component o f  a  complex i n d u s t r i a l  system t o  charac- 
t e r i z e  and eva lua te  i s  t h e  human element. Accident  s t a t i s t i c s  i n  i n d u s t r i e s  
where opera t ions  a re  predominant ly  some form o f  m a t e r i a l  hand l ing ,  such as t h e  
m in ing  i n d u s t r y ,  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  a  l a r g e  percentage o f  acc idents  a r e  e i t h e r  
caused i n i t i a l l y  by humans o r  human e r r o r  i n  some way c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  acc ident  
propagat ion.  Human e r r o r  i s  an impor tant  aspect o f  b o t h  normal and emergency 
s i t u a t i o n s .  For t h i s  reason, human e r r o r  ( o r  conversely,  human r e l i a b i  l i t y )  
shou ld  be considered i n  a  d e t a i l e d  systems s a f e t y  a n a l y s i s  o f  a  m in ing  system. 
H u m a n - r e l i a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  (HRA) i s  t h e  s tudy o f  human performance w i t h i n  
a  complex man-machine opera t i ng  system. HRA can be used t o  develop q u a l i t a t i v e  
i n fo rma t ion  rega rd ing  t h e  causes and e f f e c t s  o f  human e r r o r  i n  s p e c i f i c  
s i t u a t i o n s .  HRA can a l s o  be used t o  develop numerical human f a i l u r e  r a t e  data 
t h a t  i s  normal ly  used by f a u l t  t r e e  ana lys ts  t o  es t imate  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of 
system f a i l u r e .  The q u a n t i t a t i v e  p o r t i o n  o f  HRA i s  a t  t h i s  t i m e  n o t  
recommended f o r  technology t r a n s f e r  t o  t h e  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y  due t o  t h e  complex 
mathematics i nvo l ved  and minimal u t i  l i t y  o f  t h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s u l t s  a t  t h i s  
t ime. It i s  be l i eved  t h a t  t h e  q u a l i t a t i v e  p o r t i o n  o f  HRA can y i e l d  s i g n i f i c a n t  
r e s u l t s  f o r  t h e  m in ing  i n d u s t r y  by h e l p i n g  t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  causes o f  t h e i r  most 
f requent  accidents,  i .e., those caused by human e r r o r .  With t h e  i n fo rma t ion  
r e s u l t i n g  f rom t h i s  ana lys i s ,  mine s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s  and management w i l l  be ab le  
t o  i d e n t i f y  des i  gn changes, procedural  improvements, and s p e c i f i c  areas o f  
t r a i n i n g  t h a t  can h e l p  reduce hazards a t  mines. 
Analys i  s  Procedure 
The procedure f o r  per forming t h e  q u a l i t a t i v e  p o r t i o n  o f  an HRA i s  
descr ibed i n  t h i s  sec t ion .  F i r s t ,  a  br i 'e f  d iscuss ion of t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  of 
such an a n a l y s i s  i s  presented. Then t h e  a n a l y s i s  procedure i s  o u t l i n e d  and t h e  
major  tasks  a r e  described. The reader should be aware t h a t  a  d e t a i l e d  
d i scuss ion  o f  a l l  aspects of t h e  HRA fill e n t i r e  textbooks.  For a  g rea te r  
understanding o f  t h e  methods presented i n  t h i s  sub-section, t h e  reader i s  urged 
t o  study a  recen t  p u b l i c a t i o n ,  t h e  Handbook o f  Human R e l i a b i l i t y  Ana lys is  w i t h  
Emphasis on Nuclear Power P lan t  App l i ca t i ons ,  NUREGICR-1218 (Swain and Guttman 
1982). As t h e  t i t l e  suggests, t h i s  handbook emphasizes nuc lear  power p l a n t  
opera t ions  b u t  t h e  general concepts a r e  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  t h e  m i n i n g  i ndus t r y .  
Human performance i s  v a r i a b l e  and thus,  d i f f i c u l t  t o  p r e d i c t .  Any given 
person f requen t l y  shows v a r i a b i l i t y  f rom day t o  day and f rom one moment t o  t h e  
next .  Human behav ior  i s  a l s o  d i f f i c u l t  t o  p r e d i c t  because humans perform more 
d i f f e r e n t  f u n c t i o n s  i n  more d i f f e r e n t  env i  ronments than any o the r  component o f  
a  system. Furthermore, humans i n t e r f a c e  w i t h  many d i f f e r e n t  elements 
( i n c l u d i n g  o the r  humans), accept a  wide v a r i e t y  of i n p u t s ,  a n d  prov ide a  wide 
v a r i e t y  o f  outputs. For  these reasons, one o f  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  HRA i s  t h a t  
i t  cannot i d e n t i f y  and e l i m i n a t e  a l l  human e r ro rs .  However, i t  i s  poss ib le  t o  
-
eva lua te  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  a  human invo lved  i n  a  task  f o r  which he i s  
adequately t r a i n e d  and suggest changes t h a t  might  improve t h a t  re1  i a b i  1  i t y .  
Human e r r o r s  can be c l a s s i f i e d  i n t o  two categor ies :  s i tua t ion-caused 
e r r o r s  (SCEs) and human-caused e r r o r s  (HCEs). SCEs a re  e r r o r s  t h a t  a re  caused 
p r i m a r i l y  by f a c t o r s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  design o f  t h e  work s i t u a t i o n .  For example, 
l e s s  than  adequate equipment designs, management p rac t i ces ,  and opera t i ng  
procedures a re  SCEs. H E s  a r e  e r r o r s  w i t h  pr imary  causes r e l a t e d  t o  some human 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ,  such as sabotage o r  i n t e n t i o n a l  e r ro rs .  It has l o n g  been 
recognized t h a t  most e r r o r s  i n  a  we l l -de f i ned  work s i t u a t i o n  a re  due t o  S E S  
and r e l a t i v e l y  few a re  due t o  HCEs. Therefore, t h e  techniques descr ibed i n  
t h i s  s e c t i o n  a re  in tended t o  enable t h e  reader t o  i d e n t i f y  and examine t h e  
e f f e c t s  o f  SCEs. 
The a n a l y s i s  procedure f o r  per forming t h e  q u a l i t a t i v e  HRA i s  sumnarized i n  
F i g u r e  13. The procedure c o n s i s t s  o f  6 tasks  o r  steps. Each s tep  i s  descr ibed 
separa te l y  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  paragraphs. 
STEP 1 - Descr ibe t h e  System Goals and Funct ions 
The purpose o f  t h i s  s tep i s  t o  see where people f i t  i n t o  t h e  system goals 
and func t i ons .  The ana lys t  looks  f o r  what people a r e  supposed t o  do t o  
accompl i sh va r ious  f u n c t i o n s  and f o r  p o i n t s  o f  i n t e r a c t i o n  between t h e  system 
and t h e  people. These p o i n t s  a re  o f t e n  de f i ned  as t h e  i n t e r f a c e s  between 
equipment and personnel ; e.g., manual valves,  swi tches f o r  motor-operated 
equipment, d i sp lays  t o  be read, and s i g n a l s  o r  cues t o  respond to .  A  use fu l  
techn ique f o r  h e l p i n g  t h e  ana lys t  t o  i d e n t i f y  i n t e r f a c e s  i s  c a l l e d  a  " l i n k  
ana lys i s " .  Th i s  technique i s  used t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e  opera t i ona l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
between two elements of a  system, whether they  a re  two persons o r  a  person and 
a  p iece  o f  equipment. L ink  a n a l y s i s  i s  concerned w i t h  t h e i r  pos i t i ons ,  
arrangements, and frequency o f  interchange. Once a l l  1  i n k s  a r e  i d e n t i f i e d ,  
t h i s  s tep  i n  t h e  HRA i s  complete. However, t h e  l i n k  ana lys i s  technique i t s e l f  
can be extended t o  ga in  f u r t h e r  i n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  t h e  task  ana lys i s  procedure 
(see s tep  4 and 5 )  and on suggest ing changes t o  t h e  system' (see s tep 6). 
L ink  a n a l y s i s  i s  normal ly  performed on c e n t r a l  i z e d  c o n t r o l  opera t ions  and 
may n o t  be as use fu l  t o  t h e  m in ing  i n d u s t r y  where most o f  t h e  opera t ions  a re  
performed manually. However, t h i s  techn ique i s  u s e f u l  f o r  d e f i n i n g  t h e  
procedures used t o  perform a  s p e c i f i c  task ,  t h e i r  proper o rde r  o f  performance, 
and cues t o  t h e  opera tor  r e l a t e d  t o  which s tep i n  t h e  task  should be performed 
next. For example, consider t h e  c u t t i n g  opera t ion  a t  a coa l  mine. Th is  
ope ra t i on  i s  assumed t o  be performed us ing  a  r u b b e r - t i r e d  v e h i c l e  t h a t  c u t s  t h e  
rock face w i t h  a  c u t t i n g  ba r  s i m i l a r  t o  a  l a r g e  chainsaw. A  t y p i c a l  c u t t i n g  
c y c l e  c o n s i s t s  o f  severa l  steps, i n c l u d i n g  a  methane check,'a s tep t o  unlock 
t h e  c u t t i n g  bar ,  a  s tep  f o r  connect ing water  hoses, and severa l  steps f o r  t h e  
a c t u a l  c u t t i n g  process. L ink  ana lys i s  cons is t s  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  steps: 
(1) Descr ibe t h e  task  procedure i n  t h e  proper ope ra t i ng  sequence 
(2 )  Est imate t h e  t ime  requirements o f  each s tep  i n  t h e  procedure 
( 3 )  Draw a  s imple i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  opera t ion  and i n d i c a t e  t h e  
movements o f  personnel t h a t  a r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  perform t h e  task. Record 
t h e  l o c a t i o n s  where t h e  tasks  a r e  performed and show by arrows t h e  
paths t h e  opera tors  must take. 
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FIGURE 13. - Summary ana lys i s  procedure f o r  t h e  q u a l i t a t i v e  
p o r t i o n  o f  a  h u m a n - r e l i a b i l i t y  ana lys i s  
With t h e  task  movements i n d i c a t e d  on t h e  diagram drawn i n  t h e  l a s t  step, t h e  
a n a l y s t  can i d e n t i f y  such i tems as steps f o r  which t o o  l i t t l e  t ime  i s  a l lowed 
f o r  movement between s t a t i o n s ,  s p e c i f i c  l o c a t i o n s  where t h e  opera tor  f r e q u e n t l y  
r e t u r n s ,  and cues which i n f o r m  t h e  opera to r  when a  task  o r  s tep i n  a  task  
shou ld  be i n i t i a t e d  o r  completed. 
Sources o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  t h i s  s tep  i nc lude  schematics, f l o w  diagrams, 
b l o c k  diagrams, design requ i  rements, w r i t t e n  procedures, and personal  i n t e r -  
views w i t h  system planners and personnel w i t h  exper ience i n  t h e  opera t i on  o f  
s i m i l a r  systems. V i s i t s  t o  an e x i s t i n g  o r  s i m i l a r  p l a n t  a re  a l s o  good sources 
of  i n fo rma t ion .  An extremely u s e f u l  source o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  f o r  t h e  ana lys t  
t o  a c t u a l l y  per form t h e  tasks  h i m s e l f  t o  get  a  very good understanding o f  t h e  
a c t u a l  and p o t e n t i a l  problems i n  each task.  
STEP 2  - Descr ibe t h e  S i t u a t i o n a l  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
Many fac to rs  a f f e c t  ( o r  shape) human performance i n  a  complex man-machine 
system. Some o f  these f a c t o r s  a r e  ex te rna l  t o  t h e  person i n  t h e  system and 
some a r e  i n t e r n a l .  Such f a c t o r s  i n c l u d e  t h e  general work environment 
( e s p e c i a l l y  equipment design and w r i t t e n  and o r a l  work procedures), t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  s k i l l s ,  mo t i va t i ons ,  and expecta t ions ,  and psycho log ica l  and 
p h y s i o l o g i c a l  s t resses.  These f a c t o r s  a r e  termed "performance shaping f a c t o r s "  
(PSFs). PSFs determine whether human performance wi 11 be h i g h l y  re1 i a b l e ,  
h i g h l y  u n r e l i a b l e  o r  some l e v e l  i n  between. A c h e c k l i s t  o f  PSFs t h a t  can be 
used when per forming t h i s  s tep i s  shown i n  Table 22. Th is  c h e c k l i s t  can be 
used by t h e  ana lys t  t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  cou ld  p o t e n t i a l l y  cause a  
human t o  comnit a  performance e r r o r  o r  omi t  a  task  o r  step. The ana lys t  i s  t o  
examine t h e  system goals and func t i ons  obta ined from Step 1 and i d e n t i f y  t h e  
PSFs t h a t  cou ld  adverse ly  a f f e c t  t h e  a c t i o n s  taken by operators.  
As can be seen from Table 22, PSFs can be d i v i d e d  i n t o  t h r e e  general 
ca tegor ies :  (1)  those o u t s i d e  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  t h e  ex te rna l  PSFs, ( 2 )  those 
t h a t  a r e  a  p a r t  of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  h imse l f ,  t h e  i n t e r n a l  PSFs, and ( 3 )  s t resses 
and s t ressors .  I n  general ,  ex te rna l  PSFs a re  those t h a t  d e f i n e  t h e  work 
s i t u a t i o n s  a t  t h e  mine. Externa l  PSFs f a l l  i n t o  t h r e e  general categor ies.  The 
f i r s t  category i s  c a l l e d  " S i t u a t i o n a l  Charac te r i s t i cs " .  S i t u a t i o n a l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  i n c l u d e  PSFs t h a t  a r e  o f t e n  p lant -w ide o r  t h a t  cover many 
d i f f e r e n t  jobs  and tasks  a t  t h e  mine. For example, many deep underground mines 
a re  very warm and humid. These are  two measures o f  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  t h e  working 
env i  ronment which i s  a  PSF t h a t  covers many jobs  and tasks  a t  t h e  mine. "Task 
and Equipment Charac ter is t ics , "  i n c l u d e  PSFs t h a t  a re  r e s t r i c t e d  o r  l i m i t e d  t o  
some given j o b  o r  even t o  a  task  w i t h i n  a  job.  This can be i l l u s t r a t e d  by t h e  
many tasks  a t  mines t h a t  a r e  performed by workers who s p e c i a l i z e  i n  a  s p e c i f i c  
job,  such as l o a d i n g  and f i r i n g  b l a s t i n g  rounds o r  ope ra t i ng  t h e  h o i s t i n g  
equipment. "Job and Task Ins t ruc t i ons , "  a r e  those PSFs connected w i t h  
i n s t r u c t i o n a l  and t r a i n i n g  a c t i v i t i e s .  Th is  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a  sub-group o f  t ask  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  bu t  a r e  s i n g l e d  out  because they represent  an area t h a t  i s  a  
cos t -e f fec t i ve  method o f  improv ing human re1 i a b i  1  i t y .  
The second general category of PSFs, i n t e r n a l  PSFs, a re  t h e  c e r t a i n  
s k i l l s ,  a b i l i t i e s ,  a t t i t u d e s  and o the r  human a t t r i b u t e s  a  person comes t o  t h e  




Archi tectural Features 
Qttal i ty of  Environment: 
. 
Temperature. Humidi ty. 
A i r  Qual i ty 
Noise and Vibratlon 
Degree of  General 
Clean1 lness 
Work Ilours/Work breaks 
Ava i lab i 1 i ty/Adequacy o f  
Special Equipment. 
Tools, and Supplies 
tbnning Parameters 
O r  anizational Structure 
7e.g.. Autlar i  ty. Re- 
sponsibil i t y .  Communica- 
t lon Channels) 
Actions by Supervisors. Co- 
workers. Union Representa- 
tives. and Regulatory Per- 
sonne 1 
Rewards, Recogni tion. 
Benef i ts 
Job and Task Instructions 
Procedures Requ i red 
(Hrit ten or not Written) 
W r i  t ten or  Oral Couunrni- 
cations 
Cautions and Warnings 
Work flethods 
Plant Pol icies (Shop 
Practices) 
PERFORtUHCE . SlUPING FACTORS 
Task and Equi nent 
C h a r a c t e r i s t k  
Perceptual Requ i r e n ~ n  ts









Narrowness o f  Task 
Frequency and Repet i t i ve- 
ness 
Task Cr i t i ca l  i ty  
Long-and Short-Tenn h m r y  
Calculational Requirements 
Feedback (Knoul edge of  
Results) 
Continuity ( ~ i s c r e t e  vs 




Design o f  Prime Equip- 
went. Test Equipment. 
Mnufactur ing Equipnent , 




Suddenness o f  Onset 
Duration o f  Stress 
Task Speed 
Task Load 
High Jeopardy Risk 
Threats (Of Fa i l ure. 
Loss o f  Job) 
Monotonous. Degrading. 
or  Heaningless Work 
Long. Uneventful Vigi- 
1 ance Periods 
Conflicts o f  Hotives about 
Job Perfonnarbce 
Reinforcenlent Absent or 
Nega t i ve 
Sensory Oepri va t ion 
Distractions (Noise, 
Glare. Hovement . 
Fl  icker. Color) 
Incons i stent Cue ing 
Physiological Stressors 
Duratlon o f  Stress 
Fatigue 
Pain or  Discom~fort 









Lack of  PhysJcal Exercise 
I NTERHAL 
Organi smic Factors 
Previous Training/Experience 
State o f  Current Practice or  
Sk i l l  
Personality and Intell igence 
Variables 
Motivation and Attitudes 
Knowledge o f  Requi red Per- 
formance Standards 
Physical Condi t ion  
Attitudes Based on l n f  1 uence 
Of Family and Other Outside 
Persons or  Agencies 
Group Identi f icat ions 
j o b  w i th .  I n t e r n a l  PSFs determine t h e  p o t e n t i a l  l e v e l  t o  which an i n d i v i d u a l  
can be developed. A t t i t u d e s  based on both  o u t s i d e  and i n s i d e  i n f l uences  a r e  
espec ia l  l y  impor tant  i n  m in ing  because t h i n g s  a r e  cons tan t l y  moving about and 
changing. I n  t h i s  t y p e  of operat ion,  one b r i e f  moment o f  u n c e r t a i n t y  o r  
i n a t t e n t i o n  can cause someone t o  be s t ruck  by a  moving o re  c a r  o r  by a  
back lash ing s c a l i n g  bar  when t h e  rock g ives way. 
The t h i r d  c l a s s  of PSFs a r e  c a l l e d  s t ressors .  I n  a wel l -designed man- 
machine system, t h e  demands p laced on workers t o  perform t h e i r  t asks  a r e  
c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  worker ' s  capabi l i t i e s ,  l i m i t a t i o n s ,  and needs. Any t i m e  
t h a t  t h e  requirements of a  task  impose t o o  many demands on a  worker, per form- 
ance w i l l  suffer. Th i s  i s  one cause o f  s t ress .  Stress can be psycho log ica l  
(mental )  o r  p h y s i o l o g i c a l  (phys i ca l ) .  Stress can a r i s e  when t h e r e  i s  a  
mismatch between t h e  ex te rna l  and i n t e r n a l  PSFs. For example, assume a  mine 
under a n a l y s i s  uses b l a s t i n g  t o  loosen o re  f rom t h e  rock face. B l a s t i n g  i s  
no rma l l y  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  two t imes each day, a t  t h e  end of t h e  day and evening 
s h i f t s .  Th is  means t h a t  work i s  o f t e n  h u r r i e d  towards t h e  end o f  t h e  s h i f t  t o  
prepare f o r  b l a s t i n g  o r  t h e  charge cannot be s e t  u n t i l  t h e  end o f  t h e  next  
s h i f t .  Many minor i n j u r i e s ,  such as p inched f i n g e r s ,  crushed toes,  etc., occur 
because o f  t h i s  psycho log ica l  s t r e s s o r  - excessive task  speed. I n  t h i s  
example, t h e  i n t e r n a l  PSFs t h a t  mo t i va te  workers t o  complete a  b l a s t  a t  t h e  end 
o f  t h e i r  s h i f t  (such as compe t i t i on  between s h i f t s ,  bonus pay o r  i n c e n t i v e  
c o n t r a c t s )  overshadow t h e  ex te rna l  PSFs (such as warnings and caut ions) .  
A d e t a i l e d  exp lana t ion  o f  each PSF shown on Table 22 cannot be presented 
i n  t h i s  u s e r ' s  manual due t o  i t s  length .  For tunate ly ,  most o f  t h e  PSFs a re  
se l f -exp lana to ry  statements. For a  d e t a i l e d  d iscuss ion o f  each PSF, t h e  reader 
i s  urged t o  study t h e  pr imary  reference f o r  t h i s  sec t i on  (Swain and Guttman 
1982). To summarize t h e  procedure, t h e  a n a l y s t  evaluates t h e '  PSFs i n  r e l a t i o n  
t o  t h e  system goals and func t ions  t h a t  were i d e n t i f i e d  i n  Step 1. Then, t h e  
ana lys t  records PSFs t h a t  cou ld  have an impact on t h e  performance o f  humans and 
equipment i nd i  v i  dual l y  and as they  i n t e r a c t  t oge the r  t o  cause accidents.  Thi s  
s tep  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  u s e f u l  f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  areas i n  which r e l a t i v e l y  minor 
changes can s i g n i f i c a n t l y  reduce hazards. 
STEP 3 - Descr ibe t h e  Charac te r i s t i cs  o f  t h e  Personnel 
I n  t h i s  step,  t h e  ana lys t  i d e n t i f i e s  t h e  s k i l l s ,  experience, t r a i n i n g ,  and 
m o t i v a t i o n  o f  personnel who operate and ma in ta in  t h e  p l a n t  systems. Th is  i s  
done so t h e  a n a l y s t  can understand t h e  c a p a b i l i t i e s  and l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  p l a n t  
personnel. These aspects a r e  then compared w i t h  t h e  demands t h e  systems p lace 
upon t h e  personnel . Mismatches between capabi 1  i t i e s / l  i m i t a t i o n s  and demands 
requ i  r e  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  t o  t h e  man-machine in ter faces.  
Two impor tant  aspects o f  t h i s  s tep a r e  as fo l lows.  F i r s t ,  i t  i s  impor tant  
t o  eva lua te  peop le 's  past  experiences w i t h  o the r  systems i n  order  t o  avo id  
t r a n s f e r  o f  bad h a b i t s  t o  t h e  new system. Second, f o r  s a f e t y - r e l a t e d  systems 
i t  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  impor tant  t o  eva luate  p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  response t o  low 
p r o b a b i l i t y  events, such as a  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  v e n t i l a t i o n  system a t  a  mine. 
Without t h i s  p r a c t i c e ,  t h e  readiness t o  handle such events w i l l  decrease. 
It i s  use fu l  f o r  t he  analys t  t o  break t h e  min ing system down i n t o  major 
func t iona l  b locks and i d e n t i f y  t h e  tasks  personnel a re  requ i red  t o  perform t o  
f u l f i l l  each funct ion.  The analys t  should i d e n t i f y  and descr ibe t he  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h e  personnel i nvo lved  and compare them w i t h  t h e  task 
demands determined i n  Step 2. Mismatches between t he  personnel cha rac te r i s t i c s  
and t he  task demands should be recorded and re fe r red  t o  i n  l a t e r  stages of 
HRA. The analys t  can consider these mismatches and, i f  poss ib le ,  recommend 
measures t o  co r rec t  them by p rov id ing  spec ia l  t r a i n i ng ,  reass ign ing personnel, 
o r  r ede f i n i ng  t h e  system goals. 




Steps 4 and 5 together  c o n s t i t u t e  a  task analysis,  which i s  def ined as 
. an a n a l y t i c a l  process f o r  determining t h e  s p e c i f i c  behaviors requi red of 
human components i n  a  man-machine system" (Swain and Guttman 1982). The 
i n d i v i d u a l  tasks, o r  steps i n  t he  task,  form t he  bas is  o f  t h e  human r e l i a b i l i t y  
model t h a t  i s  used t o  est imate numerical human e r r o r  rates. This aspect o f  a  
task  ana lys is  i s  no t  discussed i n  t h i s  section. 
Task ana lys is  can be d i v i ded  i n t o  two par ts ,  desc r ip t ion  and analysis.  
Step 4 o f  t he  HRA i s  t h e  desc r i p t i ve  par t .  I n  t h i s  step, t h e  analys t  breaks 
down t h e  operat ing procedure i n t o  tasks o r  smal ler  u n i t s  o f  behavior and enters 
t h i s  and other  necessary in fo rmat ion  i n t o  a  tab le .  I n  most cases, the  
necessary in format ion cons is ts  o f  such items as t h e  piece o f  equipment on which 
an ac t i on  i s  performed, t he  act ions requi red o f  t h e  worker, t h e  l i m i t s  o f  h i s  
performance, the  loca t ions  o f  t he  con t ro l s  and displays,  and explanatory notes. 
With t h e  system goals and funct ions from Step 1 and t he  s i t u a t i o n a l  
cha rac te r i s t i c s  from Step 2, t h e  analys t  can describe t he  demands t h a t  each j ob  
places on personnel. The purpose o f  t h i s  step i s  t o  descr ibe t he  tasks and 
PSFs i n  d e t a i l  t o  ensure t h a t  t he  a n a l y t i c a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  task analys is  (Step 5) 
i s  provided w i t h  s u f f i c i e n t  informat ion.  I n  o ther  words, t h i s  step i s  used t o  
i n t eg ra te  t he  in format ion from Steps 1, 2, and 3 i n t o  a  l o g i c a l  format. There 
a re  many d i f f e r e n t  formats f o r  task analysis.  The format i s  unimportant t o  t h e  
analysis.  However, i t  i s  important t o  descr ibe and analyze each task as 
necessary t o  i d e n t i f y  e r ro r -1  i k e l y  and accident-prone s i tua t ions .  A 
recommended task analys is  format t h a t  inc ludes both a  desc r i p t i ve  p a r t  and an 
a n a l y t i c a l  p a r t  i s  shown i n  Table 23. 
The f i r s t  f i v e  columns i n  Table 23 are t he  desc r i p t i ve  p a r t  o f  t he  example 
format. The analys t  considers t he  j ob  o r  task under ana l ys i s  and assigns 
numbers t o  i nd i ca te  t he  sequence of performance. Under t h e  column labe led  
"Instrument o r  con t ro l  ,' t h e  analys t  i nd ica tes  each i t em  t h a t  d isp lays 
in fo rmat ion  t o  t h e  operator, such as be l l s ,  l i g h t s ,  gauges, meters, and s t r i p -  
cha r t  recorders. The con t ro l s  inc lude  such items as switches, keys on a  
computer console, connectors, and too ls .  The column labe led " A c t i v i t y "  i s  used 
f o r  ac t i on  verbs t h a t  descr ibe t he  k inds of human act ions r e l a ted  t o  t he  items 
i n  t h e  second column. The ac t i on  verbs used should he lp  i d e n t i f y  the  k i nd  o f  
d i sp lay  o r  con t ro l  used. For example, i f  a  togg le  swi tch i s  used, t h e  words 
" F l i p  up," o r  " F l i p  down" can be used t o  descr ibe t h e  act ion.  The analys t  
should i n d i c a t e  t h e  p o s i t i o n  t o  which a  swi tch i s  se t  o r  o ther  measure o f  
response adequacy. Under t h e  column labe led  "Cue f o r  i n i t i a t i o n  o r  completion 
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o f  a c t i v i t y , "  t h e  ana lys t  i n d i c a t e s  t h e  cue t h a t  t e l l s  t h e  opera tor  when t o  
beg in  a  s tep  and t h e  cue t h a t  i n d i c a t e s  t h e  s tep has been completed success- 
f u l l y .  E r r o r s  can r e s u l t  i f  t h e  design o f  equipment and procedures do no t  
p rov ide  good cues. M is lead ing  o r  incomplete cues can r e s u l t  i n  t h e  omission o f  
some s tep  i n  a  procedure. Column 5, "Remarks," i s  used f o r  r e l e v a n t  
i n fo rma t ion  t h a t  i s  n o t  covered i n  Columns 1 through 4. Th is  completes t h e  
t a s k  d e s c r i p t i o n  phase t h a t  i s  designed t o  p rov ide  t h e  necessary i n fo rma t ion  
f o r  t h e  a n a l y t i c a l  phase (Step 5)  where e r r o r - l i k e l y  and accident-prone 
s i t u a t i o n s  a r e  i d e n t i f i e d  and examined. 
A useful  a i d  t o  t h e  t a s k  d e s c r i p t i o n  process i s  l i n k  a n a l y s i s  (see Step 
1) .  Th i s  t o o l  a i d s  i n  t h e  design and l a y o u t  o f  c o n t r o l  rooms and c o n t r o l  
consoles by d e p i c t i n g  t h e  pathways among d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  o f  a  system as 
opera tors  and o the r  p l a n t  personnel move about checking and man ipu la t i ng  
gauges, d i a l s ,  etc., and comnunicating. Th is  t y p e  o f  a n a l y s i s  can suggest 
improvements i n  t h e  design o f  c o n t r o l  cen te rs  and opera t i ng  procedures t o  make 
t h e  a c t i o n s  r e q u i r e d  o f  opera tors  more convenient  and thus ,  improve human 
performance. L i n k  a n a l y s i s  can be a p p l i e d  t o  task  procedures where a  s p e c i f i c  
sequence o f  s teps i s  requ i red.  
STEP 5 - Analyze t h e  Jobs and Tasks t o  I d e n t i f y  E r r o r - l i k e l y  S i t u a t i o n s  
(ELSs) and o t h e r  Problems 
Th is  s tep i s  t h e  a n a l y t i c a l  p a r t  o f  a  t a s k  ana lys is .  Each human a c t i o n  i s  
analyzed t o  determine e r r o r - l i k e l y  s i t u a t i o n s  (ELSs) a r i s i n g  f rom equipment 
design features,  methods o f  use, methods o f  t r a i n i n g ,  and t h e  s k i l l  l e v e l s  of 
people i n  t h e  system. ELSs i n v o l v e  e r r o r s  t h a t  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  occur because t h e  
demands p laced on humans exceed t h e i r  c a p a b i l i t i e s  and 1  i m i t a t i o n s .  For 
example, i f  a  t o g g l e  sw i t ch  i s  used where t h e  up p o s i t i o n  i s  "OFF," e r r o r s  a re  
l i k e l y  because i n  t h i s  coun t ry  we expect t h e  oppos i te  arrangement. A spec ia l  
case o f  e r r o r - 1  i k e l  i ness  t h a t  i s  o f t e n  encountered i s  c a l l e d  an "Accident-Prone 
S i t u a t i o n "  (APS). A f a m i l i a r  example o f  an APS i s  a  s l i p p e r y  f l o o r .  
There a r e  no w e l l  -de f ined r u l e s  f o r  making t h e  determinat ions  o f  ELSs. 
The v a l i d i t y  and e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  t a s k  a n a l y s i s  depends upon t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  
t h e  a n a l y s t  t o  p u t  h i m s e l f  i n  t h e  p lace  o f  t h e  opera tor  so t h e  ac tua l  and 
p o t e n t i a l  problems i n  each task  can be i d e n t i f i e d  and understood. For t h i s  
reason, mine s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s  a r e  t h e  i d e a l  candidates f o r  per forming a  task  
ana lys is .  However, even t h e  best  t ask  ana lys t  cannot hope t o  i d e n t i f y  a l l  
p o s s i b l e  human responses, p r e d i c t  a1 1  e r r o r s  o f  omission o r  commission, o r  
p r e d i c t  a l l  extraneous a c t i o n s  by personnel. S t i l l ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  i n  a  
thorough task  ana lys i s ,  g iven s u f f i c i e n t  t ime, t o  i d e n t i f y  - most o f  t h e  
impor tan t  t asks  t o  be performed a t  a  mine and - most o f  t h e  ways e r r o r s  may be 
committed. 
The " a n a l y t i c a l "  p a r t  o f  t h e  task  a n a l y s i s  format shown i n  Table 23 
i n d i c a t e s  t h e  k inds  o f  f a c t o r s ' t h e  ana lys t  must cons ider  i n  i d e n t i f y i n g  an 
ELS. The 1  i s t e d  f a c t o r s  a r e  under four  broad headings t h a t  a r e  s e l f -  
exp lanatory :  (1 )  scanning, perceptua l ,  a n t i c i p a t o r y  requirements, (2)  r e c a l l  
r equ i  rements ( long-term o r  shor t - te rm memory), and i n i t i a t i n g  cue (present, 
absent o r  poor ) ,  ( 3 )  i n t e r p r e t i n g  requirements, and (4 )  man ipu la t i ve  problems. 
Normally, e n t r i e s  a r e  made i n  t h e  a n a l y t i c a l  h a l f  o f  t h e  form o n l y  when t h e  
ana lys t  i d e n t i f i e s  an ELS. I n  re ference t o  t h e  f a c t o r s  i n  t h e  columns, ELSs 
e x i s t  when t h e  o p e r a t o r ' s  c a p a b i l i t i e s  a r e  exceeded by t h e  system demands f o r  
r e c a l l  ing ,  i n t e r p r e t i n g ,  decision-making, o r  man ipu la t i ng  processes. These 
e r r o r s  can be e r r o r s  of commission o r  omission, extraneous ac ts ,  o r  sequent ia l  
o r  t ime  e r ro rs .  
The ana lys t  makes e n t r i e s  i n  t h e  a n a l y t i c a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  fo rm o n l y  when an 
ELS i s  i d e n t i f i e d .  The a n a l y s i s  i s  done f o r  each task  o r  s tep  i n  a  task  t o  
determine t h e  PSFs t h a t  seem l i k e l y  t o  r e s u l t  i n  e r ro rs .  I n  o t h e r  words, ELSs 
a r e  s i t u a t i o n s  i n  which t h e  performance shaping f a c t o r s  i n  a  task  a r e  n o t  
compat ib le w i t h  t h e  c a p a b i l i t i e s  and l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  in tended performer o f  
t h e  task.  Task performance e r r o r s  can a l s o  r e s u l t  when t h e r e  a r e  c o n f l i c t s  
between ex te rna l  and i n t e r n a l  PSFs. Th is  t y p e  o f  i n fo rma t ion  leads t o  t h e  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  causes o f  ELSs and w i l l  i n d i c a t e  i f  human r e l i a b i l i t y  can 
be improved by changing any PSF. Th is  leads up t o  t h e  f i n a l  s tep i n  per forming 
t h e  q u a l i t a t i v e  p o r t i o n  o f  an HRA. 
For f u r t h e r  ass is tance i n  i d e n t i f y i n g  ELSs, t h e  reader i s  r e f e r r e d  t o  
several  pub1 i c a t i o n s .  Accordinq t o  Swain and Guttman (19821, t h e  most concise 
document' i s  MIL-STD-1427B, ~i 1  i i a r y  Standard, Human ~ n g i n e e r i n ~  Design C r i t e r i a  
f o r  M i  1  i t a r y  Systems, Equipment and Faci  1  i t i e s  (U.S. Department o f  Defense 
4 Two o t h e r  useful  p u b l i c a t i o n s  i n c l u d e  ERDA-76-45-2. SSDC-2. Human 
-
  actors i n  Design ( ~ e r t n e )  and Bu l lock  1976) and a  textbook Human i a c t o r s  i n  
k n g i  nee r i  ng and Design (McCormi ck 1975). These documents present  l a r g e  amounts 
o t  i n f o r m a t i o n  on t h e  best  ways t o  design human in te r faces .  Although these 
documents a r e  use fu l ,  t h e  best  way t o  i d e n t i f y  ELSs i s  f o r  t h e  ana lys t  t o  
per form t h e  tasks  h imse l f  supplemented by observ ing and i n t e r v i e w i n g  opera tors  
who perform t h e  tasks. To ensure t h a t  s u f f i c i e n t  i n fo rma t ion  i s  obta ined by 
t h e  ana lys t ,  t h e  c h e c k l i s t  shown i n  Table 24 can be used. Th is  c h e c k l i s t  i s  
extremely u s e f u l  f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h a t  should be placed i n  t h e  
a n a l y t i c a l  h a l f  of t h e  task  a n a l y s i s  format. 
STEP 6  - Suaaest Chanaes t o  t h e  Svstem 
Th is  i s  t h e  f i n a l  s tep i n  t h e  q u a l i t a t i v e  assessment stage o f  an HRA. I n  
t h i s  step,  t h e  ana lys t  reviews t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  obta ined i n  Steps 1 through 5  
and suggests measures t h a t  c o u l d  e l i m i n a t e  o r  m i t i g a t e  s p e c i f i c  ELSs. The 
t h r e e  documents on human f a c t o r s  l i s t e d  i n  Step 5  a re  e x c e l l e n t  sources o f  
in format ion  f o r  suggest ing these measures. Using t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  task  
a n a l y s i s  as a  guide, s u i t a b l e  design changes t o  system components can be 
developed t h a t  cou ld  reduce t h e  1  i k e l i h o o d  o f  human e r r o r s ,  increase t h e  
l i k e l i h o o d  t h a t  an e r r o r  w i l l  be detec ted o r  corrected,  o r  i t  may p rov ide  f o r  
t h e  system t o  t o l e r a t e  t h e  e r r o r .  The design changes may address any o f  t h e  
performance shaping f a c t o r s  assoc ia ted w i t h  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  e r r o r .  
Advantaaes and Disadvantaqes 
A major  advantage of  per forming an HRA on a  m i n i n g  system i s  t h a t  t h e  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  o f  human e r r o r  t o  system f a i l u r e  can be examined. Human e r r o r  i s  
a  p o t e n t i a l  reason f o r  an acc ident  t o  occur i n  t h e  f i r s t  place, and a l s o  
TABLE 24. - A  c h e c k l i s t  f o r  e v a l u a t i n g  t a s k  e r r o r - l i k e l i n e s s  
- - - - - -- - - - - 
1. The cue o r  s i g n  t h a t  t e l l s  t h e  opera tor  t o  beg in  each t a s k  and each 
a c t i v i t y  i n  a  t a s k  i s  s imple and unambiguous: 
a. No incons is tenc ies ,  gaps, o r  m is lead ing  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h a t  cou ld  r e s u l t  
i n  e r r o r s  o f  judgment. 
b. No competing a c t i v i t i e s  t h a t  c o u l d  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  p e r c e i v i n g  t h e  cue o r  
w i t h  responding i n  a  t i m e l y  manner. 
2. The cue o r  s i g n  p o i n t s  t o  t h e  c o r r e c t  t a s k  o r  a c t i v i t y  only.  
3 .  The task  o r  a c t i v i t y  i s  easy t o  do. 
a. No spec ia l  problems i n  t h e  scanning, a n t i c i p a t o r y ,  o r  o t h e r  perceptua l  
requirements; i n  long-term o r  sho r t - te rm memory requirements; i n  
i n t e r p r e t i n g  and decis ion-making requirements; o r  i n  man ipu la t i ve  
requ i  rements. 
b. No spec ia l  problems w i t h  competing a c t i v i t i e s  o r  pas t  experience. 
4 .  The complet ion cue o r  s i g n  f o r  t h e  t a s k  o r  a c t i v i t y  i s  s imple and 
unambi guous. 
a. No m is lead ing  feedback t o  t h e  opera tor .  
b. No spec ia l  problems w i t h  competing a c t i v i t i e s .  
5 .  The complet ion cue o r  s i g n  f o r  one a c t i v i t y  i n  a  task  cannot be 
m i s i n t e r p r e t e d  as s i g n a l i n g  t h e  complet ion o f  t h e  e n t i  r e  task .  
c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  l e s s  than  adequate recovery f rom accidents.  The a n a l y s i s  
procedure discussed i n  t h i s  sec t i on  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s u i t a b l e  f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  
t h e  causes o f  human e r r o r s ,  whether t h e y  a r e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  p l a n t  and 
hardware o r  o f  t h e  human h imse l f .  The r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s  suggests areas 
t h a t  can reduce t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  human e r r o r s  by such measures as focus ing  
opera to r  t r a i n i n g  sessions on i d e n t i f i e d  hazards, p r o v i d i n g  i n p u t  t o  sa fe  
o p e r a t i n g  procedures, and p o s t u l a t i n g  approp r ia te  design changes. Thi s  stage 
o f  t h e  HRA requ i res  l i t t l e  system s a f e t y  a n a l y s i s  e x p e r t i s e  beyond a  d e t a i l e d  
knowledge o f  t h e  system, c o n t r o l  con f igu ra t i ons ,  and o p e r a t i n g  procedures. 
The pr imary  disadvantage of an HRA i s  t h a t  an adequate and e f f e c t i v e  
a n a l y s i s  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  time-consumi ng. The technique a1 so requ i res  s i  gni f i c a n t  
s u b j e c t i  ve judgement by t h e  ana lys t  which i n t roduces  unce r ta in t y .  Also, t h e  
techn ique r e q u i r e s  more than a  d e t a i l e d  knowledge o f  how t h e  system func t i ons .  
It r e q u i r e s  t h e  a n a l y s t  t o  know how t o  opera te  equipment and components, how t o  
mon i to r  p l a n t  va r iab les ,  and what changes i n  p l a n t  v a r i a b l e s  mean. This, 
however, was considered an advantage i n  t h e  eva lua t i on  o f  s a f e t y  methods 
performed f o r  t h i s  study because t h e  people who b e l i e v e  they  should per form 
these methods, t h e  mine s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s ,  a r e  a1 ready knowledgeable regard ing 
t h i s  i n fo rma t ion .  
Example o f  Ana lys is  Procedure 
The example chosen f o r  i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  HRA procedure i s  a  r o o f  b o l t i n g  
opera t i on  a t  an underground coa l  mine. The reader should recognize t h a t  HRA i s  
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  a l l  aspects o f  t h e  m i n i n g  opera t ion .  Only t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  
r o o f - b o l t i n g  opera t i on  i s  presented because a  complete HRA o f  a  min ing system 
i s  t o o  l eng thy  t o  present  i n  t h i s  manual. Roo f -bo l t i ng  i s  one o f  t h e  most 
hazardous o f  a1 1  underground m in ing  operat ions.  The r o o f  b o l t e r  i s  a  rubber-  
t i r e d  v e h i c l e  used t o  d r i l l  ho les  and i n s e r t  and t i g h t e n  expans ion-she l l -  
anchor b o l t s  i n t o  t h e  r o o f ,  t hus  suppor t i ng  t h e  r o o f  e i t h e r  through beam- 
s t reng then ing  (clamping t h i n  l a y e r s  i n t o  a  t h i c k  l a y e r )  o r  hanging t h e  weaker 
s t r a t a  t o  a  competent bed. Normally, d r i l l i n g  i s  accomplished w i t h  a  r o t a r y  
a c t i o n  u s i n g  auger-type b i t s  w i t h  tungsten ca rb ide  i n s e r t s .  Dust r e s u l t i n g  
f rom d r i l l i n g  i s  c o l l e c t e d  through t h e  b i t  and t h e  ho l l ow  d r i l l  rod. 
The f i r s t  s tep o f  t h e  HRA o f  t h e  r o o f - b o l t i n g  task  i s  t o  descr ibe  t h e  
operat ion.  A p a r t i a l  d e s c r i p t i o n  i s  prov ided above. It i s  a l s o  recommended t o  
perform 1  i n k  a n a l y s i s  on t h e  o p e r a t i n g  procedure because t h i s  ope ra t i on  
c o n s i s t s  o f  several  s teps performed i n  a  s p e c i f i c  sequence. The f i r s t  s tep o f  
t h e  l i n k  a n a l y s i s  i s  t o  descr ibe  t h e  task  procedure i n  t h e  proper ope ra t i ng  
sequence and es t imate  t h e  t i m e  requirements f o r  each s tep i n  t h e  procedure. 
Th is  i s  done below. 
( 1 )  Check general roo f  c o n d i t i o n s  and check r o o f  b o l t  spacings: 
1.0-2.0 minutes 
( 2 )  Methane check: 0.5-1.0 minutes 
( 3 )  Maneuver t o  f i r s t  d r i l l  hole,  extend jacks :  0.2-0.4 minutes 
( 4 )  Place d r i l l  s t e e l  : 0.1-0.2 minutes 
(5 )  D r i l l  ho le :  0.2-0.5 m inu tes / foo t  d r i l l  r a t e  
( 6 )  Add ex tens ion t o  d r i l l  s t e e l  ( o r  change s t e e l  ) :  0.1-0.2 minutes 
( 7 )  Place s t e e l  as ide:  0.05-0.1 minutes 
( 8  Lower d r i l l  boom, r e t r a c t  d r i l l  rods: 0.05-0.1 minutes 
( 9  1 I n s e r t  b o l t  and t i g h t e n :  0.20-0.50 minutes (w i thou t  p lanks o r  
s t r a p s )  
(10)  Place wrench a s i  de : 0.05-0.1 mi nutes 
(11) Re t rac t  s t a b l i z i n g  jacks :  0.1-0.2 minutes 
(12) Empty dust b i n :  0.5-1 minute  
(13) Mark o f f  h o l e  l o c a t i o n s :  0.5-1 minute 
(14) Repeat opera t ions  2  through 12 f o r  subsequent r o o f  b o l t i n g .  
Roof q u a l i t y  p lays  an impor tant  r o l e  i n  determin ing c y c l e  t imes s ince t h e  
l e n g t h  o f  hole,  h o l e  spacing, d r i l l i n g  r a t e ,  and t h e  necess i t y  f o r  p lanks,  
s t raps ,  o r  b locks  as p a r t  o f  t h e  r o o f  support  a r e  governed by r o o f  cond i t ions .  
Once t h e  procedure has been descr ibed and t ime  requirements have been 
est imated,  t h e  nex t  s tep i n  l i n k  a n a l y s i s  i s  t o  draw a  diagram showing where 
t h e  o p e r a t i n g  steps occur. Arrows a re  drawn between these l o c a t i o n s  i n d i c a t i n g  
t h e  movements o f  t h e  operator .  A l i n k  a n a l y s i s  f l o w  diagram f o r  t h e  r o o f  
b o l t i n g  opera t i on  i s  shown i n  F igu re  14. I t  can be seen t h a t  t h e r e  i s  
cons iderab le  mounting and dismount ing o f  t h e  r o o f  b o l t i n g  machine by t h e  
o p e r a t o r  t o  perform some o f  t h e  steps. Th is  i s  one p o t e n t i a l  hazard, 
Rock face 
I Roof bolter I 
I (initial position) I I + Haulage way + 
I I I 
I I 
Lo-----& 
&. The legend for the numbered task symbols 
is shown in the text 
FIGURE 14. - L i n k  a n a l y s i s  f l o w  diagram f o r  t h e  r o o f  b o l t i n g  opera t ion  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  mois t ,  humid, and s l i p p e r y  cond i t ions .  Another p o t e n t i a l  
hazard i s  t o  omi t  t h e  methane check o r  t o  perform i t  out  o f  sequence, thus  
p o s s i b l y  a l l o w i n g  t h e  methane concen t ra t i on  t o  b u i l d  t o  exp los i ve  l e v e l s  
w i t h o u t  be ing  n o t i c e d  by operators.  S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  steps f o r  s e t t i n g  and 
r e t r a c t i n g  t h e  s t a b i l i z i n g  j acks  may be omi t ted  o r  delayed which cou ld  cause 
damage t o  t h e  machine w h i l e  d r i l l i n g  o r  when i t  i s  moved t o  a  new l o c a t i o n .  
Personnel may a l s o  be i n j u r e d  i f  t h e  d r i l l  b i t  s l i p s  ou t  o f  t h e  d r i l l  h o l e  
because t h e  jacks  a r e  n o t  i n  place. A f u r t h e r  p o t e n t i a l  sequencing problem 
c o u l d  occur i f  t h e  opera to r  f a i l s  t o  check t h e  h o l e  spacings be fo re  d r i l l i n g .  
Regu la t ions  r e q u i r e  a  maximum spacing o f  r o o f  b o l t s  ( 5  f t  x  5 f t  o r  l e s s )  and 
i f  t h i s  spacing i s  n o t  met, t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  r o o f  co l l apse  i s  increased i n  
a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  c i v i l  p e n a l t i e s  and f i n e s  t h a t  t h e  m in ing  company would be 
sub jec t  t o  i f  t h e  proper spacing i s  n o t  maintained. Th is  e s s e n t i a l l y  completes 
Step 1 o f  t h e  HRA procedure as i t  a p p l i e s  t o  t h e  r o o f  b o l t i n g  operat ion.  
Step 2 of t h e  a n a l y s i s  procedure i s  t o  descr ibe  t h e  s i t u a t i o n a l  charac ter -  
i s t i c s  assoc ia ted w i t h  t h e  r o o f - b o l t i n g  task.  To do t h i s ,  t h e  ana lys t  consu l t s  
t h e  c h e c k l i s t  of performance shaping f a c t o r s  (see Table 22) and i d e n t i f i e s  
those PSFs t h a t  cou ld  p o t e n t i a l l y  a f f e c t  t h e  a c t i o n s  taken by operators. The 
a n a l y s t  f o l  lows t h e  task  ,operat ing procedure and i d e n t i f i e s  t h e  PSFs associated 
w i t h  each s tep  i n  t h e  task.  For example, i n  Step 2 o f  t h e  r o o f - b o l t i n g  task  
procedure, t h e  opera tor  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  check methane l e v e l s  i n  t h e  cu t ,  p r i o r  
t o  s t a r t i n g  t h e  d r i l l i n g  machine motor. It i s  poss ib le  t h a t  t h e  opera tor  might  
omi t  t h i s  s tep and s t a r t  t h e  motor i n  a  h i g h  methane atmosphere and cause an 
exp los ion.  The ana lys t  i d e n t i f i e s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  causes o f  t h e  opera tor  
f o r g e t t i n g  o r  d e l i b e r a t e l y  o m i t t i n g  t h e  methane check. Some o f  t h e  PSFs 
assoc ia ted w i t h  t h i s  task  e r r o r  a r e  shown i n  Table 25, supplemented by a  b r i e f  
exp lana t ion  o f  why they  were selected.  Other PSFs a re  assoc ia ted w i t h  t h i s  
task  s tep  bu t  a r e  n o t  shown due t o  t h e  l e n g t h  o f  t h e  exp lana t ion  requ i red.  
Table 25 i s  presented f o r  i l l u s t r a t i o n  purposes only.  
TABLE 25. - Examples o f  performance shaping f a c t o r s  t h a t  
cou ld  cause a  r o o f  b o l t i n g  machine opera tor  t o  
omi t  t h e  methane check 
TASK STEP - Methane Check P r i o r  t o  S t a r t i n g  Machine 
P o t e n t i a l  PSFs 
a Qua1 i t y  o f  environment - Uncomfortable temperature and humid i ty ,  
p o t e n t i a l  l y  s l i p p e r y  cond i t i ons .  Th is  cou ld  cause t h e  opera tor  t o  
d e l i b e r a t e l y  omi t  t h e  methane check because he must dismount t h e  machine 
t o  do so. 
a Avai l a b i  1 i ty/Adequacy of methane de tec to rs  - Operator may fee l  h i s  
pe rcep t ion  o f  t h e  methane l e v e l s  i s  b e t t e r  than a  p o t e n t i a l l y  inaccura te  
o r  u n r e l i a b l e  methane d e t e c t i o n  device. 
Job and task  i n s t r u c t i o n s  - Inadequate procedures, warnings, and p l a n t  
p o l i c i e s  cou ld  a f f e c t  t h i s  step. 
a I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  - Poss ib ly  t h e  opera tor  performs t h e  methane check and 
m i s i n t e r p r e t s  t h e  r e s u l t s .  
a Frequency and r e p e t i t i v e n e s s  - The opera tor  may f e e l  t h a t  s ince  he has 
checked methane l e v e l s  p r i o r  t o  d r i l l i n g  a  prev ious ho le  a  second check i s  
n o t  needed. 
a Man-machine i n t e r f a c e  fac to rs  - Design o f  t h e  methane de tec to r  may be 
inadequate which cou ld  l e a d  t o  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  e r ro rs .  
Once t h e  PSFs assoc ia ted w i t h  each s tep  o f  t h e  r o o f  b o l t i n g  task  have been 
i d e n t i f i e d ,  t h e  a n a l y s t  cont inues t o  Step 3 o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s  and descr ibes  t h e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  machine opera tors  and t h e  personnel who ma in ta in  t h e  
machines. The a n a l y s t  should examine t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  personnel 
i n v o l v e d  i n  order  t o  determine i f  t h e  demands p laced on t h e  opera tors  by t h e  
task  exceed t h e  c a p a b i l i t i e s  and l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  personnel. For example, 
methane checks a r e  r e p e t i t i v e  and f requent  t a s k  steps. Examination of t h e  
machine opera to r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  may i n d i c a t e  t h a t  a  p a r t i c u l a r  opera tor  has 
l i t t l e  o r  no pa t i ence  f o r  per forming r e p e t i t i v e  checks which may n o t  y i e l d  any 
d i f f e r e n t  r e s u l t s  than prev ious checks. Th is  i s  a  comnon c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  
humans and i n  t h i s  case i t  would o n l y  t a k e  one omi t ted  methane check t o  
s e r i o u s l y  i n j u r e  t h a t  opera tor .  The a n a l y s t  cont inues t o  compare t h e  personnel 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  w i t h  t h e  PSFs t o  determine t h i s  t y p e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  each 
t a s k  and each s tep  i n  t h e  tasks.  
Steps 4  and 5  of t h e  HRA procedure toge the r  c o n s t i t u t e  a  task  ana lys is .  
Resu l ts  o f  t h e  task  a n a l y s i s  a r e  o f t e n  combined on one t a b l e ,  as shown 
p r e v i o u s l y  i n  Table 23. Step 4 c o n s i s t s  o f  t h e  d e s c r i p t i v e  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  task  
a n a l y s i s  and Step 5  i s  t h e  a n a l y t i c a l  pa r t .  The o b j e c t i v e  o f  these two steps 
toge the r  i s  t o  i d e n t i f y  e r r o r - 1  i k e l y  s i t u a t i o n s  and t h e i r  p o t e n t i a l  causes. A 
completed task  a n a l y i s  f o r  human e r r o r  w h i l e  checking methane l e v e l s  p r i o r  t o  
s t a r t i n g  a  r o o f  b o l t i n g  machine i s  shown i n  Table 26 f o r  t h e  reader t o  f o l l o w  
throughout t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i 1  l u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  task  a n a l y s i s  procedure. 
As can be seen i n  Table 26, t h e  s tep i n  t h e  r o o f  b o l t i n g  task  f o r  t h e  
methane check i s  broken down i n t o  f o u r  smal le r  u n i t s  o f  behavior ,  l abe led  2A, 
26, 2C, and 2D. The procedures f o r  these sub-tasks a r e  descr ibed i n  column 3 
o f  t h e  tab le .  A c t i v i t y  2A i s  f o r  t h e  opera tor  t o  dismount t h e  r o o f  b o l t i n g  
machine, acqu i re  t h e  .methane detec tor ,  and advance t o  t h e  rock face. There i s  
no cue o r  s i g n  f o r  t h e  opera tor  t o  begin t h i s  a c t i v i t y .  Th is  i s  recorded i n  
column 4. I n  column 5, t h e  a n a l y s t  p laces remarks concerning t h e  performance 
shaping f a c t o r s  assoc ia ted w i t h  t h e  a c t i v i t y .  The i d e n t i f i e d  PSFs f o r  sub-task 
2A i n c l u d e  t h e  q u a l i t y  of t h e  environment ( o f t e n  hot ,  humid, s l i p p e r y ,  and dark 
c o n d i t i o n s ) ,  perceptua l  requirements ( t h e  opera tor  should know when n o t  t o  
expose h i m s e l f  t o  a  l oose  r o o f ) ,  t ask  speed ( t reacherous f o o t i n g ) ,  and f a t i g u e  
( o v e r - t i r e d  opera tors  a r e  more l i k e l y  t o  omi t  p a r t  of a  task  o r  commit an 
o p e r a t i n g  e r r o r ) .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h i s  column i s  used f o r  r e c o r d i n g  personnel 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t h a t  may have an impact on task  performance. Note t h a t  one 
opera tor  i s  i d e n t i f i e d  as one who lacks  pat ience and takes unnecessary chances 
f o r  t h e  sake o f  increased speed a t  h i s  tasks. Other examples o f  i tems o f  t h i s  
na tu re  i n c l u d e  personal  problems, medical c o n d i t i o n s  (such as back i n j u r i e s ,  
asthma, a l coho l  ism, etc. ) ,  personal capabi 1  i t i e s  (such as phys i ca l  s t rength ,  i n -  
shape, out-of-shape, etc. )  and mental capabi 1  i t i e s  ( d i s c i p l i n e d ,  e x p e r t i s e  i n  
some s p e c i f i c  area, reasoning a b i l i t y ,  etc.).  Th i s  completes t h e  d e s c r i p t i v e  
p a r t  o f  t h e  task  ana lys i s .  
Next, t h e  a n a l y s t  begins t h e  a n a l y t i c a l  por  i o n  o f  t a s k  ana lys is .  The d o b j e c t i v e  o f  t h i s  p a r t  o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s  i s  t o  i d e  t i f y  s i t u a t i o n s  where human 
e r r o r  i s  1 i k e l y  and t h e i  r p o t e n t i  a1 causes. E r ro r -1  i k e l y  s i t u a t i o n s  may a r i s e  
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TABLE 26. - (continued) 
f rom equipment design fea tures ,  methods o f  use,.methods o f  t r a i n i n g ,  and t h e  
s k i l l  l e v e l s  o f .peop le  i n  t h e  system. The k inds  of  f ac to rs  t h e  a n a l y s t  i s  
l o o k i n g  f o r  i n  each human a c t i o n  a re  grouped i n t o  four  broad categor ies ,  as 
shown i n  columns 7, 8, 9, and 10 of Table 26. Column 7  i s  f o r  scanning, 
perceptua l  , and a n t i c i p a t o r y  requ i  rements. The ana lys t  examines t h e  number 
and k inds  of gauges, d i a l s ,  l a b e l s  on switches, warning s igns,  and o t h e r  i tems 
t h a t  convey i n f o r m a t i o n  about t h e  process t o  t h e  operator. With t h i s  
i n fo rma t ion  t h e  a n a l y s t  can i d e n t i f y  s i t u a t i o n s  where t h e  opera tor  may omi t  a  
s tep  o r  f a i l  t o  de tec t  a  hardware f a i l u r e ,  alarm, o r  o t h e r  cue f o r  t h e  opera tor  
t o  begin a  task.  Recal l  requirements f o r  t h e  tasks  a r e  recorded i n  column 8. 
Reca l l  requirements can be ca tegor i zed  i n t o  shor t - te rm memory and long-term 
memory requ i  rements. The a n a l y s t  examines t h e  t h i n k i n g  processes t h a t  
opera tors  must use t o  perform t h e i r  t asks  and i d e n t i f i e s  whether t h e  task  
procedure i s  one t h a t  i s  considered by t h e  opera tor  f r e q u e n t l y  (poss ib l y  d a i l y  
o r  weekly)  o r  i n f requen t l y .  Emergency evacuat ion procedures a r e  an example of 
a  1  ong-term memory i tem. Emergency procedures a r e  n o t  f r e q u e n t l y  considered by 
workers. Obviously i t  i s n o t  economical t o  p r a c t i c e  emergency evacuat ion 
procedures a t  a  mine on a  r e l a t i v e l y  f requent  basis. Therefore, o t h e r  methods 
f o r  t r a i n i n g  workers t o  escape f rom an emergency s i t u a t i o n  must be u t i l i z e d  i n  
a d d i t i o n  t o  in f requent  p r a c t i c e  evacuations. Such measures as emergency, 
bat tery-powered l i g h t i n g  and posted, w e l l - l i t  escape routes  a r e  o f t e n  used a t  
mines and o t h e r  o p e r a t i n g  systems. I n t e r p r e t i n g  requirements a r e  recorded i n  
column 9. For t h i s  column, t h e  ana lys t  examines t h e  workers '  responses t o  t h e  
cues f o r  him t o  begin o r  complete a  task.  Often workers a r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  
analyze a  s i t u a t i o n  and r e a c t  accord ing ly ,  ga the r ing  in format ion  from 
i n d i c a t o r s ,  alarms, gauges, and h i s  environment. As can be seen from t h e  
example i n  Table 26, environmental va r iab les  can p l a y  an an impor tant  r o l e  i n  
i n t e r p r e t i n g  requirements a t  mines where c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  o f t e n  wet and 
s l i p p e r y .  Excessive task  speed i s  a l s o  a  l i k e l y  cause o f  i n t e r p r e t i v e  e r ro rs .  
Man ipu la t i ve  problems a r e  recorded i n  column 10. These a r e  problems regard ing  
t h e  phys i ca l  performance o f  t h e  task.  I n  t h e  example problem, p o t e n t i a l  
man ipu la t i ve  problems r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  wear ing o f  gloves a r e  i d e n t i f i e d .  These 
i tems a r e  most o f t e n  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  design o f  t h e  c o n t r o l  mechanisms, p l a n t  
hardware, and work s ta t i ons .  A  f u r t h e r  example might  be a  t o g g l e  sw i t ch  i n  
which t h e  up p o s i t i o n  means OFF and t h e  down p o s i t i o n  means ON, e x a c t l y  t h e  
oppos i te  o f  what i s  expected i n  t h i s  country.  Th is  completes t h e  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  f a c t o r s  t h a t  cou ld  cause e r r o r - 1  i k e l y  s i t u a t i o n s .  The. reader 
shou ld  recognize t h a t  t h i s  process i s  repeated f o r  every t a s k  and opera t i on  a t  
t h e  mine r e q u i r i n g  human i n t e r a c t i o n .  
E r r o r - l i k e l y  s i t u a t i o n s  a r e  i d e n t i f i e d  and recorded i n  column 11 of t h e  
t a s k  a n a l y s i s  form, The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  ELSs i s  f a c i l i t a t e d  by t h e  use o f  a  
c h e c k l i s t  of quest ions t h a t  t h e  ana lys t  asks h i m s e l f  t o  answer. Th is  c h e c k l i s t  
was shown p r e v i o u s l y  i n  Table 24. The ana lys t  begins a t  t h e  t o p  o f  t h e  l i s t  
and eva luates  each quest ion  i n  regard  t o  t h e  performance o f  t h e  tasks  under 
ana lys is .  For example, an ELS was i d e n t i f i e d  i n  Task 26, t h e  check-out of t h e  
methane de tec to r  r e q u i r e d  before i t s  ac tua l  use. The ana lys t  inspected t h e  
c h e c k l i s t  and i d e n t i f i e d  i tems t h a t  were i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  statements 
conta ined the re in .  The s p e c i f i c  statement t h a t  t h e  ac tua l  s i t u a t i o n  c o n f l i c t s  
w i t h  i s  I tem 3a o f  Table 24, "No spec ia l  problems i n  scanning, a n t i c i p a t o r y  o r  
o the r  perceptua l  requirements ; i n  i n t e r p r e t i n g  and deci  sion-making requirements; 
o r  i n  man ipu la t i ve  requirements." More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h e  a c t u a l  s i t u a t i o n  i n  
t h e  mine has many d i s t r a c t i o n s ,  normal ly  poor environmental c o n d i t i o n s  (muddy; 
cou l  d  r e s u l t  i n  warning s igns  and equipment o p e r a t i n g  stamps be ing rendered 
unreadable) ,  and t h e r e  i s  o f t e n  s i g n i f i c a n t  economic i n c e n t i v e  f o r  workers t o  
perform t h e i r  t asks  as q u i c k l y  as poss ib le .  Any o f  these s i t u a t i o n s  can r e s u l t  
i n  a  task  performance e r r o r  which i n  t h i s  case i s  an e r r o r  o f  omission o f  a  
s t e p  i n  a  task.  The a n a l y s t  cont inues e v a l u a t i n g  each t a s k  descr ibed i n  
columns 1 t o  5 of t h e  task  a n a l y s i s  t a b l e ,  c o n s u l t i n g  t h e  c h e c k l i s t  f o r  each 
t a s k  step,  u n t i l  he has examined every task  and s tep  i n  a  t a s k  f o r  ELSs. Th is  
completes t h e  d iscuss ion of t h e  example o f  t h e  task  a n a l y s i s  procedure. The 
r e s u l t s  can be used t o  prepare a  c h e c k l i s t  o f  ELSs f o r  t h e  s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l  t o  
use i n  p lann ing  a  hazard reduc t i on  program, communicating t h e  r e s u l t s  t o  
management, and i d e n t i f y i n g  areas f o r  s a f e t y  improvements. 
The a n a l y s t ' s  nex t  s tep  i s  t o  use t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  obta ined thus  f a r  t o  
p o s t u a l t e  measures t h a t  c o u l d  e l i m i n a t e  o r  m i t i g a t e  s p e c i f i c  ELSs. I n  t h e  
s t a t e d  example, one of t h e  i d e n t i f i e d  ELSs i s  where a  worker reads an 
i naccu ra te  methane l e v e l  due t o  an improper ly  f u n c t i o n i n g  de tec to r  
( A c t i v i t y  28) .  The e f f e c t s  o f  such a  read ing  can p o t e n t i a l l y  cause an 
exp los ion  and m u l t i p l e  deaths i f  t h e  d e t e c t o r  gauge reads a  lower methane 
concen t ra t i on  than i s  a c t u a l l y  present  o r  can cause an unnecessary shutdown of 
opera t ions  i f  t h e  ac tua l  methane l e v e l  i s  lower than t h e  d e t e c t o r  i s  
i n d i c a t i n g .  The p o t e n t i a l  causes o f  t h i s  ELS a re  a  l a c k  o f  cues f o r  i n i t i a t i o n  
and performance o f  t h e  d e t e c t o r  check-out t e s t  sequence, t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h i s  
procedure i s  repeated many t imes every day, excessive task  speed, and 
p o t e n t i a l l y  poor environmental cond i t i ons .  I n  cons ide ra t i on  o f  t h i s  
in format ion ,  p o s s i b l e  measures f o r  m i t i  g a t i n g  t h i s  ELS inc lude :  (1) focus ing 
worker t r a i n i n g  on t h e  need f o r  p roper  t e s t i n g  procedures f o r  methane 
detec tors ,  and ( 2 )  permanently a t t a c h i n g . a  s i g n  i n  a  conspicuous l o c a t i o n  on 
each methane de tec to r  t h a t  i n d i c a t e s  t h e  t e s t i n g  and opera t i ng  procedures. 
L i t t l e  can be done t o  e l i m i n a t e  t h e  excessive task  speed, repe t i t i veness ,  and 
poor env i  ronmental cond i t i ons ,  beyond i n f o r m i n g  miners o f  t h e  hazards. 
However, if a  p a r t i c u l a r  worker re fuses t o  f o l l o w  procedures o r  cont inues t o  
work excess i ve l y  f a s t  a f t e r  repeated warnings, he cou ld  be removed from 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h i s  task  and thereby e l i m i n a t e  h i s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  
ELS. The ana lys t  cont inues down t h e  task  a n a l y s i s  t a b l e  and suggests p o s s i b l e  
measures t o  e l i m i n a t e  o r  c o r r e c t  p o t e n t i a l  ELSs inhe ren t  i n  each task  and s tep 
o f  m in ing  operat ions.  Th is  completes t h e  d iscuss ion o f  t h e  example problem. 
Computer Adaptabi 1  i t y  
Much of t h e  HRA procedure fo l l ows  a  s t r u c t u r e d  and i t e r a t i v e  format. Task 
ana lys i s ,  which i s  t h e  h e a r t  o f  t h e  q u a l i t a t i v e  p o r t i o n s  o f  HRA, f o l l o w s  such 
a format. I t  i s  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t ask  a n a l y s i s  cou ld  be adapted t o  a  user -  
i n t e r a c t i v e  computer program f o r  t h i s  reason. Also, t h e  c h e c k l i s t  o f  
performance shaping f a c t o r s  (see Table 22) and t h e  c h e c k l i s t  f o r  e v a l u a t i n g  
task  e r r o r - l i k e l i n e s s  (see Table 24) can be i n p u t  t o  a  computer memory and 
r e c a l l e d  when t h e  a n a l y s t  des i res .  There i s  no b e t t e r  way o f  ga the r ing  human 
r e l i a b i  1  i t y  i n f o r m a t i o n  than t o  perform t h e  tasks  under a n a l y s i s  persona l ly .  
Thus, procedures such as l i n k  a n a l y s i s  and t h e  task  o f  ga the r ing  and reco rd ing  
system d e s c r i p t i o n  i n f o r m a t i o n  may best  be performed e x t e r n a l l y  t o  t h e  
computer. Furthermore, t h e  computer has t h e  capabi 1  i t y  t o  d i sp lay  o n l y  about 
one page of i n fo rmat ion  a t  a  t ime. It i s  des i rab le  i n  t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  steps o f  
t h e  ana lys i s  t o  be ab le  t o  q u i c k l y  review several  pages o f  i n fo rmat ion  w i thou t  
l o s i n g  t h e  t ra in -o f - though t .  This i s  f a c i l i t a t e d  by having t h e  in fo rmat ion  on 
separate pages t h a t  can be seen s imul taneously by t h e  analyst .  Thus, a t  l e a s t  
i n i t i a l l y ,  i t  i s  recomnended t h a t  o n l y  p o r t i o n s  of t h e  HRA procedure descr ibed 
i n  t h i s  sec t ion  be adapted t o  t h e  computer. 
A conceptual u s e r - i n t e r a c t i v e  HRA computer program was developed as p a r t  
o f  t h i s  study. As discussed above, a  good deal o f  work i s  requ i red  before  t h e  
ana lys t  can s i t  down and i n i t i a t e  t h e  computerized ana lys is .  L ink  ana lys i s  i s  
be l i eved  t o  be n o t  r e a d i l y  adaptable t o  t h e  computer, due t o  t h e  drawing 
requ i  red, a1 though graphics capabi 1  i t i e s  o f  c u r r e n t  computer systems are  
improving. The ana lys t  may wish t o  record  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e s u l t s  from t h e  
l i n k  a n a l y s i s  i n  t h e  computer memory t o  be r e c a l l e d  l a t e r  i n  t h e  ana lys is .  For 
example, 1  i n k  ana lys i s  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  use fu l  f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  sequent ia l  e r r o r s  
( o m i t t i n g  o r  per forming steps i n  a  task  i n  t h e  wrong sequence). I f  t h e  ana lys t  
i d e n t i f i e s  a  l i k e l y  s i t u a t i o n  where a  sequent ia l  e r r o r  cou ld  occur, t h i s  
s i t u a t i o n  can be descr ibed and i n p u t  t o  t h e  computer memory w i t h  appropr ia te  
references t o  t h e  l i n k  a n a l y s i s  f l o w  diagram where t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  described. 
When t h e  ana lys t  i s  per forming t h e  task  ana lys is ,  t h e  sequent ia l  e r r o r s  i n  t h e  
computer memory a re  avai  l a b l e  as t h e  ana lys t  desi res. 
The conceptual HRA computer program i s  a  two-stage approach. A f l ow  
c h a r t  f o r  t h i s  conceptual program i s  shown i n  Figure 15. Stage 1 i s  
e s s e n t i a l l y  a  u s e r - i n t e r a c t i v e  a i d  t h a t  f a c i l i t a t e s  performance o f  t h e  task 
ana lys i s  (see Steps 4 and 5 o f  t h e  HRA procedure). The computer program i s  
env is ioned t o  con ta in  a  l a r g e  se t  o f  quest ions corresponding t o  t h e  columns o f  
t h e  task  ana lys i s  format shown i n  Table 23. The computer w i l l  d i s p l a y  these 
quest ions i n  t h e  same l o g i c a l  format shown i n  t h e  tab le .  The ana lys t  w i l l  then 
t ype  t h e  answers t o  t h e  s t a t e d  quest ions i n t o  t h e  computer processor. The 
computer then s to res  t h e  in fo rmat ion  i n  appropr ia te  l o c a t i o n s  i n  i t s  memory. 
. I n  essence, t h e  computer program serves as a  guide t o  t h e  ana lys i s  procedure 
and as a  permanent record  o f  t h e  task  ana lys i s  r e s u l t s .  The computer can be 
programmed t o  p r i n t  ou t  t h e  r e s u l t s  i n  a  format t h a t  might  be usefu l  t o  mine 
s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l s  as a  c h e c k l i s t  o f  p o t e n t i a l  causes o f  human e r ro rs .  This 
c h e c k l i s t  i s  envis ioned t o  con ta in  t h e  e r r o r - l i k e l y  s i t u a t i o n s  a t  t h e  mine and 
t h e  p o t e n t i a l  performance shaping f a c t o r s  and human c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t h a t  cou ld  
produce ELSs. This c h e c k l i s t  i s  use fu l  f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  changes t o  t h e  min ing 
system t h a t  can reduce t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  and consequences o f  human e r ro rs .  It can 
a l s o  be used t o  convey r e s u l t s  of t h e  ana lys i s  t o  mine management. 
A f u r t h e r  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  conceptual HRA computer program i s  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  i n p u t t i n g  several  c h e c k l i s t s  t o  t h e  computer memory. These 
check1 i s t s  f a c i l i t a t e  performance o f  t h e  HRA by reducing t h e  l a r g e  c h e c k l i s t s  
and statements on t h e  c h e c k l i s t s  t o  a  computer-useable form. I n  o the r  words, 
t h e  statements on t h e  c h e c k l i s t s  w i l l  be indexed t o  a l l o w  t h e  ana lys t  t o  simply 
i n p u t  an index number t o  t h e  computer memory r a t h e r  than t h e  e n t i r e  s t a t e -  
ment. The computer program w i l l  be ab le  t o  remember which statement goes w i t h  
each index and when d i s p l a y i n g  o r  p r i n t i n g  r e s u l t s  would search f o r  t h e  
appropr ia te  index and ou tpu t  t h e  statement associated w i t h  t h a t  index. This 

scheme c o u l d  be a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  c h e c k l i s t  o f  performance shaping fac to rs  (used 
i n  Steps 2, 4, and 5), and t h e  c h e c k l i s t  f o r  e v a l u a t i n g  task  e r r o r - l i k e l i n e s s  
(used i n  Step 5). The l a t t e r  c h e c k l i s t  c o u l d  be programmed d i r e c t l y  i n t o  t h e  
computer sof tware and used as a  guide f o r  per forming t h e  a n a l y t i c a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  
task  ana lys is .  The u s e r - i n t e r a c t i v e  computer so f tware  can be programmed t o  
d i s p l a y  these statements t o  prompt a  response f rom t h e  ana lys t .  The ana lys t  
i n p u t s  t h e  approp r ia te  index f o r  t h e  PSFs assoc ia ted w i t h  t h e  task  t h a t  cou ld  
p o t e n t i a l l y  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  an e r r o r - l i k e l y  s i t u a t i o n ,  and t h e  computer s to res  
t h i s  i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  memory. The ana lys t  can a l s o  add remarks o r  o t h e r  f i nd ings  
as n a r r a t i v e  statements where appropr ia te ,  such as when an adverse personal 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  a  s p e c i f i c  worker i s  i d e n t i f i e d .  Th is  completes t h e  
d i scuss ion  o f  Stage 1 of t h e  conceptual computer program. 
Stage 2  o f  t h e  conceptual HRA computer program i s  env is ioned t o  con ta in  
key-word search and word process ing capabi 1  i t i e s .  Since mines a r e  cons tan t l y  
changing and expanding, t h e  i n i t i a l  HRA performed on a  mine i s  l i k e l y  t o  become 
outdated i n  a  s h o r t  p e r i o d  o f  t ime. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  m in ing  equipment i s  r e v i s e d  
p e r i o d i c a l l y  by manufacturers t o  i nco rpo ra te  s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t  features t h a t  a re  
n o t  p resent  on o l d e r  models. Therefore, t h e  conceptual HRA computer program i s  
env is ioned t o  i n c l u d e  c a p a b i l i t i e s  t h a t  can update, rev i se ,  and modi fy t h e  
i n i t i a l  a n a l y s i s  when and where i t  i s  appropr ia te .  To i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s ,  assume 
t h a t  an i n i t i a l  HRA determined t h a t  use o f  f lame s a f e t y  lamps t o  detec t  methane 
l e v e l s  c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  many e r r o r - l  i k e l y  s i t u a t i o n s .  The s a f e t y  o f f i c i a l  and 
mine management eva luated t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  and decided t o  purchase s ta te -o f - the -  
a r t  methane de tec to rs  t o  reduce t h e  1  i k e l i h o o d  o f  human e r r o r  i n  t h i s  
s i t u a t i o n .  To update t h e  computerized HRA, t h e  ana lys t  s imply  l oca tes  tasks  
and task  steps i n  which methane de tec to rs  a r e  used by u t i l i z i n g  t h e  key-word 
search c a p a b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  computer. He then  uses t h e  word process ing 
c a p a b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  computer t o  d e l e t e  t h e  o l d  i n f o r m a t i o n  and t y p e  i n  t h e  
updated in fo rma t ion .  The reader should recognize t h a t  t h i s  process i s  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  more e f f i c i e n t  than i f  t h e  a n a l y s t  were t o  search t h e  l a r g e  
amount o f  paperwork t h a t  can r e s u l t  f rom a  paper-type HRA study. 
Est imated Costs o f  Implementation 
Two cos t  es t imates  a r e  developed and presented i n  t h i s  sec t i on ;  1 )  cos ts  
f o r  implementing a  paper-type HRA s tudy and 2)  cos ts  f o r  a  computerized HRA 
study. The cos ts  f o r  implementing an HRA paper-study are  dominated by t h e  
cos ts  o f  labor.  It i s  es t imated t h a t  a  d e t a i l e d  q u a l i t a t i v e  HRA o f  a  min ing 
system would r e q u i r e  about 2.0 man-years o f  s a f e t y  s t a f f  labor .  Assuming t h e  
s a f e t y  s t a f f  i s  p a i d  $15.00/hra, and i n c l u d i n g  overheads, bene f i t s ,  taxes, and 
u n c e r t a i n t y  ( u n i t  cos t  es t imates  a r e  developed i n  t h e  f i n a l  r e p o r t  f o r  t h i s  
s tudy and t h e  bases and assumptions w i l l  n o t  be repeated here) ,  t o t a l  l abo r  
cos ts  a r e  es t imated t o  be i n  t h e  range o f  $90,000 t o  $120,000. The annual 
cos ts  f o r  upda t ing  and r e v i s i n g  t h e  a n a l y s i s  i s  es t imated t o  r e q u i r e  about 3 t o  
4  man-months/yr. The t o t a l  annual cos ts  f o r  t h i s  a c t i v i t y  a r e  es t imated t o  be 
about $10-,000 t o  $15,00O/yr. 
The es t imated cos ts  f o r  implementing a  computerized HRA s a f e t y  program 
inc ludes  c a p i t a l  and i n s t a l l a t i o n  cos ts  f o r  t h e  computer hardware i n  a d d i t i o n  
t o  t h e  s t a f f  l abo r  costs.  Cap i ta l  and i n s t a l l a t i o n  cos ts  f o r  an adquate 
computer system a r e  es t imated t o  be about $5,000, i n c l u d i n g  d e l i v e r y  and 
suppl i es (see f i n a l  r e p o r t  f o r  a  survey of a v a i l a b l e  microcomputer systems). 
Annual maintenance cos ts  a r e  assumed t o  be 10% per  year  o f  t h e  i n i t i a l  purchase 
p r i ce .  A lso  i nc luded  i n  t h e  cos ts  f o r  implement ing t h i s  computer program a r e  
t h e  c o s t s  f o r  t h e  s a f e t y  s t a f f  t o  a t t e n d  week-long s h o r t  courses on computer 
t r a i n i n g  and s a f e t y  a n a l y s i s  t r a i n i n g .  These cos ts  were developed i n  t h e  f i n a l  
r e p o r t  prepared f o r  t h i s  s tudy and w i l l  n o t  be repeated here. The t o t a l  f i x e d  
and o p e r a t i n g  cos ts  a r e  summarized below: 
FIXED COSTS 
Computer system purchase 
and i n s t a l l a t i o n  . . . . . $ 5,000 
Short  course attendance 
and expenses . . . . .  . , $ 9,000-12,000 
A n a l y s t ' s  f u l l y  burdened l a b o r  cos ts  
I n i t i a t e  program . . . . . $ 10,000-15,000 
Perform a n a l y s i s  , . . . $90,000-120,OO 
TOTAL • • • • • . $114,000-152,000 
OPERATING COSTS ( a f t e r  f i r s t  y e a r )  
Computer system maintenance 
and supp l i es  . . . . . . $ 500/yr 
A n a l y s t ' s  f u l l y  burdened l a b o r  cos ts  , . $10,000-15,00O/yr 
TOTAL . . . . $10,500-15,500/yr 
The reader should recognize t h a t  t h e  above es t imated costs  do n o t  con ta in  
t h e  cos ts  f o r  development o f  t h e  computer software, It i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
es t ima te  these cos ts  accura te ly .  Fu r the r ,  i t  i s  n o t  known whether these costs  
w i  11 be borne by t h e  government o r  t h e  m i n i n g  i ndus t r y .  Therefore, software 
development cos ts  a r e  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  es t imated cos ts  f o r  implementing t h e  
HRA s a f e t y  program shown above. It should a l s o  be noted t h a t  s ince  s a f e t y  
s t a f f  l a b o r  charges a r e  i nc luded  i n  t h e  above es t imates  and s ince  t h e  HRA 
sa fe ty  program would rep lace some o f  t h e  s a f e t y  s t a f f ' s  c u r r e n t  du t i es ,  t h e  
a c t u a l  a d d i t i o n a l  cos ts  f o r  implementing t h e  HRA program a r e  lower. 
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